




# FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN



**reflections of an ambassador**

**SAJJAD  
HYDER**





## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

*Ambassador Sajjad Hyder was born in 1920 in District Gujrat and was educated at the Punjab University. He was commissioned in the 8th Punjab Regiment from the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, early in 1942, and saw active service in South East Asia with the 14th Army. Earlier, he had been hand-picked to learn the Japanese language at Simla and commanded an international unit of Japanese speakers and translators attached to the 7th Indian Division in Burma and Thailand.*

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Sajjad Hyder

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# Preface

1. These essays reflect my preoccupation with, and involvement in, the foreign policy of Pakistan since our rise to statehood. As independent states in an interlocking system, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan have failed to evolve the institutional and procedural framework which would have allowed them to solve their problems in a mutually compatible manner. Pakistan's efforts and shortcomings in trying to reach this objective have been my main concern.

2. My thirty three years of professional diplomacy in the Pakistan foreign service have revolved around the two major constant challenges that confront us in the field of diplomacy and national security. The first is how to safeguard our territorial integrity and political independence from being weakened by the remorseless pull of centrifugal forces deliberately generated by India.

The second is towards securing Afghanistan's abandonment of its irridentist claims by its recognition of the validity of the present Pak-Afghan border. Any analysis of our past successes or failures must begin by using our flawed record on these two issues as a measures, as indeed must any prescription for future policy.

3. In a democratic country the conduct of foreign policy is left to the government of the day and its foreign policy establishment in the trust that they will maintain and further national interests which remain permanent and pre-eminent



at all times. A country's foreign policy has two aspects, its formulation and the mode of its execution.

4. Foreign policy in a democratic country is formulated by the cabinet with the approval of a sovereign body composed of the elected representatives of the people, and carried out by seasoned diplomats who can from their vantage points, offer their own observations and proposals. Formulated and put into practice in this manner, the foreign policy of a democratic country is based on a national consensus.

5. The key element of this process is lacking when formulation is in the exclusive hands of a ruling few, who, by the very nature of the dispensation by which they rule, are not dependent on having to base their decisions on a national consensus. Such a ruling class becomes the sole guardian and arbitrator of the national interest. At the same time, unfortunately for such countries, for these elites their own interests and self survival becomes identical to the interests of the state. There is no covenant or contract between the rulers and the ruled whose active consent the rulers are either unable or disinterested to obtain.

6. How should Pakistan, therefore, proceed in the difficult and dangerous circumstances we now find ourselves in? To begin with, as I have elaborated in these essays, we must adopt a firm and abiding commitment to democracy and democratic institutions which alone can help us to forge a national consensus which is the *sine qua non* of a successful foreign policy. Secondly, we must recognize that priority in resource allocation must be given to education. Without that we will have no hope of overcoming the daunting developmental challenges that we face. Perhaps it is not the case, but it would almost appear that education has been traditionally given such low priority to further facilitate arbitrary administration and to ensure a captive population incapable of enlightened and independent thought and action. Only the advancement of equitable and just socio-economic conditions will give our people the strongest stake in the



country's future and a readiness to sacrifice in response to challenges that will surely arise.

7. "Without the vision of the leaders, the people perish". The spirit behind my essays has been to make our people ponder on our plight and how we can redress it. If they provoke a critical discussion on the fundamental issues of our foreign policy and national security, I would deem the effort worthwhile.

Islamabad  
October, 1986.

Sajjad Hyder



## ASSIGNMENT DELHI-1947

Compared to the pomp and show New Delhi was to witness the following day, the first Independence Day celebrations on August 14, 1947, were a tame affair. Amidst a small gathering of Pakistanis, mostly Karachi-bound officials, Pakistan's first High Commissioner in New Delhi, Zahid Hussain, raised the old Muslim League flag in a brief but dignified ceremony. His diplomatic staff consisted of Akhtar Hussain, an I.C.S. officer of the U.P. cadre, who had been appointed First Secretary and Mohammad Ashraf, Stenographer. Gul-E-Rana, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's residence, was to serve both as the official residence of the High Commissioner and the Chancery. The High Commission was equipped with one type-writer and a hired Buick car, which was soon to be impounded by a zealous Indian police inspector, with the result that when hell was let loose in Delhi on September 6, Pakistan's first diplomatic mission in India was without a motor vehicle.

Also present at the High Commission on the occasion were three optees from the Indian Foreign Service, who were being trained along with others at Metcalf House in Old Delhi. Forming the nucleus of the Indian Foreign Service, there were 13 probationers who had been set apart from the 150 odd officers of the Indian Armed Forces selected for the war reserved vacancies in the Indian Civil and Political Services. They had undergone rigorous tests, first at a Selection Board in Dehra Dun and then at the Federal Public



Service Commission in Simla. However, before receiving their appointments, they were further interviewed by a formidable Board at the Ministry of External Affairs, and finally by Pandit Nehru himself. As India's first Minister of External Affairs, Pandit Ji quizzed each one of the 5 Muslim candidates about Pakistan in chaste Urdu. Only 4 could meet his personal approval.

Before leaving for Karachi, Ikramullah, our first great Foreign Secretary, asked M.J. Desai, Director of Metcalf House, to depute one of the three optees to the Pakistan High Commission to serve as Third Secretary. For some reason, Desai's choice fell on me, and I took up my first diplomatic assignment at the High Commission for Pakistan on September 1, 1947. Sultan Khan and Iftikhar Ali joined me a few days later. The Chancery was far from organised as yet. It consisted of only two rooms, one of which Liaquat Ali Khan's panelled library, served as the High Commissioner's office with a small adjoining room as the First Secretary's office. I was allotted a corner in this office. Our one and only stenographer sat in a small room in another wing of the house. Our lines of communication with Karachi were limited to the commercial telegraph and telephone, both of which were about to be sorely tested, and found to be totally inadequate.

On September 4, Dilip, a friend and classmate of my brother called on us at Pataudi House, where I was staying with my wife and young son. He insisted that Afza and Tariq should leave for Pakistan at once. Afza tried to argue with him, saying that, as officially assigned members of our first diplomatic Mission to India, we would surely be entitled to protection by the host Government. However, Dilip would not listen. Before he left, Afza handed over to him her jewel box. Not only was this box returned to me intact on my departure from New Delhi but in the meanwhile Dilip would slip into the High Commission, whenever he could, to enquire after me and to bring some food. It is my lasting



regret that out of concern for his safety, I could not see Dilip during my two subsequent assignments to New Delhi. It was thanks to people in Pakistan and India like Dilip that, in those dark days of madness, faith in human decency was kept alive. Afza and Tariq were evacuated to Lahore on the morning of September 6 after a couple of harrowing night-long vigils at the Transit office behind South Block.

### HELL LET LOOSE

On my return to Pataudi House I found Syed Ali Jawad, Secretary to the Princes' chamber and his family occupying our rooms. They had to leave their beautiful apartment in Sujan Singh Park in the middle of the night because the hell, which we in the Mission had feared, had broken out. The High Commission was full of people from all over Old and New Delhi, even outlying villages, reporting of mid-night attacks, killings and arson. Telephone calls for help kept coming throughout the day. By the evening, refugees started pouring in. We did not know what to do with them. Except for occasional forays none of us could leave the Mission for the next 4 weeks. In fact, till some semblance of calm had returned to Delhi, thanks to intervention at the highest level — that is, by Pandit Nehru himself, who was seen rushing off to riot-affected areas and beating off the looters and killers with his own hands. However, it was Mahtama Gandhi's fast unto death which finally did the trick. He was to pay for it with his life the following January.

But, before a Muslim could stir out in safety anywhere in Delhi, some 10,000 Muslims had sought refuge in our High Commission, which was ill-equipped to look after them. In the resulting state of chaos, the High Commissioner, a noble soul in a frail body, was taken ill. The whole thing was too much for him. It was with great difficulty that we could persuade him to go and make representations to the Government of India on behalf of the fleeing Muslims of Delhi, and



of our beleaguered Mission. The state of our security was such that incoming refugees were being hacked to death in front of our gates, and we feared that the Mission would be attacked at any time.

The High Commissioner did go and represent but he got no change from whomever he saw. Frustrated, he soon left for Karachi, never to return. No longer able to assess the dimensions of the problem we faced in Delhi, the Foreign Office in Karachi sent for our First Secretary for consultations, and promptly grounded him there. The Mission was now left in the charge of 3 inexperienced young officers. On taking stock of the situation, we quickly decided that our main problem was four-fold: the immediate appointment of a new High Commissioner and his deputy, the security of the Mission and those seeking refuge in it, the means of feeding the refugees, whose number was increasing by the hour, and the provision of adequate facilities for accommodating the seething mass of humanity on our hands. The last being hopelessly insoluble, we addressed ourselves to the other three.

A telephone conversation with Karachi brought the good news that Mian Abdul Aziz, a senior civil servant from the Punjab and a noted writer of Urdu prose, had been appointed our Acting High Commissioner. Mian Abdul Aziz had sought refuge with us and we had suggested his name to our Foreign Office as a suitable candidate. A few days later, Mansell, a British Officer of the Indian Political Service, was appointed as First Secretary. However, he took a number of days to come from the Residency in Hyderabad.

While Mian Abdul Aziz's appointment was being conveyed to the Government of India, we got busy with the security of our premises and of the inmates. Iftikhar Ali quickly organised a posse of volunteers to safeguard the house round the clock. To arm them, all incoming refugees were deprived of their firearms and ammunition. They were also made to deposit all their food which we then distributed



as best as we could manage. Soon afterwards a Muslim platoon of the 6th Rajputana Rifles came to the High Commission under the command of then Major Haq Nawaz. The safety of our premises and inmates was assured from then on and all incidents outside our gates ceased.

Accommodation and food being our next problem, we separated the men from the women and children, who were confined to the first floor of the house. Begum Shoaib, her two daughters and Mrs. Zaheeruddin were put in charge of the ladies' section. Naturally a number of small children in this part of the house could not bear the pangs of hunger as the men down below could. Before the refugees could be moved to the Purana Qila (Old Fort) no fewer than 20 babies were born upstairs! How to feed these hungry, crying children was one of our most harrowing problems. Luckily, Col. Bannet, the American Military Attache, came in on the second or third day of our ordeal to leave one of his Muslim domestic servants with us. We told him of the children's plight. He came back within an hour with 40 crates of dried milk. The children upstairs could be fed again!

What about the hungry adults down stairs? The authorities in Pakistan, knowing of our plight, came up with a novel solution. A British Airways fleet had been commissioned by the Government of Pakistan to evacuate refugees from Delhi. It was decided that daily cooked food supplies would be flown in by these planes from Karachi. The first lot of cooked food arrived as we began to move the refugees out. We divided the food into two parts.

The first was taken to the Purana Qila where it was snatched away before we could even begin to off load the food or distribute it in an orderly fashion. The other, smaller, portion of the food went to the High Commission where we distributed it as frugally as possible. Much of the credit for this food lift went to Begum Raana Liaquat Ali Khan and a band of selfless women working under her guidance and



inspiration.

The refugee evacuation was quite an exercise in itself. Lists of those intending to leave had to be prepared each day and then the evacuees had to be taken to Palam Airport early in the morning in a fleet of buses provided by the Indian authorities. Government officials and their dependants had precedence over others as the offices in Karachi were still half empty. Our first priority was, of course, to save as many persons as possible and to send them to security across the border.

Many of those sent by train from New Delhi never made it to Pakistan. It was the same story in the reverse direction. Appeals for help kept coming from all parts of old and new Delhi. The only way we could help in rescuing those stranded in distant areas was to don our old Indian Army uniforms, complete with side arms, and to press Akhtar Hussain's abandoned military vehicle into service to go out on rescue forays. Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi was amongst those we rescued from Old Delhi. The rescue of Dr. Rahim's elder brother, also a doctor, who had returned to New Delhi in a fit of sectarian zeal, was a touch and go affair.

Our Acting High Commissioner, Mian Abdul Aziz was with us for a few days only. He was summarily recalled on the orders of the Quaid-e-Azam himself. During a meeting with some Indian officials, despite the appalling conditions in which our refugees precariously existed, he had allowed himself to be persuaded into giving a statement to the press praising the generosity and kindness of the Indian Government in setting up the Purana Qila refugee camp.

It was my first introduction to the time honoured dictum of Talleyrand that above all diplomats should eschew being overzealous. Moreover this object lesson, whose validity has been reaffirmed time and time again in my experience, was that statesmen have a far more finely honed perception than officials of matters of public weal. It took the Quaid not more than a few minutes to realise with what abhorrence this unwise and untimely action of his Acting High Com-



missioner in New Delhi would be received in Kot Lakhpat and other refugee camps all over Pakistan.



## “THE VISIT THAT NEVER WAS”

A LOT has been said and written about Liaquat Ali Khan having gone to the United States in May 1950, in preference to the Soviet Union, from which he had received an invitation almost a year earlier. It is even said that he secured the invitation from Moscow only to prod the United States into extending the same courtesy to him that they had shown to Pandit Nehru, who was to visit the United States, at President Truman's invitation, in October, 1949. It is time to set the record straight.

It will be recalled that by the time both Pakistan and India became independent, the cold war in Europe was well under way, and that both the Super-Powers were looking for friends and allies who would be willing to stand up and be counted. The American choice fell upon India as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were household names in America, thanks to President Roosevelt's efforts during the war to secure an interim dominion status for India, and to years of hard work in America by Dr. Syed Ahmed and J.J. Singh, advocates of the Indian Congress Party.

The All India Muslim League was not unaware of these facts, and well before partition the Quaid-e-Azam had sent abroad a number of personal envoys to enlist support for the cause of the Indian Muslims. As Commerce Minister in the interim Government, I.I. Chundrigar sent out a number of Trade Delegations, all of them composed of only Muslim Leaguers, for the same purpose. Chundrigar followed the



same policy in appointing India's Trade Commissioners abroad.

The first Ambassador to go to America immediately after Partition was Mirza Abul Hassan Ispahani, who happened to be one of the Quaid's trusted young lieutenants. His was an uphill task as a sizeable section of influential opinion in America held that the partition of India was a sad mistake. As I served under him, on my transfer from New Delhi at the end of 1947, I can bear witness to Ambassador Ispahani's ceaseless efforts to make Pakistan and what it stood for known throughout America. That we ran the show from two rooms in the Shorham Hotel in Washington D.C. on a shoestring budget, did not seem to bother him at all. His energy, stemming from his love for Pakistan and the Quaid, knew no bounds. A tall, handsome and urbane man from one of Calcutta's most wealthy families, he impressed all he met. He drew no salary for himself.

④ The next important man to go out, in the context of this story, was Raja Ghazanfar Ali. A seasoned politician and member of the Central Cabinet, he did equally great work for Pakistan in Teheran. Raja Sahib had that rare touch of a politician in handling diplomatic affairs that was a matter of envy for his less gifted colleagues. A heavy weight, Raja Sahib gave back as good as he took from the Foreign Office and other Ministries of the Federal Government. It was he who laid the foundation of our close relationship with Iran.

Establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was something of a problem for both Pakistan and India. Being Dominions, the British Ambassador in Moscow looked after their interests till such times as their Ambassadors could arrive, equipped with letters of credence signed by King George VI, no less. India was able to solve this problem before Pakistan. As Minister for External Affairs in the Interim Government, Pandit Nehru sent his own sister, the dynamic Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, as India's first Ambassador to the



Soviet Union. She presented her credentials to the Soviet President on August 13, 1947.

This act was an earnest of what Pandit Nehru had said in a radio broadcast on the assumption of office as Minister of External Affairs in the Interim Government while referring to the USSR, "Inevitably we shall have to undertake many common tasks and have much to do with each other".

We for our part took the initiative to reach an agreement to exchange diplomatic Missions with Moscow. Acting on instructions, Chaudhry Zafarullah Khan broached this issue with the Soviet delegation at Lake Success in New York in early April of 1948. He then addressed a diplomatic note to Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko on April 27, 1948 proposing that the two countries exchange Ambassadors. The Soviet Government agreed to this proposal by a return note on May 1, 1948 and both sides agreed to the publication of a joint communique in Moscow and Karachi on May 2, 1948 to announce this agreement.

Notwithstanding these moves by New Delhi and Karachi, Stalinist Moscow viewed both Pakistan and India with suspicion. Despite Pandit Nehru's declared intent of having close relations with the USSR, Moscow described him and other Indian leaders as "lackeys of British Imperialism". It is not generally known that Stalin never received Mrs. Pandit, who left Moscow for Washington in 1949.

While on his way back from a Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London early in May 1949, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan made brief stops in Cairo, Baghdad and Teheran. At Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan's instance the Soviet Charge d'affaires was included among the guests the Prime Minister and Begum Raana Liaquat Ali Khan entertained at a dinner in Teheran. It was at this dinner that Liaquat Ali Khan was sounded about a visit to the Soviet Union. He indicated that he would not be averse to coming



if he were formally asked. Raja Sahib had brought about this exchange after a good deal of forethought and preparatory work, without the benefit of any instructions from Karachi. He was to repeat this performance during the Mussadaq episode.

Early in June 1949, a formal invitation arrived from Moscow through our Embassy in Teheran. It was accepted with alacrity and public announcement made on June 8, 1949. The news attracted instant notice throughout the world. It came as a rude surprise in India, where only a month earlier — that is, May 7, 1949, Pandit Nehru had announced that he had accepted an invitation to visit America in October of that year. The months of June and July were taken up in urgent consultations between Moscow and Karachi about the dates of the visit. Moscow proposed the middle of August 1949 as a suitable date for the Prime Minister's arrival in the Soviet Union. Liaquat Ali Khan offered to come within 2 or 3 days of Pakistan's Independence Day celebrations which take place on August 14.

He also accepted a Soviet offer to travel by a Russian plane and conveyed his keen desire to study economic planning, industrial and agricultural developments as well as projects for educational and cultural uplift. He further wished to visit some of the Central Asian Republics. Brisk preparations were set afoot straight away, and a list of the Prime Minister's entourage of some 20 persons was drawn up. It included not only officials representing various Ministries of the Central Government, but also scientists and other academics who, it was hoped, would establish bilateral contacts in their respective fields. The Prime Minister and Begum Liaquat Ali Khan's personal staff was to include a young, dashing Lt. Col. Yaqub Khan, who spoke Russian besides other European languages. Little could he have known at the time that one day he would be chosen to be Foreign Minister of Pakistan.



While exchanges about dates were going on the then Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad arrived in Washington on an official tour at the end of August 1949. Inevitably, the question of Liaquat Ali Khan's projected visit to the Soviet Union came up in his discussions with American officials. The Americans offered to invite the Prime Minister to the United States as well. Ghulam Mohammad encouraged the idea and in conveying the gist of his conversations to Karachi went as far as to suggest the invitation from Washington should be given precedence over the earlier invitation from Moscow. Ambassador Ispahani and all of us in the Embassy felt, rather strongly, that this was the wrong approach and that the Prime Minister should go to Moscow first.

Ever since the opening of our Mission in Washington, we had been conscious of the fact that Pakistan was being taken for granted. The State Department appeared to believe that as good, God fearing Muslims we would have nothing ever to do with the Eastern bloc, that our fidelity to the Western cause was unquestionable, and that we would not flinch from any sacrifice in upholding Western values of 'democracy and freedom'. Yet the U.S. also felt that it was India which had to be groomed as the leader of Asia and its major bulwark against Communism.

Hence our belief that a visit to Moscow would be a timely reminder to the West that, as averred by both the Quaid and our Prime Minister immediately after partition, Pakistan had no intention of taking sides in the confrontation then going on in Europe between the two Super-Powers over the Berlin air-lift and other manifestations of the cold war in Turkey, Iran and Greece. Nor did we fail to notice the sudden warmth in America's attitude towards Pakistan and its Mission in Washington after the Soviet invitation.

We might, however, have saved our breath, for back in Karachi the Government needed no exhortations from us.



Liaquat Ali Khan sincerely looked forward to his visit to the Soviet Union which, he hoped, would help in laying the foundations of a mutually beneficial cooperation between our two countries despite the differences in our outlook and belief. As the discussion about dates proceeded, we found ourselves handicapped by lack of knowledge about the conditions prevailing in Moscow.

The dates, for instance, proposed by us in August and November 1949 overlooked the fact that by the middle of August the top echelon of the Politbureau would be leaving for the Crimea, and that November 7 is the date for celebrations of the Great October Revolution, when the entire Politbureau with their chief guest, who usually happens to be the leader of a Communist country, stand atop Lenin's Mausoleum to review the Red Army.

August came and went without any firm dates being set for the visit. In September, the Soviets, all of a sudden, proposed as a pre-condition that diplomatic Missions be exchanged prior to the visit. We were hard put to field this one as we then had neither the personnel nor the means to open a new Mission in Moscow. However, so keen was Liaquat Ali Khan about the visit that Pakistan within two weeks of the Soviet suggestion agreed forthwith to exchange Ambassadors and asked the Soviet Government immediately to appoint an Ambassador to Pakistan for whom accommodation would be provided in Karachi.

In the second week of October, 1949 Pakistan requested the agreement of the Soviet Government for its first Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Shoaib Qureshi. A small staff was hurriedly assembled for him by milking such of our Missions as we had on the ground at the time. Despite a corresponding lack of urgency on the Soviet side in appointing and placing in position an Ambassador, after overcoming various logistic difficulties Shoaib Qureshi arrived in Moscow on December 21, 1949.



The immediate appointment of our Ambassador in response to the Soviet request and his arrival in Moscow was an earnest of Liaquat Ali Khan's desire to meet the Soviet leadership and establish a relationship between the two countries that would be to their mutual benefit.

The invitation from Washington had been received and accepted, as announced on December 10, 1949, before our Ambassador's arrival in Moscow. What seems to have weighed with our first Prime Minister was the fact that unlike Afghanistan the Soviet Union had not opposed our admission to the United Nations. Moreover, the USSR had agreed to our membership of the Far Eastern Commission and sent a Trade Delegation to Karachi. For our part, we had at that time in our history made it quite clear that our stance would be one of "friendship to all and malice towards none", and that Pakistan had no intention of joining any power bloc.

Clearly, there was a change of heart on the Soviet side. In October 1949, the channel of communication between Karachi and Moscow was suddenly shifted from Teheran to New Delhi. It was through the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi that a further postponement was conveyed to Karachi, which left little doubt that yet another party had intervened in the matter of Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to Moscow.

It is a pity that Liaquat Ali Khan could not go to Moscow in August or November of 1949 as he had offered to do despite the American invitation. The history of Pakistan-Soviet relations might have taken a different course had he not been stood up. This missed opportunity hurt the interests of both sides, albeit more so those of Pakistan than those of its great neighbour. The chances of a subsequent visit evaporated after Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to the United States when a host of considerations, Soviet indifference, the Kashmir problem and Pakistan's pressing defence requirements being amongst them, left Liaquat Ali Khan no option but to come down on the American side. Thus begun, Pakis-



tan-Soviet differences persisted until 1965, when Ayub Khan chose, as a matter of considered policy, to go to Moscow.

We in the High Commission stood down for another week of anguish and agony. Nothing was more agonizing than the radio speech of our President on December 16. It was completely divorced from the situation in either wing of the country. In our state of confinement we had no way of knowing that it had been recorded before the cease-fire was agreed to.

## EVACUATION

We were finally evacuated on December 20. For reasons best known to them, the Ministry of Information had decided to play down our return home. There was no one of any note to meet us or to ask us how we had spent the last 17 days of our year long incarceration in New Delhi.

Yahya Khan soon disappeared from public view. There was, therefore, no way to enquire of him of the assurances he had spoken of with such conviction on September 5. I did, however, chance upon my old batchmate, General Gul Hassan, in Larkana early in February 1972. I asked him if the reports he had described, with such contempt, as "airy fairy" on September 5 were in the event found to be devoid of all substance, or whether the war had been fought as we had predicted in detail. He had the honesty to admit that though our reports had not been given any consideration whatsoever at the time they had not been incorrect and that the war had, indeed, been fought as we said it would be. As a French diplomat put it succinctly quite some time ago to his political masters "It is my duty to tell you the truth, and it is your privilege to heed it or not".



# PAKISTAN AND THE SUEZ CRISIS

## I

A FACTUAL account of the Suez crisis, which shook Pakistan more than any other event after Partition, may help shed some light on the controversy concerning the role of President Iskander Mirza and the rest of our leadership in 1956.

The Suez canal which connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, constructed by Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps was opened in 1869. The 99 year concession granted to de Lesseps was to last until 1968. Initially, France owned 200,000 and Egypt 175,000 shares of the operating company, called the Universal Suez Canal Company. In 1875, Britain purchased the Egyptian shares. A convention signed in 1888 at Constantinople declared that the canal would "always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag". Under another provision of this convention Egypt, or Turkey as the Suzerain power, would ensure the execution of the terms of the said convention. After World War I, Britain became the "Guarantor" of the canal in place of Turkey.

Under pressure from President Nasser, who had overthrown King Farouq in 1952, Britain agreed in 1954 to evacuate its military base in Suez. Ambassador Tayyab Hussain, who was at the time in charge of our Embassy in Cairo, played a prominent part in the conclusion of this agreement.



## ASWAN DAM

In 1955, President Nasser decided to build a High Dam at Aswan on the Nile in the hope that the project would be financed by the U.S., U.K., and other Western powers. On July 19, 1956 the United States dashed his hopes by announcing that it would have no part in this programme. Stung by this refusal, Nasser, in a dramatic move nationalised the Universal Suez Canal Company on July 26. The Canal revenues, he said, would help Egypt build the Dam by itself. This extra bravado provided Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, the excuse to declare in the House of Commons on August 2 that an international waterway could not be left in the unfettered control of a single power bent upon exploiting it in pursuit of national policy. The battle to reassert Anglo-French control over the Suez Canal was on.

Even before a joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of the U.K., U.S.A. and France calling for a 24 nation conference of the canal users on August 16 could be issued, Anthony Eden called up the reservists and despatched troops and three aircraft carriers to the Mediterranean. Notice was thereby served not only on Nasser of the dire consequences that awaited him, but also on John Foster Dulles who was attending the Three Power conference in London and was opposed to the use of force, that Britain and France would 'go it alone' if necessary. As he was to aver in his memories later, Anthony Eden had set his heart on toppling Nasser in whom he saw a nascent Fascist dictator. In the event it was Sir Anthony Eden who was to find himself toppled for want of popular support at home for his reactionary policies.

Anxious to help bring about a peaceful solution of the crisis which, in our opinion, might cost Egypt its newly won independence, Pakistan accepted the invitation to the London Conference with alacrity. Our newly appointed Foreign Minister, Hamidul Haq Chaudhry, who, on his own admission, would have preferred to head the Ministry of Commerce



or Industry, would lead our delegation, which besides him would consist of our High Commissioner in London, M. Ikramullah, and Joint Secretary S.K. Dehlavi. Ambassador Tayyab Hussain, whom the Egyptian held in high esteem, joined the delegation just before it left.

Since President Nasser's action in nationalizing the canal had evoked popular support throughout Pakistan, Prime Minister Chaudhry Mohammad Ali and his Cabinet approved the Foreign Office recommendations that our delegation should uphold Egypt's claim both to the ownership and control of the canal. The most we could agree to would be supervision of a specialised United Nations agency in which users of the canal from West and East would be equally represented. The need for such a proviso was felt because some 56 per cent of our exports and 49 per cent of our imports passed through the canal at the time. It was also decided that in response to an Egyptian invitation our Foreign Minister should call on President Nasser on his way to London and, while assuring him of our support, despite his hostility to Pakistan because of our membership of the Baghdad Pact, would acquaint him with our concern for freedom of navigation through the canal and the need for restraint in the matter of dues, either of which issue could imperil Egypt's objectives and freedom.

Having tendered this advice, Foreign Minister Hamidul Haq Chaudhry arrived in London on August 15 to find himself fawned upon by the three power sponsors of the conference. Secretary of State Dulles called on him at his hotel and canvassed his support for the American proposal for an International Control Board for managing the canal. Before placing this proposal at the conference table on August 18, Dulles sent its draft to our Foreign Minister with a personal letter. Egypt, he said, lacked the know-how to run the canal by itself. Our Foreign Minister plumped for the proposal straightaway. He asked the Prime Minister to let him omit that part of his written brief which required him to support Egyptian



### Control of the Canal.

Now, for all his ineptitude in handling party and political affairs at home, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali was a very clear-headed man. What is more, he and Ikramullah were two of the best draftsmen I had the privilege of serving under. Both had that remarkable capacity, the distinctive hall-mark of all great civil servants, of going straight to the heart of the matter. Chaudhry Mohammad Ali instructed Hamidul Haq Chaudhry to ask Dulles how any resolution about international control could be enforced in the face of Egyptian resolve never to accept such control. He was sure that, no matter what decision the conference came to management of the canal would ultimately have to be left to Egypt. Hence Pakistan's inability to go along with any proposal for "international control".

Notwithstanding these clear-cut instructions, Hamidul Haq Chaudhry leaned heavily in favour of Dulles' proposal. He asked that he should be allowed to propose the establishment of a committee to negotiate with Egypt how best to set up an organization, in which Egypt would be fully represented, to manage the canal and thereby safeguard the interest of the users. Any other course of action, he said, would isolate him, and, worse, place him in the wrong company. With the apprehension of an Anglo-French attack on Egypt preying on his mind, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali reluctantly agreed to the setting up of a negotiating committee subject to the proviso that it would do no more than discuss with Nasser what operational arrangements could be made to safeguard the interests of all concerned. He expressly instructed Hamidul Haq Chaudhry once again to ask Dulles, if he had not already done so, how international control could be enforced in face of Nasser's opposition.

### DULLES' PROPOSAL

On August 21 Pakistan, together with Iran, Turkey and



Ethopia, moved an amendment to Dulles' proposal which, at best, was of cosmetic nature. A separate joint proposal by the three powers asked for the setting up of a committee to negotiate with Nasser on the basis of Dulles' proposal and not Chaudhry Mohammad Ali's. The amended proposal, as moved by Hamidul Haq Chaudhry, was immediately dubbed the "Five Power Proposal". To have a major Muslim State east of Suez uphold their proposal, when Indonesia and Sri Lanka had refused to do so, must have pleased the Americans no end.

For his part, Nasser lost no time in condemning the proposal as a hostile act. The deed was done, and there was nothing we could do in Karachi to retrieve the situation. Despite repeated instructions to be cautious and not to subscribe to the concept of so-called international control, Hamid-ul-Haq Chaudhry had allowed himself, and his country with him, to be made use of as an accessory to the creation of Australian Premier. Menzie's mission, whose failure, though a foregone conclusion, was one more excuse London and Paris were looking for.

Public opinion in Pakistan was in the meantime, for once, running ahead of the Government. Shaikh Mujib-ur-Rehman called for a 'Suez Day' to be observed throughout East Pakistan. In Lahore, a public meeting attended by some 300,000 persons, the biggest since Partition, protested against "Pakistan's lukewarm support for the Egyptian cause". Protest meetings, ending in riots in places, were held all over Karachi and other provincial towns in both wings of the country. The Dawn correspondent in London proclaimed that the Suez conference was the first occasion in which Pakistan had sided with the West in its conflict with a Muslim country. The Muslim League Parliamentary Party whose leadership Chaudhry Mohammad Ali had unwisely passed into other hands, declared in a resolution that the imposition of international control was a direct interference with the sovereign rights of Egypt and pledged whole-hearted support



to the latter. President Nasser in his outburst pointed to the chair where Hamid-ul-Haq Chaudhry had sat for three hours on his way to London to assure him of Pakistan's wholehearted support before committing what he denounced as the ultimate act of treachery. While Pakistan's name was mud throughout the Middle East, as we in the Foreign Office had feared, Krishna Menon, by pleading for a consultative body instead of a Control Board, had placed Egypt, and the rest of the Middle East with it, firmly in India's debt.

This debacle was one of the reasons, albeit not the only reason, for the downfall of Chaudhry Mohammad Ali's Ministry. In September 1956, there was a change of Government in Pakistan. Huseyn Shahid Suhrawardy took over as Prime Minister and Malik Feroz Khan Noon as Foreign Minister. Having played very little part in the first Suez Conference owing to his absence in Afghanistan on an official visit following the ugly incidents of early 1955 in which Pakistan's flag had been desecrated and the worst imaginable indignity inflicted on our Ambassador in Kabul, President Iskander Mirza may have had the fast approaching second Suez Conference in mind, in hand picking Malik Feroz Khan Noon as another pliable, obliging Foreign Minister with an old connection with Britain. If so, he could not have been more mistaken.



## II

On September 3, 1956, the 'Five-nation Committee', consisting of Australia, Ethiopia, the United States of America, Sweden and Iran and led by Prime Minister Menzies, visited Cairo and put the Dulles proposals, as amended by Pakistan, before President Nasser. The latter rejected them out of hand. An International Control Board, he said, would impinge on Egyptian sovereignty: the canal was an integral part of Egyptian territory, and as such could not be excluded from the politics of Egypt.

Having thus disposed of the two principles underlying the Dulles proposals, namely that the canal be insulated from the politics of any one nation and that an International Body be responsible for its operation, maintenance and development, Nasser invited all the 18 nations which had subscribed to these proposals to enter into negotiations with Egypt to devise ways and means to ensure the freedom of navigation of the canal, its future development and an equitable system of toll charges. This looked to us in Pakistan as a desperate effort to foreclose the possibility of any precipitate action on the part of Britain and France, both of whom were spoiling for a fight. We said we would be ready to come if the majority of users would agree to such a conference.

On September 12, Sir Anthony Eden, under pressure from Dulles, proposed a new Organization of users of the canal. Pakistan, as one of the 18 sponsoring nations of the Dulles proposal, was invited to become a founder member at



a Second Suez Conference to be held in London on September 19. Having burnt our fingers once, our first reaction was to stay away from this conference. We saw the proposed association as a stratagem to provoke incidents in the canal which would provide London and Paris with an excuse to attack Egypt.

## SECOND SUEZ CONFERENCE

However, on being assured that the Association was not a pretext for the use of force, that our attendance at the conference would not in any way bind us to support the proposal and, moreover that should Egypt refuse to cooperate with the association, the three sponsoring powers would take the matter to the Security Council, we agreed to participate. Prime Minister Suhrawardy, who was at the time in Dacca, instructed Malik Firoz Khan Noon to urge the conference to seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute through negotiations with Egypt, and in doing so openly declare Pakistan's inability to associate with the users' association. Such a stance, our Foreign Minister thought, would not only demonstrate our genuine desire for a peaceful settlement but would also silence Egypt and India's strident criticism of Pakistan.

Now, the three persons in the Foreign Office charged with handling the Suez crisis from its beginning were Foreign Secretary M.S.A. Baig, Joint Secretary S.M. Hassan and myself in my capacity as Deputy Secretary incharge of Middle Eastern Affairs. Due to our somewhat negative experience during the First Suez Conference, Baig decided that both he and I would accompany the Foreign Minister to London. There would be no departure from our written brief this time, we resolved. We were both clear in our own minds where the justice of the case lay and what our role at the Second Suez Conference should be irrespective of the pressures awaiting us in London.

Malik Firoz Khan issued a statement to the press on



September 16 before our departure for London. It stated very clearly that our participation in the conference did not bind us to be party to the proposed users' association, and that Pakistan would not be a party to the use of force or to any solution imposed on Egypt against its will. Notwithstanding this statement, there was an uproar in the national press against our participation in the conference.

### DOUBTS REMOVED

After a brief halt in The Hague, where we took counsel with Chaudhry Zafarullah Khan and Begum Raana Liaquat Ali Khan, both of whom concurred with the stance we were to take at the conference, we arrived in London on September 17. Before leaving The Hague, Malik Firoz Khan Noon issued another statement to the press which removed whatever little doubt there might have been about our intent as a result of the statement issued in Karachi the previous day.

Immediately after our arrival in London, our Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary called on Sir Anthony Eden, who told them in the utmost confidence that Britain and France had decided to attack Egypt with or without American help. He also told them not to convey this information to Pakistan by telegram or any other means whatsoever.

It was clear to us that the conference was no more than a last minute effort by Secretary of State Dulles to abort this attack as reimposition of British authority over Egypt was not acceptable to Washington. However, Washington was no friend of President Nasser, either. His acceptance of military aid from the Eastern block militated against Western interests and, therefore, the U.S. would not mind if he were to be brought down a notch or two. Malik Firoz Khan Noon forthwith took two decisions without the benefit of consultations with his Prime Minister: first to stick to his brief in the face of American pressure, and secondly, to inform Nasser of the impending peril. To this end, he sent a personal message to



King Saud, through our Ambassador in Jeddah, asking him to warn Nasser of what awaited him.

When the conference opened at Lancaster House on September 19, the Foreign Minister strongly attacked the proposal for the Canal Users' Association (SCUA) and, in unequivocal terms, declared Pakistan's determination to disassociate itself from any move to impose a settlement on Egypt. Referring to article 9 of the 1888 convention, he demolished the British claim, as successor to the Turkish Suzerainty over the canal, to come and defend it in an emergency. This speech, delivered with some force even before the proposal for the Users Association had been tabled, caused considerable embarrassment to both Salwyn Lloyd, President of the conference, and Dulles. That Malik Firoz Khan Noon had attacked a proposal that had yet to be tabled was a deliberate act. It not only took the wind out of Western sails, it also hit Cairo and the rest of the Arab World as a bombshell. Anwar Saadat, in an article in a Cairo newspaper, hailed the speech as "the return of the Prodigal" Predictably, Secretary of State Dulles was very unhappy with what Malik Firoz Khan Noon had done, and forthwith addressed a letter to him threatening to cut off economic aid to Pakistan unless the Pakistan delegation were to fall in line.

### NOON'S STAND

Notwithstanding this threat, Malik Firoz Khan Noon reiterated his earlier stand at the final plenary session. As we were leaving Lancaster House, both Baig and I flanking our Foreign minister on either side, Mr. Dulles approached us and in no uncertain terms remonstrated with our Foreign Minister about what he described as Pakistan's deviation from its earlier stand at the First Suez Conference. With a disarming smile, Malik Firoz Khan Noon turned round and said that it was his delegation which should be blamed for what had come to pass.



There was also pressure from the British side. It was far more subtle and meaningful than the American arm twisting. We were told, through our High Commissioner, that by siding with them we could ensure British and French support in our disputes with India. Malik Firoz Khan Noon refused to fall for this temptation, for he knew full well that the support being offered would get us no where. On the contrary, for Pakistan to be a party to an attack on a fellow Muslim State carried with it a price tag no Government in Pakistan could afford to pick up and survive.

Meanwhile, on the eve of the conference Prime Minister Suhrawardy had offered to visit Cairo. In his usual haughty manner, Nasser had snubbed him by saying that the Prime Minister of Pakistan would be welcome only when the conditions were right. Malik Firoz Khan Noon, therefore, turned down the Egyptian invitation to visit Cairo on our way back to Karachi. At this distance of time, I am not sure if our Foreign Minister should not have swallowed his pride and gone to Cairo. Had he done so, he would have received a hero's welcome, and thereby foreclosed the possibility of yet another attempt to drag us into this unsavoury drama of confrontation between the western powers and Nasser, who had staked his all on defying them. Finally, he paid dearly for his defiance. When I took leave of Nasser in June 1968, at the end of my tenure as Ambassador in Cairo, to go to New Delhi, he was like a broken reed. As often happens in the case of over independent leaders of poor countries, his powerful adversaries had got him in the end.

## NEW DEVELOPMENTS

For us in Karachi, the Second Suez Conference was a marked contrast to the first. As a seasoned politician, Suhrawardy knew what the public sentiment demanded. Under no circumstances was he prepared to go against that. His instructions were, therefore, quite clear and final. When we



informed him of the general trend of the conference after the opening plenary session, he told us quite sharply that we were not to depart from our written brief. It was at this stage that the sponsoring powers sought President Iskander Mirza's intervention for the first time. Suhrawardy deflected this intervention by instructing our Foreign Minister to say, just before leaving London, that the conference's proposal would be placed before the Government of Pakistan for its consideration. Since it was no more than a stratagem, Dulles saw through it straight away and proceeded to take certain corrective steps. He first wrote to Suhrawardy, from whom he could get little or no change. He next turned to Iskander Mirza again. The result of this second approach was to lead to a memorable development which will be dealt with in the concluding part of this essay.



### III

All the three sponsoring powers were bent upon securing Pakistan's membership of the Canal Users' Association, albeit from different motives. Whereas John Foster Dulles saw an association bearing the consent of all the 18 powers assembled in London as a powerful inhibiting force against reimposition of Anglo-French control of the canal, the British and the French — who, in collusion with Israel, were secretly finalising, in a villa outside Paris, their plans to launch an all-out attack on Egypt — wanted to have at least one major Muslim power on their side. To that end, Pakistan was an ideal choice. It was one of the major users of the canal east of Suez.

India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka had already refused to go along with the Western powers against a fellow Asian State. Many of the Arab States were anti-Nasser, but did not have the gumption to oppose him openly. Turkey and Iran were already in the bag, but neither at that time counted for much in the Muslim World. Pakistan's hand, must, therefore, be set to what the Americans on the one hand, and the British and French on the other, wanted to achieve in their own respective ways.

We in the Foreign Office knew all this and were determined to keep Pakistan out of what was about to happen and its ramifications, one of which turned out to be the overthrow of the Iraqi regime two year hence. However our one great weakness was even then, that more often than not poli-



cies were fashioned and decisions made for us before we could gainsay them. Two of President Iskander Mirza's constant companions in the evenings were the British High Commissioner, Sir Alexander Symon, and U.S. Ambassador Horace Hildereth. Iskander Mirza's son was married to the latter's daughter, an early bond of our "auld alliance" with America.

A few days after our delegation's return from London, Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Baig, Hassan and I were summoned to Government House for an audience. We knew we were on the mat for what we had done in London and that Pakistan's arm was to be twisted a second time. President Iskander Mirza rebuked us all roundly. He said we had ratted out on our friends and allies in London and that the only way we could expiate our sins would be to call Ambassador Hildereth and Sir Morris James — Acting British High Commissioner and later to be my colleague in New Delhi between 1968 and 1971, a fine man — and forthwith convey to them our agreement to the full-fledged members of the Canal Users Association. Since he would not listen to anything we said by way of explanation, there was nothing for us to do but to promise to carry out our President's orders. Public sentiment meant nothing to him, less our fears of what would happen once Egypt came under attack. However, we could not help noticing Prime Minister Suhrawardy's absence from this meeting. This gave us courage to put our heads together and think up something to delay matters. To stay our Foreign Minister's hand was easy: he needed no conversion. Whatever he had done in London he had done out of conviction and for the good of the country.

The meeting ordered by our President could not be postponed indefinitely. The pressure from Ambassador Hildereth and Sir Morris James was relentless. They were called to the Foreign Office on the fateful day of October 28, 1956. Besides Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Baig, Hassan and I were present at the meeting. Ambassador Hildereth asked for Pakis-



tan's immediate adhesion to the association which had already started functioning in London. Such an act on the part of a major Muslim State east of Suez, he said, would have a salutary effect in Cairo. Sir Morris James, in supporting Ambassador Hildereth, asked for our signatures there and then. Malik Firoz Khan, at the intervention of one of us, said that he was ready to accede to their request if they could only assure him that Egypt would not be attacked.

Thereupon Hildereth asked for the Foreign Minister's permission to tell a story which he said though it was not so prim and proper, lent itself admirably to our position on the Suez issue. He then proceeded to liken our attitude to that of an extremely vulgar and offensive metaphor which does not bear repetition in print. We were stunned and could not believe our ears. I feel proud to record that Malik Firoz Khan Noon's reaction was exactly that what could have been expected of a Minister of self-respecting, sovereign state. He went red in the face, rose, placed his hands firmly on the desk and said that he would wait for the assurance he had asked for. The meeting was over. Egypt was attacked that very night.

It was in consequence of this attack that Prime Minister Suhrawardy told Sir Morris James of his intention to leave the Commonwealth. The people of Pakistan could not forgive or forget this wanton aggression against a fellow Muslim state, he said. In the best traditions of British diplomacy, Morris James immediately drafted a telegram to London faithfully setting forth what had come to pass between him and our Prime Minister and sent it to Suhrawardy for his perusal before sending it off to London. It was this very telegram which set in motion the events in Teheran recounted by President Iskander Mirza in his interview. Of course, Suhrawardy knew full well that with Iskander Mirza as our head of State there was no question of our leaving the Commonwealth. It was an astute move all the same to command attention both at home and abroad. The time was



not far, he knew, when he would have to articulate his famous pronouncements of zero plus zero being equal to zero. However, his first concern at that time was to contain the situation at home.

As for what Ambassador Hildereth actually said, both Ambassador Hassan and I have recorded it for history. It was a sad day for Pakistan. There are some who believe to this day that Malik Firoz Khan Noon, by dismissing the Western envoys that day, signed the warrant of his own dismissal and that of his government two years hence. If this view were to be held as correct, one would wonder whether those who came after him had learnt any lesson from what befell him.



## THE FAILURE OF A MISSION

Hardly anything can be added to General Fazal Muqueem Khan and Col. Siddique Salik's accounts of the 1971 Pakistan-India war and of the events leading up to it. However, one dimension of this painful story still remains to be covered — that is, how we in the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi saw the inexorable march to disaster from the vantage point of our post and why we failed utterly to impart any sense of impending doom to our own Government.

In that sense my mission was a double failure: I failed to arrest the march of events both in India and in Pakistan, but not, however, for any lack of trying. There are a number of events still fresh in my mind which I would like to recount. For the present, I propose only to talk of one of them, the failure of my mission to Islamabad on September 5, 1971.

### ENVOYS CONFERENCE

Towards the end of August, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized two conferences of our envoys abroad, one in Teheran and the other in Geneva. Because of restrictions on my movement I could attend only the latter. It was an impressive affair. Our envoys from all over-Europe and the Northern hemisphere came to give detailed accounts of the situation as they saw it from their respective posts, and of their own efforts to acquaint the countries of their jurisdictions with our point of view. Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan and Information Secretary Roedad Khan sat at the head of



the table directing the discussion, which inevitably came to be centered on the all-important question of peace and war in the wake of the recently concluded Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and India. The general consensus appeared to be that, notwithstanding this treaty, peace might still be saved. Our Ambassador in Moscow did not disagree with such an assessment.

Summing up the discussion, Sultan Khan spoke of Islamabad's persistent efforts to defuse the situation in East Pakistan and of the difficulties attendant upon such a course of action. He also spoke of the dichotomy between the White House and the Department of State in that behalf. While the former stood for the preservation of peace, the latter, with considerations of its own, was not averse to adopting a stance which did not always accord with our national interest.

### INDO-SOVIET TREATY

For my part, I made bold to say that the 9 August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, coming as it did at the end of Indian preparations for war, which had started with the 29 March joint resolution of support and sympathy for the people of East Pakistan by both Houses of the Indian Parliament, meant war and nothing else. That this was, at best, a minority view became immediately clear. There were not many takers for a pessimistic view from amongst the participants. In desperation I asked Sultan Khan, my old friend and colleague alongwith Ambassador Iftikhar Ali since 1947 in Delhi, to take me to Islamabad so that I could make a personal submission to the President of Pakistan. He very kindly agreed. We arrived in Islamabad on the 2 or 3 of September. An audience was granted to me on the morning of September 5, the day after the general amnesty for "miscreants" from East Pakistan was announced under American suggestion. Sultan accompanied me to this crucial-meeting.



After I had explained at some length why I thought war was inevitable, and why, in my estimation, the month of November would be a month of peril for us, President Yahya Khan proceeded to dismiss my fears and forebodings as baseless through and through. He said that he had received so many assurances from President Nixon to the effect that there would be no war that he could not even account for all the communications to that effect from the White House. I replied, with respect, that preservation of peace between Pakistan and India depended, beside the Americans, on one other party, namely the Russians. I seriously doubted that the Russians were any longer as determined to preserve the peace as the Americans were. This clear enough reference to our unwise act of summary rejection earlier in the year of President Podgorny's proposal to reach a political settlement with our brethren in East Pakistan seemed to have touched a raw nerve. Yahya Khan turned to Sultan and said that it was time to recall me from the front line for a well-deserved rest. I submitted that I was not tired and did not wish to leave my post at this important juncture.

### GUL HASSAN

When the audience was over, Sultan remonstrated with me for my persistent, pessimistic attitude on the grounds that I was doing myself and my mission no good. I said I felt it my duty to speak the truth. At my request, he had earlier taken me to see General Gul Hassan, Chief of General Staff, who happened to be my contemporary at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, in 1941. The minute he saw me, Gul Hassan, broke into a torrent of complaint about the "airy-fairy" reports coming out of our Mission in New Delhi.

"What is this about Sam Manekshaw threatening to wrap up the whole of Pakistan in 3 weeks?", he asked me in an injured tone. I told Gul Hassan he was free to believe what he liked, but that would not prevent us in New Delhi



from sounding the alarm bells we had been doing since March 29, when I had on the institution of Martial Law in East Pakistan and New Delhi's reaction to it reported that the plan to separate East Pakistan from West Pakistan was now on.

Back in the Ministry, Director General for South Asia, Aftab Ahmad Khan, tried to reassure me with: "High Commissioner, rest assured. This time round it is not going to be like 1965". He was not speaking with his tongue in his cheek. He was only mouthing the air of "bravado". Henry Kissinger has spoken of it in his memoirs. The judgment he was to deliver to a friendly journalist on his return to San Clemente was far more devastating. The air of unreality in Islamabad had to be seen to be believed.

### MUJIB'S GAME

On my return to New Delhi, I had a chance meeting with Sardar Swaran Singh, and Gen. Manekshaw, another Indian Military Academy product, at a diplomatic party. What passed between us prompted me to make one more attempt to bring some sense of realism at home. I begged that of the two games there was still time to play we should choose to play the Mujib game rather than that of Indira Gandhi. I went further and suggested that we seriously consider a unilateral withdrawal of our armed forces from East Pakistan to facilitate a political settlement. I pointed out the analogy of Egypt in 1967. Russia and the USA working in concert had been unable to restrain Israel. Basing themselves on Tel Aviv's assurance that it would give President Johnson a week or two to defuse the situation the Russians persuaded Nasser on June 3 to stay his hand. Israel struck within 48 hours. This despatch did cause some stir at home but that was all. The die had already been cast, and there was no turning back from the precipice of false pride we stood at.

No sooner had I returned to New Delhi than telegraphic orders were received from Islamabad transferring me from



New Delhi to Ankara. I decided to ignore these orders. That was not half as difficult as an earlier order asking me to do something which, in my considered view, would have besmirched Pakistan's name and honour for a long time to come. I said no and withstood all pressure from home.

I made one more journey to Islamabad to secure formal approval of a contingency plan I had drawn up with my Swiss colleague, Dr. Fritz Real. It was agreed between us, with the subsequent approval of our respective governments, that both the Chancery building and our official Residence would pass into Swiss hands the minute hostilities between Pakistan and India broke out. The Swiss Government would look after our interests in India.

On the morning of December 11, Real came to see me at the residence, where our two families and a large number of High Commission staff were confined. He said that a telegram, transmitting General Rao Farman Ali's communication of the previous day sent through U.N. Assistant Secretary General, Paul Henry, had been received by the Secretary General of the U.N. in New York offering a cease-fire on the East Pakistan front provided that the Pakistan Armed Forces were allowed to withdraw to West Pakistan with honour. Notwithstanding that, the Government of India had planned a big push into West Pakistan on the morning of December 13 with the sole objective of destroying the Pakistan Army.

We managed immediately to pass on news of this imminent Indian push on West Pakistan to Islamabad by means of an alternate channel which had been prepared in advance for such an eventuality.

When Dr. Fritz Real called the following morning, it was not to evacuate us to Islamabad but to bring the welcome news that the planned push by Manekshaw had been postponed thanks to Nixon's intervention with Leonid Brezhnev. Firyubin, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, was in New Delhi throughout the war. He halted Manekshaw in his tracks.



We in the High Commission stood down for another week of anguish and agony. Nothing was more agonizing than the radio speech of our President on December 16. It was completely divorced from the situation in either wing of the country. In our state of confinement we had no way of knowing that it had been recorded before the cease-fire was agreed to.

## EVACUATION

We were finally evacuated on December 20. For reasons best known to them, the Ministry of Information had decided to play down our return home. There was no one of any note to meet us or to ask us how we had spent the last 17 days of our year long incarceration in New Delhi.

Yahya Khan soon disappeared from public view. There was, therefore, no way to enquire of him of the assurances he had spoken of with such conviction on September 5. I did, however, chance upon my old batchmate, General Gul Hassan, in Larkana early in February 1972. I asked him if the reports he had described, with such contempt, as "airy fairy" on September 5 were in the event found to be devoid of all substance, or whether the war had been fought as we had predicted in detail. He had the honesty to admit that though our reports had not been given any consideration whatsoever at the time they had not been incorrect and that the war had, indeed, been fought as we said it would be. As a French diplomat put it succinctly quite some time ago to his political masters "It is my duty to tell you the truth, and it is your privilege to heed it or not".



## MIKHAIL KAPITSA A PROFILE

The arrival in Beijing on September 8 of Mikhail Stepanovich Kapitsa, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, has aroused world-wide attention. His ten days stay in the Chinese capital is to further the ongoing Sino-Soviet talks to normalise their relations after political conflict, including armed skirmishes, of two decades and more. This break between Moscow and Beijing after a generation of ideological solidarity and co-operation changed the world power picture and led to a basic change in East-West relations. With Pakistan opening the door, and albeit getting dismembered for its failure of perception, the United States and China ushered in a new phase of their mutual relationship, which was hailed in the West as deliverance from the Soviet threat. Richard Nixon, the architect of this new shift in U.S. policy, went so far as to proclaim last October that China was moving away from doctrinaire communism, and that even though it had not as yet embraced a free political system, nothing had been left to draw the Soviet Union and China together again.

At precisely the same time — that is, October last — the first high level talks in three years between China and the Soviet Union were getting under way against a backdrop of suggestions from Beijing that relations with Moscow were about to undergo a thaw. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Illichev, whom I had seen from Moscow undertake many a visit to Beijing in vain, resumed with his opposite number,



Qian Qichen, the first formal high level contacts between the two countries since China had broken off discussions after Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. The backdrop to their meeting, in turn, were unmistakable hints from Beijing, met by widely publicised calls for normalization of relations by Leonid I. Brezhnev. No wonder there were alarms about the U.S. losing its "China card" in its rivalry with the Soviet Union. How to avoid the possibility of a new hostile alliance between Moscow and Beijing is the current night-mare of Western policy planners.

There are others who think, and rightly so, that the acceptance of a common need for peace by all three powers rather than a quasi alliance of two against the third would bode well for the cause of world peace. It would reduce the danger of nuclear war and even lead towards the much desired resolution of "third countries" problems between the Soviet Union and China, which Moscow initially refused to discuss, such as Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia. Bilaterally, the most important issue is, of course, the massing of Soviet troops and missiles on China's border. Normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union is, therefore, of great interest to us in Pakistan in as much as it would facilitate a peaceful settlement of the Afghanistan problem into which we have got ourselves needlessly mired.

It is against this background that Mikhail Kapitsa's visit to Beijing should be seen by us. He is, of course, no stranger to Pakistan. He lived among us as the Soviet Ambassador from 1958 to 1962, when he made a host of friends throughout Pakistan. Born on November 5, 1921 in the Ukraine, Kapitsa happens to be a career diplomat of some 40 years standing. He served in the USSR Embassy in Beijing from 1943 to 1946 and again from 1950 to 1952. He served in the South Asian Section of the Soviet Foreign Office from 1965 to 1970, thereafter becoming its head for a whole decade.



It was in this capacity that I first met Kapitsa on my arrival in Moscow in June 1975. It did not take me long to discover that he cherished affectionate and fond memories of his sojourn in Pakistan and those he had made friends with. I also found him one of the most outspoken and outgoing Soviet diplomats I had met anywhere in the world. He was most friendly and helpful throughout my stay in Moscow. I could always call on him at the shortest possible notice and draw him out on any aspect of the Sino-Soviet relations. It was he who outlined to me one morning in the Kremlin the exact likely course of the succession struggle that would follow Chairman Mao Zedong's death.

### ASSESSMENTS

He began with his assessment of the strength of various factions in the Central Committee. He then predicted that the new Chinese leader to succeed Chairman Mao would be found from among three personages, namely, Chiang Ching the wife of Chairman Mao, Hua Guo Feng and Chen Hsi-Lien, the Commander of the Beijing military district. Kapitsa continued that since China had a history of Empress Dowagers, Chiang Ching as head of the Radical faction could not be ruled out. However, he assessed Hua Guo Feng, as the most likely successor, particularly as after the Lin Piao affair a military General might not be acceptable to the Party. It may be recalled that at this time Western sinologists were in the main completely unaware of the potential importance of Hua Guo Feng as was evident from the omission of his name from the principal biographic dictionaries on China. Kapitsa's scenario of the Chinese succession, balanced between the Radical and Pragmatists at that point of time, was no less of news in Islamabad than it was to me in Moscow.

Kapitsa's knowledge of China and Chinese affairs is encyclopaedic. His Chinese is as good as his English. What with his beautifully tailored suits, silk shirts and sulka ties,



Kapitsa was something of a wonder in the diplomatic corps in Moscow. Much sought after, he never declined an invitation to the Pakistan House.

A doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of Moscow University and author of different books on international affairs and the Far East, many of which are standard text books for courses at Soviet Universities, Kapitsa was awarded the order of the U.S.S.R. International Affairs Laureate in 1982. He became the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR the same year.

Kapitsa is married to Lyudmila Vitoldovna, a specialist in Western European literature and a journalist. They have a daughter and two sons.



## BREZHNEV AND THE USSR

The Great October Revolution anniversary is celebrated in Moscow every year with great fanfare. In the morning, there is the well-known military march past in Red Square with the entire Politbureau standing atop the Lenin Mausoleum. In the afternoon, there is a grand reception in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, where the Secretary General of the Communist Party receives felicitations from high officials of his Party and Government, from Heads of Foreign Missions in Moscow, and from visiting delegations and dignitaries. November 7, 1978, was the sixtyfirst anniversary of the Great October Revolution. After all the Ambassadors had been presented to the Secretary General and President of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and his Politbureau colleagues, Mr. Brezhnev lifted his glass and proposed a toast. "To the workers!" he said in a loud and ringing voice. Toasting workers is an old Leninist tradition. The point to ponder in this instance, however, is that the man proposing the toast happened to be not only one of the two most powerful Heads of State in the world, but also the son of a metal worker.

President Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was born on December 19, 1906 in the Ukrainian city of Kamenskoya, now Dnepropetrovsk, the son of a metal worker. He went to a local school where, in a class of 40, he happened to be the only working class boy. After a brief stint as a specialist in land reclamation, he became a metallurgical engineer in a



local steel mill. He joined the Komsomol, the youth organisation of the Communist Party, in 1931. When Khrushchev became head of the Ukrainian Party in 1938, Brezhnev was appointed a senior Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, or regional Party organisation. Thus began an association that was to take him all the way to the Politbureau.

When the German forces over-ran the Dnieper region in 1941, Brezhnev joined the Red Army as deputy chief of the political administration of the Southern Army Group with the rank of Lt. Colonel. By the time the war finished, he had risen to the rank of Major General. By all accounts, his war record was distinguished and he was honoured with a place in the victory parade in the Red Square. The war made a great impact on him. He never forgot the horrors of war.

Brezhnev was appointed Party Secretary of Zaparozhe in 1946 and of Dnepropetrovsk in 1947. In both places he rebuilt steel mills ruined during the war. After serving as head of the Party in Moldavia from 1952 to 1954, he was given the charge of virgin lands project in Kazakhstan. Having completed his task successfully, Brezhnev returned to the Party Secretariat in Moscow in 1956.

In the Soviet tradition to rise in the Party hierarchy men have to be builders first and foremost. That is why many of the Soviet leaders happen to be engineers. Khrushchev won his spurs by building the Moscow underground, which compares favourably with any underground railway system in the West. Brezhnev brought the vast expanses of virgin lands under the plough in the province of Kazakhstan. That brought him the recognition without which there could have been no further advancement. His return to Moscow coincided with the 20th Party Congress, in which Khrushchev made his famous denunciation of Stalin. To understand Brezhnev's rise to the highest post in the Party, it is necessary to know something of the power structure in the Soviet Union.



## POWER STRUCTURE

The Politbureau is the Party's highest body. Its membership comprises a dozen or so leading officials of both Party and Government. All major issues of policy are referred to it for decision. The other two party institutions of great importance are the Party Congress and the Central Committee. The Party Congress meets every five years and its membership of about 5000 is drawn from the Provincial Party Organisations. The Central Committee is a smaller but far more important body. Its membership at the beginning of this year stood at 319. The Central Committee includes leading members of the central and regional party organisations, the Government, the Armed Forces, the KGB, the Foreign Service, and of the arts and sciences.

In principle, both the Party Congress and the Central Committee come before the Politbureau. The Party Congress represents the supreme authority of the Party while the Central Committee, elected by the Congress, carries on the Party's business during the intervals between the Congresses. The Politbureau is therefore no more than the standing committee of the Central Committee to which it must answer for whatever it does. In fact, however, the order of precedence is reversed. It is the Party Congress and the Central Committee which answer to the politbureau and carry out its policies. The politbureau reaches its decisions by consensus, each member exercising his right of equal vote.

Both Stalin and Khrushchev resorted to the stratagem of shifting thorny internal questions from the Politbureau to the Central Committee and the Party Congress. During 1955 and 1957, Khrushchev used the Central Committee to dislodge three of his rivals in the Politbureau, namely Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich.

In a complete reversal of this practice, in October 1964, the Central Committee was told to ratify the Politbureau's



decision to relieve Khurshev of his post as the First Secretary of the Party. The vote against Khurshev was unanimous.

Ever since, the October 1964 Plenum has served as a model for every meeting of the Central Committee. It is generally believed that the author of this reversal was none other than Mikhail Suslov, the Party ideologue, who died in February this year.

Unlike his predecessors, Brezhnev, when elected to the highest post in the Party, confined himself to only two fields of activity, agriculture and foreign affairs. Under his guidance, huge investments were made in land reclamation and agricultural improvement between 1970 and 1980. By one estimate, agriculture took precedence over all other civilian expenditure. It is a pity that inspite of this huge infusion of funds the agriculture sector has failed to measure up to the country's expectations. Owing to bad weather the Soviet Union has had bad harvests for 4 years in a row since 1979. However, it needs to be said that the huge quantities of grain imported by the Soviet Union during these four years is mainly for livestock, to increase meat production in the country. Some idea of this problem can be had from the fact that the city of Moscow alone needs as many as 8,000 heads of cattle to meet its daily requirement of meat. This was told to a few of us who one day called on Grishin, Secretary of the Moscow Party, to learn what it took to run a metropolis of more than eight million. There is enough grain produced in the Soviet Union to meet the country's needs for bread, the price of which has stood at 20 kopecks per loaf for the last 20 years or so.

President Brezhnev's control of foreign affairs since 1969 was so complete as to leave no room for doubt about his pre-eminence within the Soviet leadership. It was his personal interest in reducing the risks of confrontation that led him to open his account with the agreements with West Germany and with the Soviet Union's erst-while allies on



Berlin in the 1970s. 1970 to 1973 were also the years when, together with President Nixon, he helped to forge the concept of detente or peaceful co-existence. While for President Nixon it was a way out of the Vietnam war, to President Brezhnev it meant "the overcoming of the cold war and the transition to normal stable relations among states". "Detente", he said in an important speech while I was in Moscow, "means" willingness to resolve disputes not by force, not by threats and sabre rattling, but by peaceful means, at the conference table. Detente means a certain trust and ability to take into consideration each other's legitimate interests". Legitimate interests meant both political and economic interests. Agreements on SALT I and over European boundaries, together with those other agreements already referred to, were more productive in reducing the risks of super power confrontation than those of the previous 25 years.

The ideological differences between the USSR and the USA, however, were hard to reconcile and conflicts of interest became unavoidable as they embarked upon policies to promote their own systems and ways of life. Mutual recriminations during the Carter era were the inevitable result. Differences over Human Rights and Third World policies, especially over Angola and Ethiopia overshadowed whatever limited gains had been made in the field of arms control.. The whole edifice of detente collapsed with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. The agreement on SALT II was held up by the Senate, while the Carter administration imposed a grain embargo and boycotted the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow.

What little was left of the spirit of detente was lost with the advent of the Reagan administration. Insurgencies in Central America, Martial Law in Poland, possible Soviet nuclear superiority were all held in Washington as deliberate Soviet attempts to advance Moscow's expansionist goals through detente. For his part, in his last speeches, President Brezhnev adopted a tone of aggressiveness towards the United States.



He had given up all hope of any improvement in his relations with the U.S. under President Reagan. He managed, however, to save something of the frame-work of detente in his relations with the West Europeans who have consistently resisted American pressure to reduce their commercial and economic contacts with the Soviet Union. As averred by former Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua, President Brezhnev worked for normalization of Moscow's relations with Peking before his death.

The Soviet Union was already a great military power by the time Brezhnev came to power in 1964. By 1972, when SALT I was signed, the USSR had achieved nuclear parity with the United States. For a regime which had been plagued, for some justifiable reasons, with an ever present sense of insecurity since it came to power in 1917, this was the most important achievement of the Brezhnev era.

Notwithstanding the creation of the most powerful war machine in the world, President Brezhnev would have liked to be remembered for his efforts in the cause of peace. The Soviet people will recall, with reason, the Brezhnev era as the most peaceful years since the Bolshevik Revolution. They know that decisions will soon have to be taken to make the economy work better and agriculture more productive, which may mean a tightening of belts. It is in the field of foreign policy, however, that the new Soviet leadership will have to assess its priorities. In that context, the Afghanistan problem will be a central issue.

In my three and a half years in Moscow I had the privilege of meeting President Brezhnev on many occasions. I always found him lucid, affable, ready to listen and attentive. His assumption of the office of President of the Supreme Soviet Presidium in 1977 coincided with certain important developments in our own country. During a strictly formal ceremony in the Kremlin early in July 1977 all Heads of Missions were told to make their offers of felicitations as brief as possible. Considering that there were as many as



120 Heads of Missions lined up to go upto him one by one shake his hand, say their piece before moving on, President Brezhnev could not have devoted more than a minute or two to each one of us. However, when I made bold to engage him in a somewhat longish conversation exceeding the time allocated to me, he listened to me patiently with full attention and returned a reply I could not fault on any account.

On another occasion during the Great October Revolution celebrations in the Kremlin Hall of Congress on November 7, 1978 when our daughter Rehana who had learnt Russian on coming down from Oxford, was presented to President Brezhnev she congratulated him in Russian. He was most pleased, joked with her in a grand-fatherly manner and asked that she be presented to Madame Brezhnev as well. At that moment I could not help recalling how his predecessor, Khrushchev, on a similar state occasion on the May day of 1960, had threatened my distinguished predecessor, Mr. Akhtar Hussain, with rockets trained on Peshawar during the aftermath of the U-2 incident. The difference in personal styles would be a good way for us in Pakistan to compare and remember these two Russian leaders.



## CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN BONN.

With the swearing in of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's 17-member Cabinet on October 4, the change of Government in Bonn is now complete. The 13 years old Coalition of the Socialist Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party came to an end on September 17, when the Free Democrats withdrew from Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's Coalition. Their switch to the Conservative Opposition Party, the Christian Democratic Party, two years before the general election inexorably led to Chancellor Schmidt's downfall and Helmut Kohl's election in his place. Notwithstanding Schmidt's plea for new elections, the Conservative 'No confidence vote in the Bundestag on October 1, which was the constitutional instrument of change, constituted an unprecedented step in the history of the Federal Republic. At the instance of the Free Democrats, who hope to improve their sagging position, Fresh elections will now be held in March 1983. Considering our close, friendly relations with Bonn, we in Pakistan would do well to understand the mainsprings of what has come to pass and what it may portend for the future.

The first post-war Administration of Chancellor Konrad Adenauers' Christian Democratic Party, a successor to the pre-war Centrum Party, lasted from 1949 to 1963. Its main task was to reconstruct a new Germany at home and reconciliation with France abroad. It succeeded remarkably well in achieving both these objectives. By the time Ludwig Erhardt succeeded to the office of Chancellor in 1963, the Social Democratic Party, an old and established party which



had not wielded power since the Weimar Republic in the 30's, came to share the public vote with the Christian Democratic Party in equal measure. This drove Chancellor Eardhardt to seek an alliance with the smaller, liberal party of the Free Democrats. However, the alliance collapsed when in 1966, as now, the Chancellor asked for tax increases and deficit spending while the Free Democrats demanded lowering of taxes for industry and cutbacks in social programmes. For 3 years, the Free Democrats stayed out of the Government, leaving the two bigger parties to form a Grand Coalition, under Chancellor Kiisinger, from 1966 to 1969.

Because of the strong ideological differences between the partners, this Coalition lasted only as long as the Free Democrats, who commanded 8% of the national vote at the time, chose to sit it out. However, in 1969, they finally overcame their disinclination to join hands with the Socialists and what they traditionally stood for in German politics. With their return, the Christian Democrats went into Opposition. Despite repeated efforts under Brazel, Khol and Francis Josef Strauss, the Christian Democrats failed to dislodge the Social Democratic Party and Free Democrats Party Coalition first under Chancellor Willy Brandt and then under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The partnership finally came to an end last month over budgetary policies and the rising tide of the "Greens", a loose and somewhat to the left coalition of ecologists and anti-nuclear protesters. While Chancellor Schmidt called for higher taxes, the Free Democrats led by their Economic Minister, Otto Lambsdorff, demanded reduction in taxes and social welfare programmes, particularly unemployment benefits at a time when un-employment in West Germany, at the record level of 1.7 million, is the highest since 1950. The fact is that despite this and a stagnant economy, the German workers, the socialists main constituency, live well and are in no mood to suffer want.

The Coalition was already in danger due to opposition from within the Social Democratic Party itself on the issue of



development of U.S. missiles in the mid 80s. Schmidt had threatened to resign if his party did not support this deployment. This would have led to the Coalition breaking up. For America a break up due to budgetary differences was far preferable than over the missile deployment issue. The actual crisis was triggered by the June elections in Hamburg when the "Greens" replaced the Free Democrats as the third ranking party in the State. The tempo increased as the elections in Hesse, a Social Democrats' stronghold, neared. At a political rally in Wiesbaden, on August 30, Chancellor Schmidt and other speakers were pelted with rotten eggs. The Free Democrats failed to gain the required 5% of the vote while the "Greens" won as many as 9 seats. No wonder a perceptive observer in Bonn found the atmosphere early in September as funeral.

West Germany rose to the position of *primus inter pares*, the first among equals, in Western Europe with the appointment in 1969 of Willy Brandt as Chancellor and Walter Scheel as Foreign Minister. Together, they fashioned and put into effect "Ost-politik" which opened the way for improved relations with the Soviet Union and other East European states and led to the 1971 Berlin Agreement. The high water-mark of this period, in my estimation, was Willy Brandt's act of great courage when, on a visit to Poland, he knelt in all humility at the memorial in WARSAW dedicated to the victims of German slaughter during the war. An equally courageous act of the Brandt-Scheel team was to establish relations with East Germany.

Although Pakistan had drawn a good deal of opprobrium throughout West Germany with its wrong headed policies in East Pakistan in 1971, I found both Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel sympathetic and ready to help. My first meeting with Willy Brandt was at his annual dinner for Heads of Missions in Bonn in the middle of 1972. I took the opportunity to seek his intervention on behalf of our prisoners of war in India. He listened to me patiently and pro-



mised to do whatever he could. The next day I was called to the Foreign Office and informed of the action the Chancellor had taken at my request. The Foreign Minister was no less kind.

By the time I was transferred to Moscow in June 1975, Walter Scheel had taken over as the President of West Germany. When I went to take leave of him, he told me, among other things, that under a German custom, I was allowed two wishes before I left. I said that since the dust had now settled over the unhappy events of 1971, would he consider a high level exchange of visits between Pakistan and West Germany. Secondly, would he cause a chair to be created at Heidelberg or Munich for the study of Iqbal's poetry. He granted the first request there and then. As for the second, he promised to do what he could. An Iqbal chair was duly created at the University of Heidelberg a year or two later.

We are lucky that we have good friends among the Christian Democrats. Francis Josef Strauss, that outstanding politician and Bavarian Minister-President, whose Christian Social Union Party has as many as 4 members in the new Cabinet, is a good friend of Pakistan. It was during his term of office as the Defence Minister that we were able to reach friendly arrangements with Rheinmetal and other West German industrial houses in the matter of co-operation with our ordnance factories to service our defence needs. Strauss paid us a visit last year and we can hopefully look forward to his continued friendship. Another good friend of ours among the ruling Christian Democrats happens to be the former Foreign Minister, Herr Schroder.

It is not only unemployment, a stagnant economy and the decline in the Free Democratic Party fortunes that eroded the Socialist-Liberals Alliance. The deterioration in American-Soviet relations since the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan has also taken its toll. Gone are the days when first Willy Brandt and then Schmidt, both men with a charisma of their own, could play the role of an honoured



“translator” between the two Super Powers. Although Chancellor Schmidt agreed to the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles on German soil, when smaller Holland and Belgium had dithered, President Reagan’s ban on the Soviet pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe is liable to hurt German industry. No wonder Chancellor Kohl should have called for “respect of contracts already concluded”. That assurance is meant for the West German Trade Unions, which unlike their counterparts in England have so far supported the Federal Government in Bonn and which may in future prove to be a headache for Chancellor Kohl.

Chancellor Kohl’s declared resolve for “the establishment of friendly and co-operative relations with the U.S.” is no less significant. Co-operation with the United States which bears as much as 53% of the NATO defence budget and keeps a large number of American soldiers on the German soil, is one of the constants of Bonn’s foreign policy. However, the price tag at times tends to be excessive. One such occasion was the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, when the American Administration, intent upon making up Israeli losses in a hurry, decided to move military stores from its West German depots. This infuriated the Arab states. They lost no time in making it known in Bonn that unless this transfer of stores was stopped forthwith, they may be forced to place an embargo on oil supplies to West Germany. The warning was heeded at once, and Israeli ships heading for Hamburg and Bremenhaven were turned back mid-steam. There was an uproar in Washington and Tel Aviv, but Bonn held fast to its national interest. It was not long afterwards that the story about the East German spy broke, and Chancellor Willy Brandt was forced to resign. Perhaps he had not heard of the saying in these parts that in an elephant’s foot lies every body else’s foot.



## QUEST FOR NUCLEAR INDEPENDENCE : THE ENRICHMENT PROCESS

I have only a nodding acquaintanceship with Dr. A. Q. Khan, as during my daily walk, I occasionally see him quietly tending his roses and tulips. However, metaphorically our paths have crossed as I was Pakistan's Ambassador in The Hague when the international controversy over his alleged pivotal role in Pakistan's development of centrifuge uranium enrichment technology broke out with sensational hypotheses as to how we "stole" uranium from Niger, the technology for its enrichment from the Netherlands and machinery from all over Europe, charges which reverberate till today.

Since, over the years, I have concerned myself with the economic and strategic necessity of developing our nuclear programme, I was able actively to rebut these presumptions in meetings with the Dutch authorities and with detailed interviews in Dutch newspapers. That combined with the traditional Dutch legal sense of fair play may have contributed to the Dutch Inter-ministerial Working Party, which had been set up in March 1979, concluding in its published report to the Parliament that Dr. A. Q. Khan had stolen nothing, had no legal case to answer and that the enrichment process being developed by Pakistan could have been based on other widely published and openly available sources.

Now three years later a Dutch Court has indicted, in absentia, Dr. A. Q. Khan to a four year prison sentence for his two open letters to former colleagues in a company with which Pakistan was openly transacting commercial



business. The Court utilized an obscure Dutch statute which makes it an offence to attempt to obtain classified information. As the written judgement has been reserved we can only deal with the broad principles involved. I feel that the people of Pakistan on whom it reflects have a right to know the issues at stake, technical, political and legal:

- (1) What has been the non-proliferation policy of the developed world, especially since the Indian explosion of 1974, and on what assumptions has it been based on?
- (2) What is centrifuge technology, what research work is it based on and what does it owe to Holland and its Troika partners in Urenco-centrec, the U.K. and West Germany?
- (3) What is the history of the diffusion of knowledge in nuclear technology and what role has been played by expatriate scientists? and lastly,
- (4) What are the legal principles involved and how best should Pakistan meet this continuing challenge to its self-respect?

Non-proliferation policy can be broadly divided into three stages. Phase I was characterised by technological restraints adopted by the US, UK and Canada during and after World War II coupled with the only initiative for universal non-proliferation and international control, the Lilienthal-Brauch plan, for which common ground could not be found with the USSR. Technological secrecy was overtaken by the worldwide discovery of uranium resources and the growing military nuclear programmes of the USSR, the UK and France. In stage II, the US reversed its policy and spread nuclear technology through its Atoms for Peace Programme in the 50s and 60s. on the institutional side the NPT was negotiated in 1970 primarily to bring in West Germany and Japan by promising them the nuclear technology to develop their economic and strategic capabilities provided they did not go nuclear.



Phase III began with the Indian nuclear explosion. The US orchestrated the developed world response. There was no concern for the already completed and unsafeguarded capabilities of India, CIRUS reactor had been supplied by Canada and its heavy water by the US and it provided the plutonium for its nuclear explosion. France supplied Israel with an equivalent reactor at Dimona as well as with reprocessing technology. James Angleton's CIA Israeli desk reportedly gave Israel nuclear weapons construction plans. Israel stole weapons grade enriched fuel from the American Apollo plant and hijacked 300 tons of European uranium fuel. South Africa developed its own enrichment process at Pelindaba and Valindaba as an off shoot of West Germany's Becker jet-nozzle system. A Vela Satellite scan shows the possibility of a completed joint South African-Israeli nuclear test. Instead, France cancelled sales of reprocessing plants to South Korea and to Pakistan despite in the latter case IAEA safeguards and approval. Canada violated its contract to supply nuclear fuel for Pakistan's Canadian built KANUPP reactor.

The developed countries got together first under the Zanger Committee and then under the secret London Club which evolved into the Nuclear Suppliers Group to evolve a common policy of restraints against the supply of "sensitive" nuclear technologies ranging from reactors to pencil quality graphite. This group spanned the ideological spectrum from the USA to the USSR. Nonproliferation policy had turned full circle back to a policy of technological denial instead of concentrating on developing political incentives. The fundamental premise of the NPT was annulled. Signing the NPT no longer guaranteed access to nuclear technology. It could still be denied or even destroyed, as NPT signatories, Libya and Iraq, have found to their cost.

During this period the cost of uranium increased, the US failed to guarantee its enrichment contracts for nuclear fuel supplies, oil prices shot up and complacency based on



cheap energy was shattered. There was a growing perception in the developed world that its economic security lay in the next step in nuclear development, enriching its own fuel and reprocessing it to extract plutonium for recycling and for breeder reactors. The US did not oppose uranium enrichment because it felt that it would be confined to the developed world, and would be beyond the technological capability of the developing countries. Hence the US concentrated its non-proliferation crusade against the spread of plutonium reprocessing technology because it lay within the technological competence of a number of developing countries as India had shown in 1966.

That is why the disclosure in 1979 of Pakistan's nascent enrichment effort caused such a psychological shock to the developed world. Instead of recognising that its policy was based on the wrong assumptions it found it easier to rationalize this failure by claiming that the technology had been stolen.

Let us now turn to the history of enrichment. In 1930 Otto Hahn had discovered fission, and it became apparent that great amounts of energy could be released, possibly for destructive purposes, given sufficient quantities of refined fissile material, either plutonium 239 or uranium 235. Plutonium 239 can only be produced by reprocessing fuel irradiated in a reactor. Uranium 235 exists in natural uranium but only to the extent of a 0.7% concentration. Light Water Reactors which predominate today require fuel enriched to 3% while nuclear weapons require at least a 90-95% enrichment of around 11 kg for a modest bomb. Many avenues were explored to enrich uranium. All began by converting it to the gas uranium hexafluoride.

Gravitational or centrifuge separation for gases was first carried out by Breiding in 1895 and Lindemann in 1919 who suggested its use for isotope enrichment. Basically the method is the same as used in cream separation, a container is



given centrifugal acceleration so that the heavier components spin to the outside while the lighter fractions concentrate on the inside. The earliest relevant work was done by Prof. Brems in 1934 at the University of Virginia. During the war the US concentrated on the alternate gaseous diffusion method which was more rewarding at that time. Even so US scientists such as Karl Cohen conceptually further developed the centrifuge process.

In Nazi Germany thanks to the efforts of Martin, Har-teck, Beyerle, Steenbeck and certain Dutch collaborators, by 1942 centrifuge enrichment of small quantities of uranium was achieved. In 1945 the Soviets put Prof. Steenbeck and his compatriot Dr. Gernot Zippe to work on centrifuge enrichment at Suchumi near the Black Sea. Zippe designed the thin-walled rotor needle centrifuge which finally made centrifuge enrichment possible. Steenbeck went back to the GDR while Zippe ended up in the US where the Atomic Energy Commission gave him a contract to work on centrifuge enrichment at the University of Virginia. The US Government itself published his definitive and seminal work on enrichment, the "Zippe report", in 1960 as US report ORO 315 which forms the basis of all subsequent and current work in this field.

When the Europeans were looking for a process to enrich fuel for their reactors once the US had displayed its unreliability as a supplier, they were drawn to the centrifuge process because all the theoretical work had been done, the capital costs were much less than for gaseous diffusion, power requirements 90% less and the main drawback up till now, materials unreliability had been solved by the development of new high specific strength materials such as titanium, aluminium alloys, maraging steel and composite materials utilising carbon and glass fibres.

The Netherlands, UK and West Germany set up a consortium, URENCO—Centrec, to enrich fuel. All three countries developed prototypes. The German model was chosen



for production in the Netherlands at Almelo. Dr. A. Q. Khan had originally gone to Europe to study in Berlin. He met and married a lady of Dutch descent and together they went to finish his studies at Delft University from where he went to complete his Ph. D. at Louvain in Belgium. He was subsequently employed as a metallurgist by the FDO in Holland. His expertise was limited to materials some of which may have been used in the Dutch centrifuge prototype which was rejected by the Urenco Troika. Subsequently, according to the official Dutch report he was asked in 1974 to translate two unimportant reports from German into Dutch out of twelve separate German reports for starting production of the German prototype. For sixteen working days he was housed in a building outside the Almelo factory and only allowed access to its non-classified cafeteria and rest rooms. The report concludes that because of these factors and because of his diligence in translating two Germany manuals in 128 hours he could not have had any opportunity to concern himself with any other matter. The consortium owes a debt to Dr. A. Q. Khan's contribution as obviously he was one of the few scientists with adequate Dutch and German language capability.

All that Urenco established was that it was now possible to centrifuge enriched uranium at an economically competitive price compared to gaseous diffusion. Any other country wishing to develop a research enrichment programme would only find the Almelo experience relevant if it wished to go in for mass production for export. Crudely put; it would cost a country 65 million dollars to develop a research facility based on the Zippe report and 60 million dollars based on the Almelo refinements of scale. The economic penalty is insignificant.

### EXAMINATION

It might be pertinent to examine the diffusion of



nuclear technology. In the US the expatriate Hungarian scientists, Wigner and Szilard, drafted the letter for the German Swiss Einstein to sign and to send to President Roosevelt on the necessity of developing an Atom Bomb which initiated the American effort. The actual research was perhaps 80% due to expatriate Hungarian, Danish, Norwegian, Dutch, Austrian and German scientists. Americans such as Oppenheimer, Lawrence and Seaborg stand out in the minority compared to Fermi, Szilard, Franck, Niels Bohr, Goudsmit, Von Neumann, Lars Onsager, Hans Bethe and their many British and Canadian fellow researchers. It was another foreigner, the Hungarian Teller, who discovered the concept behind the next nuclear weapon development, the Hydrogen Bomb, and the German, Werner Von Braun, whose V2 rockets developed at Peenemunde killed and wounded 8375 UK citizens during the war, gave the US the rockets behind its satellites and ICBMs.

Technological denial, to the consternation of the US, could not prevent the first Soviet Atomic pile going critical on Christmas eve of 1946, its first nuclear explosion in 1949, its Hydrogen Bomb in 1952 at the same time as the US and the world's first civilian nuclear power plant in 1954, due to Kurchatov's team. This policy could not also prevent the UK and France quickly developing and demonstrating their own capabilities. China, in turn, astonished the world by becoming the first country to enter the nuclear club by utilising enriched uranium from its Lanzhou gaseous diffusion plant.

This is not to say that low enrichment such as that practised at Almelo is the same as high enrichment. An Almelo type process would require some 12 to 15 passes through a cascade of centrifuges to produce 3% enriched fuel utilising what is known as 4.3 separative work units or SWU per kg produced. Highly enriched 90% uranium would require some 65-75 passes utilising approximately 250 SWU per kg, an exponential increase in difficulty. The main



problem behind centrifuge enrichment remains the constant prospect of materials damage and destructive failure propagating to neighbouring units. For example, if 200 centrifuges are used for low enrichment the break down of ten of them will only lead to the loss of some 10% of low enriched fuel. However, if 20 centrifuges are being used for the last pass the break down of even one of them may lose 40% of the highly enriched batch. Furthermore, apart from fast cascade connection changes, high enrichment also requires completely different restructuring to take into account criticality or the danger of having too much fissile material together in case it starts to fission by itself. High enrichment impinges on the frontiers of metallurgical and centrifuge research and technology. In this field Pakistan has no proven model to emulate should it decide to pursue this route.

To some extent the revival of this Dutch case is no doubt due to political factors including the growing strength of the antinuclear movement. Commendably, the Dutch, on moral grounds, do not want to be seen as encouraging or contributing to proliferation in any way. I think that it is clear that this apprehension is groundless in the case of Dr. A. Q. Khan and our small enrichment effort. It would be indeed more pertinent for the Dutch to look at Article VI para 2 of the Almelo Agreement whereby the British Government is free to use the low enrichment output produced by Urenco as a feed for its separate gaseous diffusion plant to produce weapons grade uranium. Then there is also continuing pressure from other countries. The official Dutch report relates that Prime Minister Begin of Israel sent a strong letter reproaching Holland for allowing the employment of Dr. A. Q. Khan within its borders.

### LEGAL CASE

The legal case itself rests on arguably very weak grounds. The official report of 1980, which had already exonerated



Dr. A. Q. Khan, had already noted that he had written some letters to his former colleagues to ask for some information and components. I wish that the Court in its judgement of November 16, 1983 had taken note not only of the official report but also of the following considerations:

- (1) By any definition of national or international law, espionage is defined, as Oppenheim has so succinctly put it, as the act of secret agents of a State sent abroad for the purpose of obtaining clandestinely information in regard to military or political secrets.
- (2) Dr. A. Q. Khan, a Pakistani working and residing in Pakistan, had the perfect right to write any number of letters openly to the FDO, a company which was openly commercially selling equipment to Pakistan upto mid 79, in response to requests initiated by Dr. Khan. In fact the FDO sent open telexes in reply to both letters and even sent the components requested. A representative of the FDO visited Pakistan in March 79.
- (3) If the official Dutch Governmental report and by implication the Amsterdam Court have found that Dr. Khan has committed no crime while he was in Holland upto mid 1976, it is difficult to accept that his subsequent two letters merit the construction given by the Court or that the claim to jurisdiction lies within the scope of extraterritorial protective national practice.
- (4) As the Dutch enrichment effort is no doubt for peaceful non-military purposes, the classification level as in the case of Japanese centrifuge research must be governed by commercial rather than security considerations. This factor coupled with the statute of limitations should provide the Court of Appeals with another valid reason to reverse this judgement.

### OUR SINS

At the same time we must recognise our own sins of



omission analysing why this case has reached this unfortunate pass before evolving a strategy to meet it. When I visited the Netherlands in December last my Dutch friends felt embarrassed at this case going to Court but with some sorrow they also pointed out that our official reaction had been very slow and legalistic. According to them, evidently the summons were communicated to our Government in October of 83 and it permitted the respondent to challenge its very validity in Court. However, the unnecessarily legalistic response was that as no agreement existed between the two countries to serve summons no further action could be taken and even this reply was received after the case had been decided. The officials responsible for such an unmitigated lack of vision and dispatch should be shifted to areas where their capacity for national damage would be of less consequence. At the same time the international lawyers whom we have no doubt now engaged must also be briefed on the underlying political and technological issues. We must also remind our Dutch friends who have so steadfastly contributed to our socio-economic development that it might be less than fair to punish or to condemn a Pakistani national over whom they might have had some rights if they had given him their nationality and whose only limited access to technology was at their pleasure while a different set of standards is applied to their own nationals, such as, Dr. Barendrecht, the former scientific and commercial Director of the Comprimco, the high level national Bureau for Nuclear Projects in Amsterdam, who left Holland to take up a job as a principal expert in Brazil to help build the Brazilian enrichment factory in the mid 70s.



## II

### CAPABILITIES AND SAFEGUARDS

Recently the Indian Government's Policy Research Centre called together the country's civilian and military elite for a conference on India's security and the relevance of the nuclear option. The conference concluded that India would not be able to attack a nuclear weapons capable Pakistan as it had done in the 1971 Indo-Pak war. The present visit to Pakistan by the Director General of the I.A.E.A., Mr. Hans Blix, provides us with an opportunity to assess where we stand, to examine our capabilities and the relevance of safeguards. We cannot hope to deter India unless we acquire a credible capability, given, of course, political progress, constitutional consolidation and socio-economic development and we cannot hope to project a deterrent credibility when we ourselves are still in the dark on this issue.

### OUR PREDICAMENT

To a large extent our present strategic predicament is due to the late awakening nuclear vision of our leaders some twenty years after India, compounded by a continuing weakness in analysis and implementation. Our foreign policy strategists lack the rigour to master the technical and legal foundations while our scientists and nuclear administrators work in a vacuum dulled by the lack of public discussion and accountability.

The Indian nuclear effort pre-dated Partition, concentrated on acquiring a modest unsafeguarded reactor and



reprocessing capability within the published conceptual framework of a research and development plan culminating with breeders and, therefore, justifying the production and stockpiling of weapons grade plutonium. Not only was Pakistan slow in following this example but it based its international policy on the erroneous assumption that by joining in a campaign to safeguard India's programme it could forestall that ominous day without realizing that by so doing it was thus curtailing its own options.

Empirically speaking, while we developed our manpower base in fifties and sixties, we did not begin planning to acquire the hardware. We made the grave mistake of going for a safeguarded power reactor, Canadian KANUPP, instead of a relatively unsafeguarded research reactor. We are still paying for this decision. Again, in 1974 when Canada unilaterally abrogated its nuclear fuel supply contractual obligation we did not avail of this opportunity to give six months notice to terminate the underlying Pak-Canadian Agreement on which the continued existence of the IAEA administered Trilateral safeguards depend. Instead the late Prime Minister Zulifkar Ali Bhutto encouraged the development of our uranium centrifuge effort in comparative obscurity while the attention of the world was diverted to our public and eventually unsuccessful effort to obtain a commercial plutonium reprocessing plant from France.

However, while giving credit to where it is due for recognizing and developing the economic and security aspects of our nuclear policy, it must be stated that every head of state from President Ayub towards the end of his regime until President Zia-ul-Haq has faithfully carried on this quest on which our survival may well depend.

Our relations with the IAEA over safeguards are a reflection not only of a lack of clear thinking on our part but also of the evolving evaluation by the new Director General



of his post and responsibilities after taking over from his distinguished predecessor and compatriot, Mr. Sigvard Eklund, who served for twenty years. The moment the PAEC announced that it had succeeded in fabricating its own fuel for KANUPP in 1980, the IAEA began to worry that we might be able to utilize the on-loading system of such CANDU reactors for safeguards diversion.

The basic purpose of agency safeguards is to provide the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. This purpose is served by the provision of material accountancy as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. Countries which have signed the NPT agree thereby to submit all their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. Hence for NPT signatories the IAEA has the right to worry about and to press safeguards on any suspected unsafe-guarded facility.

### NON NPT STATES

In the case of non-NPT countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan and India, the IAEA can only concern itself with safeguarding specific projects through implementing agreements concluded by sovereign States and containing specific methods for safeguards implementation arrived at through negotiation and common agreement. All project safeguards agreements can only be subsequently applied after a common acceptance and not through unilateral action by the State or the IAEA. Another important safeguards consideration concerns confidentiality. Under Article VII (F) of the IAEA statute the Director General and the staff cannot disclose any confidential information, other



than to the Board of Governors who supervise their work. Furthermore, under Article XII dealing with Agency safeguards any report on safeguards non-compliance must be reported to the Director General who can only transmit such report to the Board of Governors for further negotiation and action. One of Director General Eklund's last official actions was in July 1981 to dismiss an Agency safeguards inspector, Mr. Richter, for disclosing confidential safeguards information, in this case to a U.S. Senator.

One of Mr. Blix's first acts on becoming Director General was to give an interview in February 82 to the New York Times in which he stated that while the Agency had no evidence of Pakistani diversion, the existing safeguards were not adequate and that amongst other countries India and Pakistan were refusing to submit to Agency inspection various unsafeguarded facilities.

## PROTEST

The Indian Government immediately delivered the Director General an aide memoire in protest and received in reply an apology. Pakistan's reaction is not on the record and it became the target of a public effort by the IAEA to impose additional safeguards utilising a hitherto new safeguards concept that the scope and level of assurance are main factors in the resulting safeguards effectiveness. While the Agency could find no evidence of non-compliance after 70 inspections it pressed this issue with the Director General again indicting Pakistan during a press conference while visiting India in December, 82. As for India, the IAEA agreed partially to safeguard the new Tarapur reprocessing plant for safeguarded fuel and did not complicate the new Indo-French accord for fuel supplies for the Tarapur reactor now that the U.S. had backed out as a supplier.



By February 1983 Pakistan was forced to accept a heightened safeguards regime for KANUPP in a gesture of unilateral submission unprecedented in the history of international nuclear energy exchanges. We should have formulated our policy response at the very beginning of this episode, either to stand pat on our secure legal position, or, we should have decided to accept these new conditions on an already safeguarded facility. By temporizing we only increased the suspicions of the international community which was needless because even a hypothetical diversion capability would have had to remain covert and therefore would have lacked credibility.

We must realize that international assessments regarding our capabilities rest on a number of our admissions and external suppositions. There is KANUPP and a small insignificant research reactor at PINSTECH. We admit having a research enrichment facility and therefore by implication a uranium hexafluoride gas production plant. A fuel fabrication facility. Since 1979 there seems to have been an international suspicion, if not consensus, that we have built or are building a small hot cell reprocessing laboratory near PINSTECH. This was specifically mentioned in the International Safeguards study of September '79 prepared by the international Consultative Group on Nuclear Energy which had a Pakistani participant who expressed dissenting views in general, in Theodor Winkler's paper of April '80 on Nuclear Proliferation and the Third World, and in Shai Feldman's tendentious article in the journal 'Survival' for May/June '81.

Where do we go from here? We must begin by clearly identifying the various nuclear options open to us, how to make them credible to our friends and potential adversaries and the lead time frames involved before choosing the best option or mix of options.



In scenario one, our capability time frame can be assessed by the time it would take us to terminate the Canadian agreement, dependent IAEA safeguards, subsequent short fuel burn-up, cooling time and reprocessing time. Eighteen months for an unsafeguarded capability as fuel already produced would still be covered by pursuit safeguards.

In scenario two, we achieve high weapons grade uranium enrichment by developing our nascent centrifuge effort. The problem would then be to achieve credibility as no international observer would rely on our unsubstantiated declaration to this effect and a demonstration explosion may not be in our interest. In this case we could achieve recognition for this capability by presenting a strategic quantity of high enriched uranium 235, ten kg, to the IAEA which is empowered under Article IX to accept such special fissionable materials for deposit and for delivery to other members for research purposes.

## REACTOR

In scenario three, we finally decide to build our own small unsafeguarded research reactor or even a crude burn pit pile from which we could extract uranium for reprocessing. The cost, depending on the sophistication, would be between ten to fifty million dollars. The time frame, two years from commencement to plutonium production. This is really the preferred option, especially if the more complicated enrichment route proves intractable.

As all these three options might take some time to mature, we must find a modality which can be superimposed not only on our existing safeguard obligations but should also existing safeguarded and unsafeguarded facilities in the quickest possible time to shore up our deteriorating security position within the over all context of a flexible international constitutional progress. We should, therefore, immediately de-



clare to the IAEA that we intend to reprocess, under safeguards, nuclear fuel irradiated at KANUPP. In that eventuality, as in the case of India at Tarapur, IAEA safeguards would apply to any existing reprocessing facility that we might have, only as long as the safeguarded fuel was being processed therein. Safeguards would also apply to the plutonium produced and the storage area as the IAEA is ensuring in India, at Eurochemic-Mol in Belgium, at WAK and KEWA in West Germany at EUREX and ITREC in Italy, at the Boris Kidric institute in Yugoslavia and at Tokai Mura in Japan;

With plutonium available we could proceed with the development of a zero power research reactor and then, in collaboration, a small experimental breeder reactor. This option could be immediately implemented and would give us a safeguarded but albeit credible last resort capability within a few months. It would then be clear that if we faced a supreme national emergency we have the nuclear where-withall to meet such a challenge. A recognition of this state of affairs would provide sufficient deterrence. Above all we must come to some decision.



### III

#### **How TO PREVENT A Nuclear Race between India and Pakistan.**

In today's nuclear world, mankind, through the agency of the Superpowers, has the potential if not to destroy life then at least to create a hazardous post-nuclear exchange twilight, be it of ice or of fire. In the regional context, the tension that has existed between Pakistan and India has caused us to fall behind in development, even though both countries, at independence in 1947, were the strongest economies from Korea to Egypt. Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan summed up the Pakistani perspective on bilateral relations in his address to the Majlis-i-Shoora on July 21, 1984: "No subject has had a more vital bearing on Pakistan's foreign policy than our relations with India. The state of relations between Pakistan and India directly affects not only the peace and stability of the region but, more importantly, it is an essential factor in the realisations of the hopes and aspirations of the people of both countries for a better life."

In analysing the nuclear issue, a number of preliminary and fundamental questions have to be examined. First, is there a nuclear race between Pakistan and India, and how did it originate? Second, is the nuclear issue one of the causes behind the suspicion and hostility in Indo-Pakistan relations or is the nuclear issue a symptom of this unfortunate state of affairs? Third, is it possible to prevent such a race if it is in progress or is likely to begin? Fourth, is it desirable to pre-



vent such a race? Fifth, what measures must both countries consider to prevent such a race, and how exactly do they fit into the range of measures that both countries must adopt to improve the whole spectrum of bilateral relations?

### AMBITIONS

It is the official position of both countries that they have no nuclear weapons ambitions and that their nuclear research is solely motivated by peaceful intentions. Occasionally, such professions have been jointly made, as in the press statement of both foreign ministers on June 10, 1981, where "both sides reiterated their policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They called upon all nuclear weapons states to engage in serious discussions on nuclear disarmament."

However, it must be recognised that in the minds of the international community there is a very strong presumption that both countries are engaged in such a race. The Indian explosion of 1974 directly led to the formation of the broad East-West Nuclear Supplies Group countries to prevent the possibility of a multiplier effect, but at the cost of the basic bargain offered by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, namely the free exchange of nuclear information and facilities in return for the pledge to renounce the nuclear option. Even more important, the strategic planners of both countries have to take into account the capabilities of the other side rather than declared intentions.

### POLICY

On the nuclear issue, the policy of Pakistan has been reactive to India's, as indeed it has been to the whole gamut of bilateral issues. With its trained nuclear manpower, India went into the development of a multi-purpose nuclear programme far ahead of Pakistan and initially even of China.



While India fought to keep its nuclear options open, Pakistan reacted by trying to further international negotiations for curtailing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In the mid-fifties, when the I.A.E.A. statutes were being negotiated, Pakistan supported the proposal to declare all nationally produced stocks of plutonium subject to international control. India resisted and was supported by the USSR, leading to the eventual compromise that such plutonium could be retained for national research purposes. Pakistan then supported efforts to negotiate the N.P.T., but India resisted, calling it discriminatory. Hence, India in 1974 was able to utilise the plutonium produced from the Cirus research reactor in Trombay, supplied by Canada and serviced by heavy water given by the USA, for its nuclear explosion.

Whatever India might say subsequently on the difference between a peaceful nuclear explosion and a nuclear weapon device, the fact is that in the minds of the world community and its neighbours, India has demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability. It could hardly be otherwise when even a country such as Israel, which has not overtly demonstrated its nuclear potential, is regarded as a nuclear weapons power.

### CAPABILITY

At the same time, there is a strong feeling in India that Pakistan, through its nascent uranium research facility at Kahuta, is striving to achieve nuclear weapons grade enrichment capability. This apprehension exists even though centrifuge technology has never hitherto been successfully utilised for more than the 5% enrichment needed to fuel nuclear reactors, even though plutonium is a far more efficient material for nuclear weapons, and though the construction of a small plutonium producing reactor, coupled with a small reprocessing facility, would be a far more sure route for Pakistan should it wish to develop a credible nuclear option. However, in bilateral security affairs, it is the perceptions



that count, that fuel unproductive military spending and occasionally even Scenarios for taking out suspect facilities on the other side.

As mentioned earlier, Pakistan's policy towards India is mainly reactive. This is as true of the nuclear issue as it is of our bilateral relations in general. Since India is not only our neighbour but is also far larger, it could not be otherwise. As Additional Secretary Mr. Abdul Sattar put it to the Delhi Study Group on May 15, 1981, when he was ambassador to India: "A larger and powerful country has no reason to imagine danger from a relatively small neighbour, one-eighth its size in population and resources. Principles apart, there is no basis in fact for fear of an impending arms race. Objective disparities in manpower, resources and industrial infrastructure rule out the possibility of Pakistan winning such a ruinous race. Pakistan does not aim to achieve parity with India."

Therefore, in the nuclear field, India, which has already demonstrated its capability, has the primary responsibility for choosing which route both countries will now take in the nuclear field., that of competition and possibly confrontation, or that of moderation, co-operation and controlled limitation.

Before examining in more detail choices open to both countries, it is necessary to digress briefly on the historic trend of our bilateral relations. It would be unwise for us to regard the nuclear issue as the underlying cause of our unsatisfactory relations. It is purely symptomatic and must be recognized as such. To us in Pakistan, the reason for this malaise are our perception that beneath a thin veneer, the Indian leadership and a sizable segment of its following continue to regard the formation of Pakistan as an historical error forced on India, that given the opportunity they would like in some way to redress the situation and that, in their



mind, the 1971 war supported this presumption.

### APPREHENSION

If we are not beset by this fear, we are still hemmed in by the very real apprehension that at best India will not be satisfied with anything less than a client state status for its neighbours, of whom for India, we are the most recalcitrant and important. This fear about Indian hegemony is very real and is being constantly fuelled, although perhaps at times by Indians acting unconsciously.

For example, Professor Bhabani Sen Gupta, in his recent articles on the need for a ceasefire in Sri Lanka, concludes that while the Tamils are part of the island's population, they also have very strong cultural and linguistic links with the Tamils living in India and elsewhere. These links are not merely relics of the past but are real, and, therefore, it is politically and morally impossible for India to abandon Sri Lankan Tamils to the ruthless ethnic antagonism of the majority Sinhala community. However, when the Pakistani public applies these criteria to the treatment of Muslims in India, as Pakistan has the right to do under the Liaquat-Nehru Agreement, India does not regard them as valid in regard to itself.

The central conclusion of professor Gupta's article is that an Indian role in Sri Lanka and policy evolved around that role may be the beginning of a new Indian approach to relations with all its neighbours in South Asia, who will thus realise that India with its great size, population, military power, economic development and natural resources is an asset of each neighbour and not a source of fear or danger. For Professor Gupta, Bhutan is the only neighbouring country with which India has no problem. In the light of the fact that under a bilateral treaty, India controls Bhutan's



foreign relations, this example is not likely to give much comfort to India's other neighbours.

Unfortunately, far too much of both India and Pakistan's resources, diplomatic efforts and intellectual capital are devoted to the unproductive task of reaction. On a number of issues, the establishment of a joint consultation arrangement and the setting up of SARC, Pakistan has made significant concessions over its past policy.

However, on other issues, such as Pakistan's proposals for mutual and balanced force reductions and a No War Pact, India's response has to rise above regarding these proposals as tactical devices and treat them as substantive blocks for the edifice of better relations. There is also the issue of Afghanistan, which vitally affects both countries and could indeed provide an opportunity for a common approach, which would not only help the solution to this problem but would also provide another important device for the improvement of stability in the region. The modalities, however, are secondary to the prerequisite that India must act in such a way that the apprehensions of its neighbours are modified.

In this context, we may now go back to the examination of the nuclear issue. There is in Pakistan a school of thought which holds that Pakistan's attainment of nuclear capability, whether demonstrated or otherwise, is central to its security, in the context of its relations with India and is in the interest of the stability of South Asia. Evidently, this conclusion is shared to some extent by certain Indian strategists. At the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, two years ago seminars were held on India's security and on nuclear weapons policy options which came to the conclusions that if both countries possessed nuclear weapons a balance would exist and that if Pakistan had nuclear weapons in 1971, India would not have been able to take advantage of the situation.



Hence, it could be argued that the development of the nuclear option by both countries could by itself be a stabilising factor. However, at present, there is no sign of official recognition of such a strategic doctrine.

Again, if India and Pakistan are to try to contain any potential nuclear race, the starting point must be for India, as the larger power which is also nuclear capable, to respond constructively to the host of Pakistani proposals on this issue. These are well-known. Basically, Pakistan is ready to accept any mutual modality that India might find acceptable, be it international, regional or purely bilateral. Pakistan is ready for simultaneous signing of the N.P.T. It is also ready to negotiate a nuclear free zone for South Asia. The treaty of Talteloco, in Latin America, furnishes a good example for a regional arrangement. Pakistan is also ready to accept mutual on site inspections of each other's nuclear facilities to remove any mistrust on this score. India's objections and its position on these proposals are also well-known. What is really needed now is some fresh thinking in India and the formulation of its proposal or proposals for Pakistan to consider.

It is well within the bounds of probabilities that both countries have the ability, given good will on both sides, to work out a mutually acceptable, reciprocal and non-discriminatory agreement. Such a solution would not only prevent a nuclear race but would allow both countries to collaborate on a vital technology which has an important role to play in the economic development of this region in an age of declining energy resources. Why should India have to turn to the United States and France for enriched fuel for Tarapur when Pakistan might be able one day to supply this need? In the same way, India's experience in fuel reprocessing and heavy water production would be of great value to Pakistan. The nuclear issue should be symbolic of future



Indo-Pakistan relations. We should try to reach a mutual agreement on this issue. Until then, we can prevent its becoming a race or an item of contention by taking each other's declared intentions at face value and not giving it undue internal or international importance.



## PAK AMERICA RELATIONS : A NUCLEAR PAKISTAN ?

The other day the President of Pakistan avowed that Pakistan would resist discriminatory pressure to curtail its nuclear development. No one in Pakistan would disagree with this resolve. However, it is unfortunate that this issue has been, in the main, analysed either outside Pakistan or when within, in spasmodic responses to outside stimuli which have been often biased, sometimes ill-informed and usually provocative. The importance of nuclear fission for Pakistan's economic and strategic security has yet to be presented as a coherent doctrine to the people of Pakistan. While the status of Pakistan's nuclear development and capability has been of some controversy, the underlying strategy, the various options, their significance and the means to achieve them have yet to be spelled out.

The essential elements of a nuclear fuel cycle are: (1) mining uranium ore and fabricating it into fuel rods for natural uranium/heavy reactors such as Pakistan's sole power reactor at KANUPP in Karachi, (2) a heavy water production plant, (3) a facility to turn the uranium ore into the gas, uranium hexafluoride, so that it can be sent to, (4) a plant, in which it can be enriched to between 2 and 5% for use in a boiling or pressurised water reactor such as the one envisaged at Chashma, (5) a research or power reactor, (6) a reprocessing plant to extract whatever is left over from the spent fuel including plutonium that has been produced, (7) a breeder reactor utilising a plutonium core surrounded by a natural uranium blanket which will not only generate electricity but will



breed more plutonium than it consumes.

The world as a whole is running out of fossil fuels and in the first quarter of the next century there will have to be a massive shift to nuclear power. The soft energy paths of solar, wind, sea and geothermal energy will unfortunately only be able to provide a maximum of some 20% of global needs. If nuclear fusion becomes a practical proposition it could provide a way out but there is no guarantee of its eventual success. If utilised in existing nuclear reactors, even the finite quantities of available global uranium will also be exhausted in the near future. Reprocessing of spent fuel with consequent recycling will cut fuel needs for the present generation of reactors from 20 to 50%. While existing reactors only utilise at least 60 per cent of uranium's energy hence stretching existing supplies sixty times. A ton of uranium in a breeder gives the energy equivalent of two million tons of coal.

Energy consumption and socio-economic development go hand in hand. At present Pakistan has one of the lowest per capita and commercial electricity/energy consumption levels in the world. It is 1/10th of the world average, 1/3 of the Asian average and 1/70th of the North American consumption level. Not suprisingly the per capita GNP in Pakistan is also about 1/70th of the North American equivalent. In the next two decades the demand for per capita energy consumption in Pakistan will increase by at least 400 per cent. How is Pakistan to meet this need? Despite increasing our indigenous oil production by some 40 per cent of our total import 86 per cent of which accounts for some 50 per cent of our total annual foreign exchange inflows. Our coal reserves are insignificant, standing at about half a billion tons compared, for example, to India's 81 billion tons of coal reserves. Our natural gas reserves amount approximately 724 million tons of coal equivalent. We should reserve its use as a feed stock for industrial use, but having no alternative we are depleting this valuable resource at a rate which may not



enable us to use it in the major part of the next century. We are fully utilising hydro-electricity and have reached approximately 50 per cent of its maximum economic utilisation.

« Our first great civilisation, which with Sumeria and Egypt laid the foundations of the historic world, the Indus Valley Harappan culture, perished when it could find no constructive response to the challenge of declining fossil fuel supplies at a time when the Aryans were making their first probes. The extinction of the Harappan civilisation which covered an area of most of today's Pakistan and beyond, led to a 1000 years dark Millenium brought down to us only in epic fables before the balance between man, his wants, the environment and man's innovation was restored leading again to the rise of cities in North India. If Pakistan cannot find the answer to its energy needs its people can look forward only to a return to a pastoral life. At the moment nuclear energy provides the only long term answer. »

The importance of achieving autarky in the nuclear fuel cycle was brought home in 1976 when Canada unilaterally ended its commitment to supply fuel for Pakistan's Canadian built reactor, KANUPP, in Karachi. Ostensibly the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been negotiated in 1970 to prevent further proliferation whilst encouraging the development of peaceful nuclear energy indigenously and through co-operative efforts. However, soon after the Indian explosion it became clear that the rationale behind the NPT had been the desire to prevent Japan and West Germany from going nuclear by allowing them in return to develop complete nuclear capabilities. In the developed world, Israel, South Africa, West Germany, Japan, Italy and the Netherlands, apart from the five sanctioned nuclear powers, possess either or both the reprocessing and enrichment facilities which can provide the plutonium 239 or the 90 per cent plus enriched uranium 235 required to produce nuclear weapons.



## INDIAN EXPLOSION

Consequent upon the Indian explosion the thrust of non-proliferation policy changed not only to the denial of advanced nuclear technology even to countries which had signed the NPT, but also confined its scope to potential further proliferation implicitly accepting South Africa, Israel and India as *de facto* nuclear powers. The 15 member Nuclear Supplies Group, originally the secret London Club, has become the co-ordinating body for this restrictive policy.

The security of Pakistan does not rest on any one solution. There is no magic bullet. There can be no substitute for our building appropriate institutions, for raising our socio-economic levels, for recognising and giving effect to the pivotal role of education, for justice, for a foreign policy which strives constructively to reduce tension with all our neighbours while maintaining our independence and self-respect. However, in the last resort, a country's security must rest on its military capability to deflect the use of hostile force, and, preferably, to deter the actual deployment of such hostile force.

Within these parameters it is clear that Pakistan with its smaller size can never hope to deter a bigger neighbour by building up its purely conventional military capability. A nuclear capability alone represents the only possible equaliser for Pakistan in this context. The present state of the art allows for computerised trigger mechanism tests using depleted uranium cores doing away with the need for an actual demonstration explosion. In Europe, despite the legacy of two world wars, the nuclear balance has deterred any conflict from arising during the last 37 years. It is not hard to postulate that if a similar nuclear balance had existed between, Pakistan and India, both countries would not have been forced into a series of conflicts which have turned the Sub-continent into economically the most depressed area in Asia in contrast to its pre-eminence and promise at the moment of



independence.

If we are to achieve a credible nuclear capability in the interests of the stability of South Asia and with the goal of thence more realistically being able to persuade our nuclear capable neighbour towards some measure of bilateral nuclear disarmament, how is this to be done?

The first decision that has to be taken is institutional. Pakistan has a very limited technological base in terms of facilities and manpower. The nuclear effort in Pakistan, if it is to succeed must pool all available manpower. All research efforts must be subject to constant peer group evaluation and review. Our financial resources are far too limited to squander without such institutional safeguards. Secondly, as we have an experimental enrichment project we must explore the technology of achieving high strategic enrichment. This is no easy task as it impinges on the frontiers of existing metallurgical technology to ensure that the break down rate of ultra centrifuges with the attendant loss of material does not jeopardise the objective.

To a large extent our present predicament is due to the lack of vision of our leaders in the sixties when we were offered facilities to match those being developed elsewhere at affordable prices. The principle draw-back from which we still suffer is that, unlike some other states, we did not go in for a small research reactor which can produce plutonium. Our main priority should now be to build our own small air cooled graphite moderate natural uranium reactor. This would give us the plutonium we would need not only for research for breeder reactors but also to gain credibility as a nuclear capable power as some other developing countries have done.

We, of course, retain the option of reprocessing fuel from KANUPP. It may be recalled that the trilateral safeguards with Canada and the IAEA over this reactor are not only being maintained, but are being extended in severity, in



a gesture of unilateral submission unprecedented in the history of international exchanges in nuclear energy. India has taken a firm stand that no safeguards will apply to Tarapur after the original thirty years agreement runs out in 1993. The trilateral safeguards over KANUPP, in terms of international law and practice, could be said to have, ended as a consequence of Canada's unilateral cessation of fuel supplies. Furthermore, the safeguards agreement is based on the life of the extendable ten years Pak-Canadian Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy which itself has been subject since 1969 to a clause allowing the treaty to lapse six months after a unilateral notification by either side. Should Pakistan wish to maintain the safeguards on KANUPP there is still no bar on the reprocessing of its spent fuel although this will be consequently subject to safeguards.

It is also time that we built a heavy water plant not only to service KANUPP but also any other small heavy water natural uranium research reactor which we might wish to build ourselves. Any nation which has the experience of building fertiliser plants should be able to produce a heavy water plant with its derivative technology.

At the same time Pakistan could invite India into a series of peaceful nuclear exchanges. India's experiment reactors would be of value to our nascent efforts. Furthermore, our low enrichment experience might one day be of practical value to India. Had our effort in this field been more advanced there was no reason why India should not have turned to Pakistan and not France for separative enrichment work for Tarapur, given a climate of detente between our two countries.

Much has been written in India on the potential need for peaceful nuclear devices to unlock fuel reserves which would be otherwise inaccessible. The position is very much geologically the same in Pakistan. Both countries could learn from each other in this field as well.



It is rightly held that leaders with vision decisively effect the quality of life of the people. In the context of Pakistan's economic and strategic-security, the nuclear issue holds an unrivalled place. I make bold to state that Pakistan has no option but to develop its nuclear energy cycle, which more than any other single factor will give it the economic and strategic security that it has sought since 1947.



## THE GENEVA TALKS

Since our rise to statehood, the true test of our foreign policy has been our ability (or lack of it) to assess and deal with super-power intentions in our region so that we can avoid becoming a cockpit of their mutual rivalries. We have not always failed on this account. I well remember the occasion in 1969 when Indira Gandhi wistfully told Air Marshal Nur Khan, who had come to New Delhi to condole President Zakir Hussain's death, that Pakistan had succeeded in establishing the best of relations with all the three big powers with interests in our region.

This was no ordinary compliment, for less than a year earlier, the news of Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan and Premier Kosygin's letter enjoining a just and fair division of the Farrakka waters had come as a rude surprise to the Indian Capital. And yet all this gain was frittered away in a mere matter of two years thanks to our inability to separate the chaff from the wheat, and our penchant for giving back as good as we take. There is no other explanation of the Yahya-Podgorny exchange of April, 1971. Our ambivalence towards Washington has been no less glaring at times.

At the third and last round of Geneva talks there was no meeting of minds either on a time frame for a Soviet pullout, or, more, on the connotation and denotation of guarantees of non-interference in Afghanistan. The whole exercise, therefore, needs to be seen with our own eyes and not through Moscow or Washington's coloured glasses. No sooner had the



talks ended than the Western media went to town with stories of a "complete block", blaming the Soviets for the deadlock. For their part, the Soviets blamed the Americans. Georgy A. Arbatov, head of the prestigious North American Institute in Moscow, had said in a speech in Geneva that the Soviet Union was ready to pull its troops out as soon as sufficient guarantees of non-interference were forthcoming from Pakistan. He went on to say that Washington was exerting pressure on Pakistan to avoid a peaceful settlement. Ambassador Smirnov said much the same thing on the eve of Secretary Shultz's arrival in Islamabad earlier this month. No wonder while the talks were being made out to have stalled, if not actually failed, in the Western media, Tass should have gone on to accord them the accolade of success. The truth, as always, lies between these two extreme views. To discover exactly where and how to deal with it, we must first assess the Super Power's intentions in Afghanistan.

### SOVIET INTENTIONS

The reasons Moscow has advanced over the last three years for its military intervention in Afghanistan are well known in Pakistan and do not need repetition here. Of course, neither an invitation by Hafizullah Amin, nor the safety of Soviet Union's 'soft belly' in Central Asia as Professor Gankovsky described it at a South Asian Peace conference in Islamabad last November, nor the application of the Brezhnev Doctrine to Afghanistan appear as justification enough in the eyes of the people of this country. Access to warm waters of the Arabian Sea is a favourite though not very well documented theory and hardly worthy of any credence in the context of today's realities. In a recent article, of which more later, Selig Harrison says: "—informed American and other Western Intelligence sources agree that Moscow has not used its occupation to improve its logistical capabilities in Afghanistan for offensive action against neighbouring Persian Gulf states". It was this fear that had exercised President Carter no end at



one stage. Keeping the US out of Iran and demanding an equitable share of the Gulf oil at some future stage are two credible enough reasons that the regional states of South Asia ought to keep in mind about the 1979 developments in Afghanistan. The Soviet influence in South Asia has to be perceived in realistic terms. It cannot be just wished away.

That the Soviets have come up against unforeseen difficulties in Afghanistan is no longer denied, or the cost thereof minimised, in Moscow. This is a refreshing change of the Andropov era. Hence Moscow's active encouragement of the on-going U.N. mediation efforts, which picked up un-expected momentum after Senor Cordovez's shuttle diplomacy in the January of this year. A detailed twenty page "comprehensive settlement" calling upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan within a finite period, and requiring Pakistan to end all its support for the Mujahideen and to stop all weapon shipments reaching them through Pakistani territory, as discussed and agreed to in principle in Geneva last spring, caused considerable surprise to our friends, especially the American policy planners.

### US OBJECTIVE

Beginning with "what should American objectives be in Afghanistan", Harrison, in an analytical essay in the summer issue of "Foreign Policy" examines in depth several critical, interrelated issues involved in the projected U.N. package deal. After enumerating the compelling reasons for which Pakistan would like to have an early settlement he describes the absence of a definite provision for replacement of the Karmel regime as the most sensitive aspect of this deal, meaning thereby that any agreement without such a provision would not be acceptable to the American Administration. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind on this account after Secretary Shultz's recent visit to Pakistan. Withdrawal of all Soviet Forces, respect for Afghanistan's territorial



integrity, the right of its people to self-determination without foreign interference, and restoration of the Afghan people's spiritual and national values happen to be also ex-King Zahir Shah's demand. But then how realistic a demand it is in the context of today's realities is another matter.

A highly placed Soviet source is of the opinion that the problem of insurgency inside Afghanistan is almost licked, and that Pakistan can keep the three million refugees it has on its soil just now. He emphasises that some of these refugees will not be allowed to return to Afghanistan anyway. Therefore, the demand for self-determination as also the propaganda campaign, with a spate of damaging press leaks, launched throughout the West on the eve of Geneva talks last month may have conceivably helped to abort whatever gain was made last spring.

Assessing American interests in the U.N. negotiations, Selig Harrison says that the American Administration is divided (we have been here once before!) "between the State Department officials, who are waiting to see the formal form of the agreement, and hard liner elements in the National Security Council and the Pentagon, who are ready to reject it but do not expect to be called upon to give such a decision". The latter are understood to argue that the U.S. should not make it easy for the Soviets to withdraw even if they were ready to do so.

Dimitrei k. Simes, a colleague of Selig Harrison at the Carnegie Endowment and Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, explains what this means, rather graphically, in the *Christian Science Monitor* of June 13:

"The Soviet Union demands a guarantee that the U.S. will cease supporting Afghan rebels. The same is expected of China, Pakistan and Iran. Totally abandoned, the rebels would — the Soviet leadership hopes — be faced with a choice between defeat and accepting a junior role in the Kabul



regime. Neither morality nor pragmatic U.S. non-involvement guarantee should not be simply pocketed by the Kremlin. If Andropov wants it, he has to be prepared to discuss it directly with Washington and to pay the necessary price. If not, he deserves as much help from the U.S. as this country received from the Soviet Union when it tried to negotiate an honourable exit from Vietnam: zero".

For his part, Selig Harrison ends his scholarly essay with the exhortation that despite its imperfections, the projected U.N. settlement would present a clear victory for international public opinion, reflected in successive U.N. resolutions calling for a Soviet pullout. "Conversely", he concludes, "the United States would quickly squander the political benefits that it has gained from Moscow's ugly adventure, if Washington appeared to be prolonging the bloodshed for its own strategic reasons to be fighting to the last Afghan".

Irrespective of the consideration whether or not the Soviet participation in the Geneva talks is a propaganda ploy and of the Americans wanting to withhold their support to an early settlement in Afghanistan till such time as the Soviets are ready to enter into a political dialogue with the U.S., the time has come for us to assess afresh the demands of our own national interests. The chief among these is the presence of some three million Afghan refugees. The economic, social and political problems arising out of their prolonged stay in Pakistan are becoming increasingly exacting. And weapon trials—an ugly word - are always prone to leaks. If the key to a peaceful solution to the Afghan problem lies in Moscow, as it indeed does, then let us go to Moscow and persuade it to allow the Geneva talks to resume where they were left off last April. A deal should still be possible under three major heads—namely, withdrawal of Soviet forces, end of Pakistan's support to the insurgency in Afghanistan and the return of Afghan refugees. A strict simultaneity in the enforcement of all is a must in so far as Pakistan is concerned. Of course we, for our part, should be more flexible than we were at one



time, thanks to the heady resolutions in certain international forums. The reason for their inefficacy is aptly illustrated by what Stalin once asked of a visitor who assured him of the Pope's support: "how many divisions does the Pope's have?" Only a pragmatic approach can help us to lower the ante and bring the game back to our own table from the Super Power chess board.

### ZAHIR SHAH

Ex-King Zahir Shah's recent interview to Patrice De Beer of *Le Monde* is germane to the point I am making. While saying that he never wanted to sign an agreement which was hostile to the U.S.S.R., he asks Pakistan to do nothing against Afghanistan which might imperil Pakistan's own interests and perhaps its very existence. The history of Pakistan - Afghanistan relations of the past three decades and more does not inspire confidence in this gratuitous advice. As for his claim that all his life he has believed in democracy, and he is not going to change now, he cannot have been serious. In their unremitting hostility towards Pakistan, did the ruling family of Afghanistan ever conceive the possibility that one day three million of their deprived nationals would find no shelter anywhere in the world except in Pakistan?

We have received the Afghan refugees with open arms in spite of the ruling family, which has much to answer for their plight. We never shut our eyes to the geopolitical realities of our situation, and to our indissoluble ties with our Muslim brethren across the border. The same sense of pragmatism and vision now demands that we perceive and understand what is going on in Afghanistan, lest we meet the same fate as they did by closing their eyes to the undeniable economic development taking place in other parts of Central Asia, specifically in Tajikistan on their very doorstep. Internal stability, socio-economic progress and regional harmony are the essential pre-requisite of our National survival.



And like any other country, we can and should rely only upon our own national will and ability to survive.



# PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PREDICAMENT

## I

Four years have now gone by since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is time that we in Pakistan faced this issue squarely and dispassionately, without rhetoric or emotion, and analysed three interrelated questions which are fundamental to our survival as a nation state.

i) Why did the USSR invade Afghanistan, what really is happening there now and what are the chances for the Soviets to leave?

ii) What in broad qualitative terms are the financial, economic, social, political and international security costs to Pakistan of this Afghan diaspora to Pakistan?

iii) What should be our response both internally and in the context of our external postures.

In this first essay I shall try to tackle some of these issues.

There are a number of explanations offered as to why the USSR invaded Afghanistan. Some postulate defensive motives, others expansionist aims, and their relevance lies in extrapolating the future course of events. Very often we tend to ignore the most obvious explanation because it appears too simple. I believe that the basic Soviet aim was to prop up and to save the new marxist-socialist regime from being toppled and being replaced for the first time in Afghanistan's history by an anti-Soviet regime. No doubt the opportunity offered other advantages, a potential flanking move into Iran had the US used the hostage crisis to intervene physically, closer access to the Indian Ocean and, more important, to the Gulf oil fields and oil lane choke points.



## MISFORTUNE

It has been Pakistan's misfortune that our foreign policy planners could not conceive, in the post Daoud era, that if the Taraki/Amin regime was destabilized the USSR would physically intervene and become our neighbour. Had our assessment been otherwise, as I urged from my perspective from Moscow, the outcome might have been different and certainly less disfavoured for Pakistan. We lost then an opportunity to achieve an Afghan recognition of our border, the Durand Line, which has constituted one of the two enduring objectives of our foreign policy since 1947 along with the principal task of coping with the ever present threat from India.

While the present government came to power criticizing as unrealistic and counterproductive the high profile foreign policy of the last regime, our response to the invasion was to play the role of drum beaters for the rights of the Afghan people, of the Afghan state and to become an international Don Quixote tilting for the rights of smaller states against a super power, both in the Islamic Conference and at the UN. The more we beat the drum the more Afghan refugees poured in.

A cool, dispassionate historic look at Pak-Afghan relations would show what exactly we owe the Afghans who in the last three thousand years have either freely allowed invaders to enter our land or who have joined these influxes to the extent that some Afghan tribes such as the Dalakzais and Suris have vanished from Afghanistan and settled in the sub-continent. There is no record of any Afghan going back. While many Indian Muslims fought for the Afghans against the British during the First Afghan war from 1838-42, this favour was never returned. Instead during the Great Mutiny of 1857 those of our revolutionary ancestors who fled to Afghanistan were sold back by the Afghans to the British for the price of Rs. 50 if they had a rifle or Rs.30 without a rifle,



to be blown up from British guns in regimental squares. During the Khilafat Movement over 20,000 Muslims from the sub-continent, mostly from the Punjab and Sind, went on Hijrat to Afghanistan. They were pushed out, some to the USSR where still a few small Punjabi speaking communities exist, or back, literally without the shirts on their backs.

In 1944, the Afghans in diplomatic negotiations with the British laid the foundation of their still existing claim to a large part of our beloved land. Even Nehru, the then Foreign Minister of the Interim Government of undivided India in 1946 was forced to reply that if the selective claims of history gave Afghanistan the right to demand parts of the NWFP and Baluchistan, then sub-continental rule over Afghanistan gave a more valid right for incorporation of Afghan territory upto the Hindu Kush. In 1947, Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan's admission to the UN. From 1947 onwards Afghanistan maintained its irredentist claims and followed an active policy of inciting destabilization and subversion in our border areas to divert the attention of its people from internal socio-economic and constitutional problems which it would have done better to tackle and which unchecked are directly responsible for Afghanistan's present plight.

There are those who say that Afghanistan showed its goodwill by not trying to take advantage of our vulnerability during the 1965 and 1971 wars. However, the fact is that the ratio of forces would have still forced them to pay an unacceptable price without a sure prospect of success, and, most important of all, China made it clear that it would not stand by even in 1971, when the Indo-Soviet Treaty had estopped any Chinese action against India.

It is a tragic illustration of our failure to define our foreign policy goals that till this day not one solitary Mujahideen leader in Afghanistan or in Pakistan has ever publicly stated that it was wrong of Afghanistan to have followed such an irredentist and confrontatory policy towards Pakistan,



that they now recognize for all time the validity of the Durand Line as our international frontier, and that they will never revert to such a policy in the future. However, whenever a foreign policy is not solely motivated by national self interest but by polemics and short term gains, it loses its protective role and becomes prey to outside powers and pulls.

### A STEP AHEAD

We are a poor developing country striving to raise our standard of living and to keep it just one bare step ahead of our high, three percent per annum population increase. No attempt has yet been made in Pakistan to quantify in broad terms the financial, economic ecological and social costs of this Afghan invasion into Pakistan, let alone the political fallout which is becoming increasingly evident.

If we take the Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-88) as a reference mark we can in 1983 terms quantify the direct fixed cost to our exchequer of maintaining these three million refugees at US\$ 300 million or Rs. four billion a year exclusive of declining international donations. Loss of import duty for exempting all relief vehicles and goods comes to about US\$ 50 million annually but will be excluded from the total head in this analysis. The refugee burden also imposes a heavy burden on our social services and general developmental infrastructure. Scarce resources such as cement have to be diverted for refugee relief and rehabilitation from development projects and potential exports.

Another invisible cost is labour displacement by refugees competing for employment at lower wages. Lost labour opportunity costs in a variety of occupations and small trades, particularly in the field of transportation, have also to be taken into account. The refugees who work do not in any case pay any tax, and, without any stakes in the country, are motivated purely by the need to make short term profits



without adding to our long term commercial infrastructure.

The ecological cost from refugee deforestation and over grazing very directly adversely affects our present and future eco-system. On an average every refugee family utilizes some five point three cubic meters or four tons of firewood a year. We already consume some thirteen million tons of firewood a year and the two million tons used by the refugees comes to fifteen percent extra which we cannot afford when our current reforestation programmes can only provide for twenty per cent of the actual need. This additional degradation of our forestry resources, especially in the NWFP, will lead to soil erosion, flash flooding and eventually affect our agricultural land and weather cycle which already in the last two years has shifted towards delayed rains.

## REFUGEES

The very presence of these refugees in such numbers, even if they were strictly law abiding, has caused demographic changes with the refugees outnumbering the local inhabitants in a number of areas. Existing social tensions have been kept in check as long as the refugees have been mainly confined to the NWFP and Baluchistan. However, their importation into the Punjab has inevitably led to a reaction which has now found expression in political dissent. Unlike Iran, we have not been able to impose the law of our land on these refugees. The Iranians with their strong sense of cultural identity and pride coupled with the political strength which comes from the ballot box take no nonsense from armed, able bodied refugees who, they think, should be either fighting in Afghanistan or on the Gulf war front. In bazar clashes in Iran refugee trouble makers have had to pay the price for inciting tension while in Pakistan it is the local inhabitants who have to suffer even in our federal capital in Islamabad.



## II

The revolution in Iran drove the Iranian heroin chemists into Pakistan and the Afghanistan crisis has led to a vast increase in opium production in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A combination of these two factors has turned Pakistan into the world's primary heroin production centre. While there is some anxiety occasionally about possible Soviet ripostes or subversion we fail to realize that as long as the Afghanistan crisis persists our social fabric is being eroded far more effectively by the rapid rise of heroin addiction in Pakistan itself which has reached some three hundred thousand people. It might be recalled that the supply of cheap and readily available narcotics to American troops in Vietnam proved in the end more useful to their foes than battlefield confrontation. Only a solution in Afghanistan can curtail this increasing narcotic flood across our borders.

It is clear that a foreign policy must rest on a broad national consensus and that this consensus can only come about when a widely accepted constitutional solution is evolved based on parties and elections. However, one of the main reasons advanced against elections now is that if elections were held the progressive parties with their ballot power would return to power while the fundamentalist parties relying on almost one hundred thousand armed refugees would not allow such a government to remain in office. Be that as it may, it is clear that we cannot allow the refugees to have a veto power over our internal political process and certainly not to become a state within a state which is what, if un-



checked, they are evolving into.

Turning back to the fiscal cost of these refugees we may calculate through shadow pricing the indirect economic cost to be, at a very conservative estimate, equal to the direct financial cost, bringing the annual total to Rs. eight billion a year. The ecological cost in terms of firewood, deforestation, erosion, flooding, soil malnutrition and other downstream productivity losses, at a time when our own wood fuel needs will outstrip supply within ten years, can be estimated at some Rs. six and a half billion per annum. Hence during the Sixth Five Year Plan period the refugees will cost us Rs.72 billion in gross economic terms or Rs. 40 billion in monetary terms.

If we relate this to our projected plan expenditure we can see that our annual 83-84 federal and provincial development plan intends to utilize Rs. 31.1 billion for development outlays. The direct annual fiscal costs of these refugees come to about 26 per cent of this total. The entire Five Year Plan intends to allocate Rs.15.3 billion to agriculture, Rs.19.8 billion to education, Rs. 13 billion to health and Rs.2.3 billion to population welfare programmes. The total social services sector allocation over five years comes to Rs. 35 billion, and in fact will probably amount to far less in the light of existing resource constraints which have already led to a fourteen percent cut-back.

The Rs.40 billion that we will have to spend on the refugees if they stay over five years or the Rs.72 billion that they will actually cost us should be seen in the context of what else these resources would provide for could they be so freed. Rs. 40 billion would suffice for 85 per cent of the cost of the projected Kalabagh dam on whose energy generation our economy will depend in large part. It would be enough to pay for two one thousand Megawatt nuclear power plants at Chashma. It could enable us to produce a completely indigenous nuclear capability alongwith a credible medium range delivery system which is vital in the context of our



security vis a vis India.

Once or twice when there was a discussion on avenues to tackle the Afghanistan crisis, during my recent visit to the United States, it was pointed out to me that a more flexible Pakistan approach would lead to a cut off of American aid and possibly Saudi and Gulf assistance as well. While this very proposition is debatable, certainly at least in the context of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries, the Rs. 8 billion or US\$ 600 million refugee costs per annum should also be compared to existing levels of economic assistance from these sources. The five year American economic aid package is for US\$ 1.6 billion or US\$ 320 million a year. Saudi economic assistance average out to about US\$ 59 million a year. Aid from other Gulf countries and Islamic banks has been around the US\$ 40 million mark annually. This brings the aggregate economic assistance from the US, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region, excluding Iran, to be around US\$ 420 million annually in present and projected terms.

What, however, do these refugees costs mean in human terms? Remember that we are a country with one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world. Seven percent of children under five suffer from third degree malnutrition, 52 million of our population is under 15 years of age, only 26 per cent of the population is literate and within the next five years some four million souls will enter the labour market where there is already 3.1 per cent unemployment, a figure which is bound to rise as the Gulf expatriate labour boom now begins to wind down. It means that for every Afghan refugee that is allowed to stay indefinitely in Pakistan, one additional Pakistani child or adult will die from malnutrition/lack of health facilities, one additional Pakistani child will go without adequate education, and one Pakistani adult will be without a job. In my concluding essay I will try to outline an approach to deal with this predicament which constitutes a threat to our security, stability, political and socio-economic development.



### III

IN my first two essays I tried to tackle Soviet motivation in invading Afghanistan and analysed the cost benefit ratio as essentially detrimental to our economic development and security. I now turn towards an exploration on how we should meet these challenges.

We must begin with an objective assessment of how the Soviets are faring in Afghanistan and what pressure would be required to get them out. While a number of sources in our region and outside have portrayed the USSR as bogged down in a deepening morass it would be fatal to become a prisoner of our own propaganda despite our natural sympathy for an occupied people. The actual position has been best summed up in Drew Middleton's New York Times article of Dec. 26, 1983 entitled "4 Years of Afghan Battle: No Vietnam for Moscow."

Quoting western analysts he observes that only 12-15000 Soviet troops are actively fighting the resistance with five to seven hundred employed in daily operations due to the availability of air power and the willingness of the newly reconstituted Afghan army to carry out ground operations and that Soviet losses do not exceed one thousand a year. The conclusion is that even if the Afghan resistance were better supplied they face a pessimistic future as the Soviets could contain them and unlike the US in Vietnam the Soviets are not going to get tired of Afghanistan which is too close to them and too close to the Indian Ocean.



## CONTROL

What the USSR is doing in Afghanistan is exactly what the British did to control our tribal areas at minimum cost by seizing the high ground, communication centres and urban areas. We followed the same policy since 1947 withdrawing originally even from Wana and Razmak. Today certain tribal areas such as the Tirah valley still lie outside our control. We preferred a policy of creeping annexation to the cost of physical domination. The USSR in dual track policy is aggressively developing socialist institutions and indoctrinating student, military and political cadres in the urban areas while condoning tribal customs in the rural areas the better to manipulate traditional tribal cupidity for loyalty and armed support.

In Afghanistan's ethnic plurality the Pakhtuns are the dominant factor. Soviet policy, based on their Central Asian experience is to set up "national minority republics" to weaken the Pakhtun hold. The resistance movement is itself split between the Pakhtun elements operating in the South bordering Pakistan and other ethnic units determined to build themselves up against future Pakhtun domination.

Three effective centres of resistance exist within Afghanistan with one of them at truce with the occupying forces. The weakness of the fragmented Afghan resistance lies in two factors. The need for more sophisticated arms and the lack of a unifying ideological alternative. The best and the brightest of Afghanistan's young men who could lead an Afghan renaissance come to Pakistan, make a round of the Mujahideen groups and leave for the West as they can see no constructive and progressive future policy on offer. The present leaders can talk, attract funds, some can fight, all are agreed to get the Soviets out but they lack the vision to inspire confidence in the viability of a potentially liberated Afghanistan.



We in Pakistan must realise that if we really want to effectively help the Mujahideen then like North Vietnam which fought for 30 years we would have to not only fulfill their arms requirements but also infiltrate a major part of our army and para military forces, at least that part ethnically indistinguishable from the Afghans, into Afghanistan over a long time span far greater than our attempt in Kashmir in operation Gibraltar, the prelude to the 65 war. We should then be prepared for massive aerial bombardments, excursions and salients into our territory, subversion and probable parallel counter-measures from India. When the Vietnam war finished in 1975 Vietnam's economic goal was to regain the developmental levels of 1969 before the major American military effort and bombing began. Short of this there is no help that we can give which can further the military confrontation and civil war beyond further sacrificing Afghan lives. Obviously no one in Pakistan would support a course of action which would so manifestly lead to our own destruction.

The problem of our present policy is that while the dangers are almost as great there is no visible recognition of this in terms of action on the part of our policy makers. Technical virtuosity cannot compensate for a lack of depth and support in foreign policy.

There are a number of schools of thought in Pakistan as to what our policy on Afghanistan should be based upon. The dominant theory is that the Afghans are fighting our battle, that we are next on the Soviet hit list and that we can keep the pot on the boil in so controlled a manner to preclude both Soviet and Indian active enmity while still reaping the rewards of American appreciation. Another real politik hypothesis is that the invasion has deterred secessionist provincial tendencies and that since a strong reconstituted Afghanistan, either marxist or under the Mujahideen, would inevitably revert into a new more effective threat to Pakistan, our interests lie in a continuing low level of fighting which



will postpone such an eventuality without incurring Soviet hostility. The common man is worried by the rise of tension and the failure of our foreign policy to ward off threats to our security now appearing for the first time on two fronts.

### PAK-SOVIET TERMS

It is clear that either there can be a solution on Afghanistan on US-Soviet terms or on Pak-Soviet terms. What are American intentions? There has been a most interesting recent published exchange of views between Selig Harrison, who feels that the American Administration is trying to bleed the Soviets to the last Afghan and is therefore holding up the Geneva talks, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Murphy who denied this allegation. Another pertinent article in the New York Times of Dec. 29, 1983 by Professor Jiri Valenta, another analyst worthy of deep respect, asserts that the US must get the USSR to the negotiating table while increasing military pressure without undermining the government in Pakistan and also exploring the possibility of sending supplies through Iran to bring about a "Finlandized" Afghanistan.

As a former US National Security Adviser said to me recently, during a discussion in New York on Afghanistan, Pakistan has three options open to it. A major escalation which we would not survive, a minor escalation which we could live with and which would be necessary to pressure the USSR, and de-escalation which would lead to a cut off of US and Gulf aid. I told him that any further escalation might mean an additional two to three million refugees in Pakistan.

What then is the solution to our predicament? I would make bold to state that the three underlying problems behind our security since independence have been:

- (i) political instability and a lack of political evolution in Pakistan due partly to a deeply ingrained fear in the minds of our people as to the very survival of the country itself.
- (ii) the Soviet perception that since 1947 Pakistan has been



hostile to its interests, a perception which has been strengthened by our pro-western alliances over the years and which has been given the final seal in the Soviet mind by our policy on Afghanistan, and,

(iii) India's perception that we are in constant competition in the regional and international arena and hence its desire at best for a *risorgimento*, possibly our balkanization which it began in 1971 with the creation of Bangladesh and at least by our acceptance of a client state status.

If we had experienced uniform political development and followed a more realistic foreign policy, perhaps we would have been in a position to truly manoeuvre today. But we have failed on both fronts and that moment has passed even if it is not apparent to our policy makers. Drastic diseases need drastic cures.



## IV

Our only possible option is to now follow a course of action adopted by other countries in response to their security needs, a move towards formal and permanent neutrality. To ascertain the actual concept and role of neutrality a number of models can be studied, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Malta and Austria. The basic concepts are clear. Permanent neutrality rests on the classical definition of neutrality under international law laid down in the "1907 Hague Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land", no more and no less than non-participation in a War on Land", no more and no less than non-participation in a war between other states. A state which has adopted neutrality assumes certain attendant rights, duties and obligations both in war and in peace which constitute the law of neutrality. Measures to apply this law constitute the policy of neutrality. The three fundamental pillars for a state to bind itself to permanent neutrality are (a) declare its permanent neutrality and to resolve to maintain and defend it with all the means at its disposal, (b) never to join any military alliances or permit the establishment of military bases by foreign states on its territory, and (c) never to participate in a war between other states.

Finland's neutral status arising out of its disastrous World War II pro-Nazi decision to invade the USSR is consequently based on the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the USSR and is therefore somewhat unfairly termed as "assymetrical neutrality" by



certain observers. Sweden's permanent neutrality rests on its declaration and practice without any legal or constitutional obligations to this effect. In the Swedish view international guarantees of neutrality by the great powers would in themselves create some measure of dependence and circumscribe national freedom of action.

### BEST EXAMPLE

Austria, I feel, furnishes the best example for us. When in 1955 the occupying forces, including those of the USSR, left, Austria constitutionally adopted a policy of permanent neutrality. In fact Soviet troops withdrawal was dependent on Austria going neutral. Neutrality can be consistent with an active international role. Sweden's contribution to the North South dialogue and to disarmament has been far out of proportion to its size. Neutrality has given such states great weight and respect in international affairs. Austria is also illustrative of a very active foreign policy. Jewish emigres leaving the USSR transit through Austria which is also far in advance of other Western countries in establishing relations with the PLO.

Each neutral State tailors its practice of neutrality to its needs. Pakistan need be no exception. An active Austrian type of neutrality would allow us to continue to play a leading role in the Muslim world, making us more acceptable to all sides. Freed of our major security concerns significant defence expenditure could be reallocated for socio-economic development. This is not to say that neutrality implies disarming oneself. The three main neutral states, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden field highly efficient and well armed volunteer forces. Both Switzerland and Sweden have the capability to go nuclear if they so desire within a very short lead time and there is no reason why any fresh neutral states should not follow their example.



It might be argued that while the USSR, which has long term objectives in this area, would accept such a development India might be less than happy. India would prefer a client state but faced with a Pakistan closely allied to the US and China, it would find a neutral Pakistan a more acceptable and less competitive proposition. Moreover, if we are to evolve a durable *modus vivendi* with India we are likely to pay a lesser price if this accommodation is reached on Soviet terms rather than purely on Indian terms.

### OPPORTUNITY

What of the USA? Undoubtedly the US would not be happy right now for Pakistan to go neutral despite its pressure on us to come to terms with India. However, for us 1984 furnishes a unique opportunity. In an election year American foreign policy is traditionally on the defensive if not paralysed. Even President Reagan is being forced to say that he wants an opening to the USSR. Hence, the Administration cannot afford to appear to oppose a settlement on Afghanistan. Furthermore, Reagan's re-election hangs in the balance. There is a hypothesis that the Zionist lobby realizes that every new President is so beholden for its critical electoral support that he must completely back Israel and that a re-elected President would feel strong enough to follow a more balanced Middle East policy. That is why when American Presidents talk of a more even handed approach they do so from retirement or after electoral defeat.

If the democrats get in again we can expect a winding down of the US aid and commitment to Pakistan and possibly a Yalta type agreement with the USSR including Afghanistan at our expense. All the other Presidential candidates have taken such a strong position on nuclear proliferation that it is likely that a continued US relationship would be dependent on our giving far more positive proofs of giving up the nuclear option than demanded by the Reagan Ad-



ministration.

### REFUGEE FACTOR

There is of course the Afghan refugee factor. The refugees may give us some trouble but in the face of a Pak-Soviet-Afghan understanding their capability would be limited and this would be the spur to bring them to the conference table.

The evolution of neutrality in other countries owes much to their geographical position as areas of not primary but secondary importance across opposing two power blocks and tensions. Pakistan stands astride US-Soviet force potentials centered around the strategic Gulf areas and between Chinese Indian points of friction. Neither side would like us to belong to the other but would prefer our neutrality to that eventuality. As Machiavelli stated, "If you have a friend who has troubles with others, he wants you to be his ally; if somebody dislikes you or is indifferent, he wants you to remain neutral."

In the light of our situation we should have two aims, to avoid coming under the influence of one super power while avoiding becoming the menacing outpost of the other super power. The alternative may not be even Balkanization but Polandization which occurred when a country's continued inflexibility and over-reaching ambition led to its three partitions and occupations with the loss of national identity for centuries. A policy of neutrality is the only answer.



## THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN PAKISTAN AND THE FOREIGN FACTOR

It is paradoxical that we in Pakistan have a habit of seeing and blaming a hidden foreign hand behind each successive crisis that we ourselves create while at the same time we remain blind to the opportunities we have created for foreign exploitation. The present constitutional crisis, which is what it deserves to be called, is no different in that respect from 1971 when it comes to a failure of perception.

The fundamental problem, to arrive at a nationally acceptable modality for transferring power, is inherent in any system of government which does not owe its origin and continued existence to a positive expression of national consensus. Such systems survive by their own momentum, by the favourable balance of forces, disunited opposition, the lack of a democratic tradition and through the *de facto* compliance of a citizenry. It is all too easy for such regimes to delude themselves that compliance over a period of time is equivalent to positive assent for indeterminate further periods of time. In fairness it must be admitted that the problem of constitutionally transferring power has historically bedevilled the Islamic world let alone our own experience in Pakistan.

Faced with the present constitutional crisis one may postulate a number of broadly acceptable assumptions pertaining to our internal situation:

- i) The Martial Law regime has enjoyed an adequate span of six years to achieve its stated objectives of promoting stability, Islamization and the construc-



tion of a new political order.

- ii) Only a democratic system can evolve the politics of national consensus on which our survival as a unified nation state depends.
- iii) Unfortunately, for a variety of historical reasons the smaller provinces of Pakistan have traditionally resented and feared the spectre of real, imagined or potential Punjabi domination.
- iv) As the Armed Forces are drawn primarily from the Punjab, whose population exceeds all the other provinces put together, a Martial Law regime inevitably, despite any efforts to the contrary, accentuates this provincial anti-Punjab hostility.
- v) The writing on the wall has been clear to see in Sind for any one who wished to see. Sindhi resentment is based on a number of factors. To begin with, there is Karachi with its influx from Central India after partition. Then the giving of lands under Ayub Khan to select generals and ICS Officers who brought their own tenants into Sind. The hanging of the first Pakistan Prime Minister from a minority province weighs most heavily in Sind. Lastly, in this non-exclusive list the Sindhi notables, as those elsewhere, are tired of being deprived of political power which is synonymous with political patronage on which their continued influence depends.
- vi) Similar anti-Punjab feelings exist in the N.W.F.P & Baluchistan. Over a period of time the Government might find it equally difficult to handle evolving situations in both these provinces.
- vii) Punjab is, of course, too big & Punjabis too diverse to live up to the fears of their provincial bretheren in terms of potential domination. By the same token it takes time for a trend to mani-



fest itself in the Punjab, but as it had done in the past Punjab may well throw in its pivotal weight in the demand for restoration of democratic institutions.

- viii) The country needs and merits a return to representative and democratic rule as soon as possible.

### EXTERNAL FACTORS

What I am concerned with is to assess and to try to bring to the fore the external factors that we must now take into account in tackling the evolving situation. To begin with, let us examine the options open to the government in dealing with the existing situation in Sind, leaving aside for the moment the other provinces. There is, of course, the political solution being urged by many concerned and patriotic voices. However, in Pakistan we have traditionally suffered from a propensity to misperceive political problems as "law and order" situations which merit only "law and order" solutions. We paid grievously for this mistake in 1971 in East Pakistan.

If the Martial Law Government decides to take a hard line to deal with the disturbances in Sind, this could mean the use of the Army which has already been utilized, in a different context, earlier. This would confirm Sindhi suspicions of Punjabi domination, and, by itself would have lasting & detrimental consequences. More important, we would then have to face an Indian response.

We can still all remember Indira Gandhi's statement after her victory in East Pakistan as she was about to swing her Army against West Pakistan.

She spoke of the deprived rights of the Sindhi and Baluchi people. Already Foreign Minister Narsimha Rao and Mrs. Indira Gandhi have commented on the present situation in Pakistan and have expressed their support for movements to-



wards democratic rights. While we may justly complain of Indian hypocrisy in denying to us the right to criticise endemic communal violence in India, it would be foolish of us not to recognise two pertinent factors. First, India, like it or not, is a big country in comparison to us. The realities of power of realpolitik, not international morality or equity, dictate how countries behave in comparable situations. Secondly, our unfortunate and high profile involvement in the Afghanistan quagmire has forced us in the last few years, encouraged for different reasons both by the USA and China, to turn cap in hand to a policy of almost appeasement towards India. We are now reaping the consequences of a foreign policy weakness of our own making.

### **HARDLINE SOLUTION**

The government of Pakistan should have no doubt that should it opt for a hard line solution in Sind, it would give India the excuse it has been waiting for. India might point to a refugee burden entering India across the Tharparker border. Furthermore, it would seek international justification for opposing what it would term as human right excesses by an unrepresentative regime. These excuses would give India the opportunity to try to topple a regime to which it is ideologically opposed, and also further to weaken Pakistan whose existence it was forced to accept in 1947.

There is a great deal of difference between the options open to the government in Pakistan, and the ability of military regimes in Latin America and Turkey to stay in power. In Latin America and Turkey, army regimes gained some acceptability for varying periods of time and ending episodes for anarchy primarily by being able to crush left wing guerilla movements which were urban and not rural in nature. In Latin America, no stronger neighbour lay in wait. In the case of Turkey, NATO provided a shield against any possible Russian reaction. None of these factors obtain in our case.



On one side there is a hostile Afghanistan/Soviet combination. On the other side our traditional rival, India.

Our vaunted American connection would not be of any value in deterring India. We have seen that before in 1965 and 1971. A hard line reaction by the government may, therefore, well antagonize important elements in the American body politic and thus erode the U.S. Administration's ability for support. We have seen during the fall of the Shah in Iran how difficult it is for a Super Power to help maintain a regime which lacks popular support, and conversely, in Iran again, how difficult it is for any foreign power to destabilize a regime which has broad based support expressed through repeated elections.

Recent international history has shown that Vietnam was able successfully to invade Kampuchea without any effective international reaction, to a large extent because of the unsavoury human rights record of the Pol Pot regime. India would have a number of tactical and strategic responses open for exploitation. It could clandestinely send arms into Sind if the situation deteriorated. At a later stage it might initiate a limited military action in Sind with the aim of provoking a Pakistani reaction either in Sind or elsewhere which would allow India to broaden its objectives to include any or all of the following: to seize all or part of Azad Kashmir, to destroy our nascent nuclear facilities and capabilities, to destroy our military potential. Alternatively, India may decide that a small but decisive military action at any spot of its choosing, such as the Haji Pir Pass or elsewhere, might be sufficient to destabilize a military government unable to reply effectively with force and beset with internal difficulties.

### NO LOVE LOST

For their part, the Babrak Karmal regime in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union surely have no love lost for Pakistan at this stage. Our principled insistence that the people of Afghanistan should be allowed themselves to choose their own



political and economic system has now become a double edged sword. The USSR may try to activate whatever influence it has in the NWFP, Baluchistan and in the labour movement. No one can tell what percentage of the 3 million Afghan refugees are in reality subversive elements. There has been a certain lull in aerial and ground violations along the Afghan border, but there is no guarantee that this situation will continue.

Finally, in relation to external factor while we can count on a number of oil rich Arab countries as well disposed to the government there are others who are less friendly and who may now decide to throw in their considerable financial influence for whatever it is worth.

### POLITICAL REALITIES

The history of Pakistan has shown that foreign factors are often crucial in the making and unmaking of different governments. The 1965 war irreparably weakened Ayub Khan, and led to his eventual down-fall. The 1971 debacle led to the immediate ouster of Yahya Khan. It is an article of belief in certain quarters that certain foreign policy objectives including those in the nuclear field led to the hostility of a certain Super Power against the last government. Governments in Pakistan have learnt to their cost the price of not assessing properly the inter-action of the foreign factors with internal policy.

For the sake of Pakistan, the government must bend all its efforts towards finding a political solution in consultation with our broad based political realities in order to evolve a representative government and a national consensus on which will depend our ability to face and to surmount internal and external challenges which threaten our very existence.

Phone: 215827



## “PAKISTAN’S SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SETTING”

Clauswitz’s dictum, “war is an extension of policy by other means”, led me backwards from my experience as an army officer during the Second World War to the practice of diplomacy, the art of preserving peace. Hence my perspective is based on my experience of 33 years in the field of our foreign policy dating back to the day of our independence and creation on August 14, 1947, when I joined our High Commission in New Delhi, where I have since served three tours of duty. Hence, in this paper I shall try to explain the basics and constants with which we have worked all these years to achieve a goal which the foreign policy establishment of Pakistan shares with our Armed Forces, namely the integrity and independence of our beloved country.

2. If I differ somewhat from our policy planners in how best to ensure our integrity and independence, it is because I believe that like all things else, a foreign policy must evolve, learning from past mistakes and successes, adapting to changing situations and stimuli, if it is not to stagnate. The cardinal maxim of diplomacy and *real-politik* is: “a country has no permanent allies or enemies, only permanent interests”. We are the only country to have been successfully divided since the second world war and this result of our failure to measure up to the challenges we faced both internally and externally places a heavy burden on each one of us to try our best to ensure that nothing of this sort should reoccur. For my part, I always, during my career, conveyed my assessments, however unpalatable they were, as was often the case from New Delhi during the period before the 1971 War and from



Moscow from 1975 to 1979. I continue to do so till this day, after retirement, owing to my sincere belief that the public has a right to be fully informed of the issues at stake, that this can only be done through a process of open discussion in the media and in the legislature, and only through this process the real masters of our foreign policy, the people of Pakistan, will be able to choose the correct path.

3. Since this paper is concerned with our national security I propose to range, by necessity, over a wide field. I would like to examine three inter-related subjects which bear upon the past and continuing evolution of the conduct of our national security:

- (i) The global and regional background,
- (ii) Pakistan's internal development and the various national attitudes or characteristics that impinge upon our security, and
- (iii) The evolution of our foreign policy, its military and strategic context, and the options now available to us.

4. The struggle for position and influence that is the hallmark of the East-West contest for dominance constitutes the dominant global phenomenon of our times since the end of the Second World War. I will, therefore, begin by outlining the interplay of global powers at the point of time when Pakistan and India arose as nation states of this Subcontinent.

5. First, the United States. The two World Wars had enabled the United States to race on its way to becoming *primus inter pares*, the first among equals. While Europe diverted its limited resources to armaments the Americans harnessed their still untapped potential of the North American Continent for military purposes. After 1945, the United States possessed more than 50% of G.N.P., or manufacturing capacity, of the free world. It had heavily invested in new



plants, and managed to channel its prodigious wartime energies into impressive growth in the following year. It enjoyed near monopoly in domestic and in many foreign markets since its former commercial rivals had been ruined by the war. To find an equivalent position, we have to search back in history. In 1815, Britain had completed its triumphal war against Napoleon: its industrial revolution was taking off, its rivals were exhausted economically, and it had a monopoly of world markets. It was the age of — “Pax Britannia”. After 1945, it was the age of “Pax Americana”.

6. It was in these favourable circumstances, the sole possession of the atom bomb included, that today's American leaders grew up assuming that the whole world belonged to them. It was in such circumstances too that America could bear heavy defence expenditure during the early stages of the cold war, which had quickly followed the era of good feelings between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Soviet suspicions and expansion into Eastern and Central Europe, and the pressure on Iran and Greece in 1946, led to the strategy of containment. A year and a half after World War II, the Truman Doctrine was enunciated, opening the way for economic and military supplies to both Greece and Turkey. The role of anti-communism in American policy was essentially to mobilize congressional and public support for the policy once it had been decided upon. What had begun as the strategy of containment in Europe and Far East after the rise of the Chinese Peoples Republic, led to the strategy of “Frontier-manship”. As the Berlin and Cuba crises demonstrated, the chief function of a military power was to delineate and protect frontiers.

7. These frontiers had been clearly drawn: (i) along the river Elb and the middle of Berlin, (ii) at the 38th parallel in Korea, (iii) the 17th parallel in Vietnam, (iv) along the coast of China at Quemoy and Matsu, and (v) more tenuously at the “Northern tier” from Turkey to Pakistan. Any attempt to cross these frontiers, overtly or covertly, would risk hostilities. It was out of this strategy that the Baghdad Pact, later CENTO, and also SEATO were born. But of that, more later.



8. In 1945, the Soviet Union lay in ruins. It had lost some 20 million in dead and wounded, its cities in the theater of war a rubble, its countryside a vast expanse of desolation, and its people over a large part of the country, especially in the Ukraine, reduced to destitution and hunger. However, as averred by an American intelligence forecast immediately after World War II, "with Germany crushed, there was no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military forces". As the Soviet Union expanded its control, contrary to the promise of Yalta, over Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, the Big Three cooperation in Europe came to an end. In each of Eastern European States where the Soviets had their troops, they unilaterally established pro-Soviet coalition governments. As a State that had no natural protective barriers, such as the English Channel or the Atlantic Ocean, and had in consequence been subjected to repeated attacks from outside, the Soviet Union pushed outward to keep enemies as far away as possible. Thus "defensive expansionism" became mingled with expansionism for offensive motives, such as the sphere of communist control.

9. The power vacuum created by Germany's defeat, which permitted the Soviet Union to expand into the centre of Europe, precipitating the Cold War, was almost a replay of the struggle that erupted after the end of the war against Napoleon. The Tsar's troops not only entered Paris, but with his control over Poland fears arose of Russian hegemony over the continent of Europe. In consequence, Austria, Hungary, England and France signed a secret alliance to go to war with Russia if the Tsar would not sign the peace treaty that would bring security to each one of them in equal measure. With Stalin now taking the position of Tsar Alexander, the emergent bipolar distribution of power led each state to see the other as the principal threat to its security and to take appropriate steps which in this case the Soviet Union deemed essentially defensive, but which the United States saw as offensive, expansionist, and aggressive.

10. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in South Asia broke out soon after the withdra-



wal of the British Imperial power from the region and the emergence of Pakistan and India as independent states. In 1949, President Truman invited prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru to pay an official visit to the United States. Shortly afterwards the Soviet Union extended an invitation to our Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, to visit the Soviet Union. It was not long before India gravitated towards the Soviet Union and Pakistan opted for security alliances with the United States. The Jammu and Kashmir dispute confirmed this alignment with the respective super powers because India needed a Soviet veto to block the implementation of the U.N. pledge of a *plebiscite* to settle the dispute.

11. In 1954, Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States to qualify as a recipient of non-reimbursable military aid, undertaking to cooperate with the United States in the defence of the area in which Pakistan was situated. Later that year, Pakistan became a member of SEATO, which was specifically meant to prevent South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from being over-run by North Vietnam after its decisive victory over France at Dien-Bien-phu. In 1955, Pakistan acceded to the Baghdad Pact initiated by Britain and Iraq for an unspecified kind of defence cooperation against communist aggression. The United States became a full member of its military committee.

12. From 1955 to 1960, Pakistan enjoyed a kind of honeymoon relationship with the United States, though the quantum and quality of military equipment supplied to Pakistan was carefully limited so as not to enable Pakistan to achieve military parity with India. Pakistan began to have second thoughts about its alliance with the United States when President Kennedy reversed the Dulles policy and hailed the non-aligned nations as bridge builders between the Cold War contestants — that is, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Kennedy also rushed military assistance to India, including US air force cover, after the brief Sino-Indian clash at the end of 1962, without requiring India to commit itself against China in a defence alliance.



13. In the 1965 seventeen days war between India and Pakistan, President Johnson imposed an arms embargo against Pakistan which effectively deprived it of military aid. The United States even lost interest in promoting an India-Pakistan settlement on Kashmir and encouraged Soviet mediation at Tashkent early in 1966. The two super-powers found themselves at one in denying to the Peoples Republic of China any role in the affairs of the region. Pakistan's developing ties with China were another source of friction with the United States. It was President Nixon who saw in Pakistan-China close relations the possibility of using Pakistan as a bridge in his policy of rapprochement with China so as to gain leverage with the Soviet Union and to use both these communist powers in ending the Vietnam war. It was Pakistan that arranged Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China in the following year.

14. The Soviet Union, which for over a decade was locked with China in a bitter ideological and political controversy leading to their armed clash along the Usuri river border in 1969, became so concerned over what it perceived to be a shift in the balance of power in favour of the United States, in which Pakistan had played a major role, that it threw its support behind India and the secessionist movement in East Pakistan and Indian interference in Pakistan's internal crisis in 1971. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971 was concluded to prevent China from assisting Pakistan in the ensuing war of secession by raising the threat of Sino-Soviet conflict if China were to intervene. The famous 'Tilt' towards Pakistan in the India-Pakistan War of 1971 was motivated by the U.S. desire to impress China that U.S. friendship was more dependable than a serious intention to prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan. President Nixon's willingness to lift the embargo on arm supplies was frustrated by the force of opposition in the U.S. Congress and American public opinion which had turned massively in favour of the independence of Bangladesh.

15. At the time I was in New Delhi. I consistently forewarned our government that, according to intelligence



reports, India would launch an all-out offensive against East Pakistan. We had even obtained the battle plans. However, our military and political authorities discounted these assessments and felt them to be overly pessimistic. I felt and stated in a conference for our envoys in Geneva in the summer of 1971 that the Indo-Soviet Treaty had the gravest implications for us. Finally, I advised the Government that we had only two games left to play, the Indian game which would lose us East Pakistan, or Mujibur Rahman's game which might possibly save the situation. The Government response was to post me at Ankara as it was felt that this difficult period in New Delhi had made me tired and over-pessimistic. Only the outbreak of hostilities while I was still in New Delhi prevented my transfer to Ankara.

16. Chou-en-Lai's admonishment to the U.S. not to forget Pakistan had little effect on the subsequent U.S. stance towards Pakistan. Nixon in his reports to the Congress downgraded South Asia as an area of security interest to the United States, and Henry Kissinger moved to rebuild its relationship with India by implicitly conceding India's claim to have emerged from the war with Pakistan as the predominant power in the region.

17. A new issue further complicated Pakistan-US relations. In his presidential election campaign, the Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter made nuclear proliferation a principal plank in his election platform. Although it was India which had exploded a nuclear device, it was Pakistan which was singled out for the concentration of massive U.S. pressure to force France to cancel its agreement with Pakistan for the sale of a fully safeguarded reprocessing plant. Even economic aid to Pakistan was cut off until the reprocessing plant agreement was cancelled by France under unrelenting U.S. pressure. This aid was again halted before long. Acting under U.S. legislation, President Carter demanded that Pakistan forego uranium enrichment, though India was exempted from the application of U.S. law by continuing the supply of enriched uranium to its U.S. supplied power reactor at Trombay. Relationship with Pakistan was downgraded as President



Carter concentrated on the build-up of the political importance of selected nations as "regional influentials" — Saudi Arabia, Israel, the Shah's Iran and India.

18. During this period of the seventies, Pakistan turned towards consolidating its time-tested ties with China, the normalization of its relations with India and improving its relations with Afghanistan which had become a Republic under President Daud after the fall of King Zahir Shah. Considerable progress was made toward finding an amicable solution of the question of recognition by Afghanistan of the Durand Line as the frontier between the two countries, only to be abruptly reversed after the communist coup led by Nur Mohammad Tarraki and Hafizullah Amin in April 1978. Ever since, Afghanistan has become one of our major two security concerns. But let me go back so that we understand this grave problem a little more clearly.

19. The objectives of any country's foreign policy are determined by certain basic conditions of an objective nature which in some cases such as geography, strategic interests and the ideological socio-economic aspirations of its people remain constant while in other cases such as the changing regional and geo-political situations may change from time to time being outside that country's control. In the case of Pakistan, these basic determinants are as follows:-

- (i) The geographical position of Pakistan, with two great powers as its neighbours, China with a common border and the USSR separated by the thin strip of the Afghan Wakhan border; two neighbours, India and Iran of great regional significance and Afghanistan. At the same time while Pakistan is physically located in the South Asian region its coastline lies on the access to the Persian Gulf and is linked to the Middle East through the Iranian plateau and through the historical, religious and cultural links which in the past brought Islam to South Asia and therefore provided the foundation for the creation of Pakistan.



- (ii) The ideological desire of the Muslims of South Asia to have their own homeland whose creation and sustenance could provide the only guarantee for them to preserve their religious and cultural way of life with the opportunity of economic development within the framework of political and constitutional development which could not have been achieved as a minority community within a historically alien structure. It is important to remember that the genius of the people who inhabit the India of today has always been hostile to any other cultural or religious influences in terms of either inter-action or even co-existence.

The arrival of Islam in South Asia in the 7th century was unique insofar that for the first time the Indian caste system was unable to either check its spread or to subsume it as it had done in the past to foreign influences from Greece, Iran and Central Asia, as well as to indigenous movements such as Buddhism. What was known as India never really existed as a unified whole and in fact only constituted the name of the overall administrative unit progressively conquered and controlled by the colonial British. Once the British were about to leave, it became increasingly clear to the Muslims that if they were to survive and prosper it would only be in the context of their own homelands on the flanks of India. This decision was spear-headed by the Muslims of Central India most of whom knew that only some of them could migrate to Pakistan. But even so they felt that the creation of Pakistan was even for them their best hope for the future. A combination of external aggression and super power hostility with political ineptitude led in 1971 to the break-up of united Pakistan but the continued independent existence of both Pakistan and Bangladesh has reaffirmed the rightness and wisdom of the decision of the Muslims to create their own homelands.

20. Determined by these basic parameters the objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy are:-



- (a) The basic objective of any country's foreign policy, the maintenance of its integrity through the furtherance of its strategic interests.
- (b) The socio-economic development of its people through an economic system which takes into account existing economic resources both internal and external, attuned to the religious, cultural aspirations of its people, its ideological mainspring.
- (c) Strict adherence to the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and respect for their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity — principles which are enshrined in the charter of the United Nations and in the charter of the organization of Islamic Conference and which constitute the very essence of the non-aligned movement. A belief that the security of Pakistan lies in unswerving adherence to these basic and peremptory principles of international conduct.

Pakistan was with China amongst the original co-sponsors of the historic Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955 which was the direct precursor of the non-aligned movement, and which institutionalised in international affairs the famous principles of peaceful co-existence. From then on Pakistan acted on all issues in solidarity with the non-aligned movement and proceeded to remove any obstacles for its formal membership of the non-aligned movement which it joined in 1979 at the Havana Conference.

- (d) Support for the struggle not only to complete the process of decolonisation but also to eradicate neo-colonialism.
- (e) To utilise the United Nations not only to achieve our national objectives but to strengthen regional and global security for the consolidation of world peace by upholding the fundamental principles of the U.N. charter, by joining other like-minded nations in fighting injustice, exploitation, repression and aggression wherever these



occur and by encouraging the North-South dialogue towards the establishment of a new and more equitable international economic order.

21. In more concrete and specific terms, irrespective of changing regional and international conditions, the principal and constant objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy, as officially and repeatedly articulated, are four-fold:-

- (i) A policy of further consolidating our friendship with China, a great power, which has traditionally extended to Pakistan its fullest support and with whom our basic interests coincide.
- (ii) Good relations with the USA and the USSR, without preconditions on the basis of non-interference and respect for our non-aligned status: also with the major economic powers of the OECD and COMECON, in particular Japan, France, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. Amongst these our links with Japan are of particular importance as it is the first Asian country to industrialise and whose technological advances and management techniques provide for us not only a model to emulate but a significant source for transfer of technology.
- (iii) The collective strengthening of the Third World through our membership of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in the context of our solidarity with the Muslim World based on bonds of faith, culture and history, along with our active membership of the non-aligned movement which links similar developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
- (iv) To safeguard our territorial integrity and political independence from being weakened by the remorseless pull of the centrifugal forces deliberately generated by India while trying to resolve the Kashmir issue. To get Afghanistan to drop its irredentist claim by recognising the validity of the present Pak-Afghan border.



22. At the same time the experiences of the 1965 war and the 1971 dismemberment have forced the recognition of certain basic empirical realities in the conduct of our foreign policy and security affairs.

- (a) China, which remains the corner-stone of our security, has the greatest interest in our continuing integrity and political independence because of our strategic position astride both Sino-Indian territorial points of friction and between a potentially hostile Soviet-Indian linkage, but lacks at this time the means to build us up sufficiently in the military and economic spheres, while it has not yet reached the strategic strength to counter-balance Soviet treaty obligations extended to India.
- (b) America potentially has the greatest ability to help us both economically and militarily, a fact which is also recognised by China which has tried to evolve a common interest for American support for Pakistan. However, in the post-Vietnam era the ability of the USA physically to support its allies on the ground has lacked sufficient credibility although the position has improved with the advent of the Reagan administration and would appear likely to improve even further in his second term. However, past and potential U.S. guarantees for Pakistan's security do not adequately take into account the threat from India.
- (c) The USSR has the greatest ability to harm Pakistan as it demonstrated in 1971.

23. Hence in 1979-80 Pakistan recognised that there had been a significant qualitative change for the worse in the regional and international situation owing to the Soviet invasion and continued presence in Afghanistan, and, therefore, the new additional objective of Pakistan's foreign policy became "A resolution of the Afghanistan crisis". I have



deliberately labelled it as a "crisis" and not merely as a "problem" or "situation" as this invasion has directly and adversely affected Pakistan's own security situation by adding to, not substituting for, the primary threat from India on our east. On our western border we are now "eyeball to eyeball" with the USSR, if I may borrow a metaphor used earlier in another diplomatic context.

24. More specifically the Soviet invasion affected Pakistan in a number of ways :—

- (1) A negative security implication arising out of a common border with a super power.
- (2) The emergence for the first time of a potential two-front simultaneous threat which Pakistan had avoided up to now even in its 1965 and 1971 conflicts with India.
- (3) The greater possibility of subversion in the border regions with Afghanistan.
- (4) The tremendous economic, social, security and political consequences of a flood of Afghan refugees. The very presence of these refugees is negating our hopes of economic development while the demographic structure is being distorted leading to social strains which could have far-reaching consequences.
- (5) The dangerous neighbouring precedent of physical intervention by a larger neighbour to influence the political structure within a smaller country.
- (6) The emergence, paradoxically, for the first time of a common strategic interest with India, to get the USSR out of Afghanistan, even if this factor was not officially acknowledged as such by India.



25. Pakistan then had four policy options open to it to deal with this new regional situation :—

- (a) Directly to confront the Soviet Union by participating in the Afghan resistance, by sending volunteers as has been done elsewhere in the past in other regional situation, and thus making more probable a Soviet-Afghan overt and covert response in turn. Nothing short of such a move would be likely to give the Afghan resistance a faint chance in purely military terms. Even so Afghanistan's contiguity to the USSR would probably rule out a replay of the US-Vietnam example.
- (b) To acquiesce in the *fait accompli* imposed by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan with all its attendant implications.
- (c) To evolve with India a common approach on getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan which would at the same time allow us to reach a *modus vivendi* with India as well as with the USSR and Afghanistan which in turn would have to recognise the present Pak-Afghan border. If such an approach were successful Pakistan would also have a chance of getting rid of the burden of the Afghan refugees. The ultimate conclusion of such a policy might have to be Pakistan's evolvment of a policy of declared or implicit neutrality in the interests of credibility and motivated solely by its supreme strategic interest of maintaining its territorial integrity.
- (d) To oppose the Soviet action for its violation of accepted international norms in the U.N. and international forums without directly confronting a super power while, at the same time, seeking to strengthen its security posture, militarily and diplomatically, without aligning itself with either side in the super-power confrontation.



26. As we all know Pakistan chose this last policy option in early 1980 in the light of its assessment of the country's geo-political circumstances. It would appear that this choice was guided by the following implicit assumptions:—

- (1) It is not possible to reach an accommodation with the USSR which will definitely take on Pakistan if it is allowed to consolidate in Afghanistan. Hence, in the international and internal spheres, the Afghan pot must be kept on the boil.
- (2) The security of Pakistan lies with a reinvigorated relationship with America which can both build us up economically and militarily, and can also help get the USSR out of Afghanistan.
- (3) Despite our policy on Afghanistan in concert with America we can negate Indian hostility and Indian solidarity with the USSR by offering it a no-war pact.
- (4) We can forestall the potential effects of concrete Soviet hostility not only through our American connection, but also by strictly rationing our sympathy for the Afghan Mujahideen whilst at the same time entering into indirect talks under the aegis of the United Nations.

27. Pakistan, therefore, took a number of concrete steps to decrease the danger from its deteriorating security situation. To begin with, it moved in the international field. The UNGA special emergency session of January 11-14, 1980 was followed by an extra-ordinary session of the foreign ministers of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference held at Islamabad from 27-29 January, 1980. This session adopted resolution I/EOS which strongly deplored the Soviet invasion and called for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. In terms of condemnation this resolution was stronger than that passed by the UNGA. It is also indicative of the somewhat



circumscribed freedom of action that Pakistan was to enjoy on this issue that this extra-ordinary session was held at the prompting of Bangladesh and that the resulting resolution also decided to suspend Afghanistan's membership of the OIC while also calling upon member states to withhold recognition to the illegal regime in Afghanistan and to sever diplomatic relations with the country until the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.

28. The next 11th regular meeting of the OIC foreign ministers, again at Islamabad from May 17-21, 1980 established a standing committee of the foreign Ministers of Iran and Pakistan and the secretary general of the OIC to explore the potential form of a comprehensive solution for this crisis. The resolution of this session also reaffirmed the four principles which have become the bedrock for a potential settlement in terms of international opinion:

- (a) Immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan;
- (b) Respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan;
- (c) Respect for the inalienable right of the Afghans to determine their own form of government; and
- (d) The creation of conditions for the return of the Afghan refugees to their country in security and honour.

29. In terms of the OIC and the UNGA it would suffice to say that despite a consistently numerically high level of support from member states for resolutions annually on Afghanistan upholding these principles, such action has not by itself contributed to a successful resolution of this problem, although it has certainly prevented international apathy and potential *de facto* acceptance of this situation, at least until now. However, the main positive result of action within the U.N. and supportive action elsewhere has been



the appointment of the U.N. secretary general's personal representative on Afghanistan and the process of negotiations and consultations that have subsequently ensued.

30. Despite other initiatives from the EEC, bilateral US-Soviet discussions, Sino-Soviet talks, the process set into motion by the appointment of the personal representative really constitutes the "only game in town" when it comes to actual institutionalised negotiations on resolving this issue. I would, therefore, briefly like to examine the course of these negotiations before assessing the present prognosis and examining whether or not the relevance of these negotiations has been completely over-shadowed by the possibility of a US-Soviet agreement linking the resolution of the Afghan issue to other areas of super power concern and possible cooperation.

31. At the 35th session of the UNGA resolution 35/37 was adopted on Afghanistan which *inter-alia* expressed the hope that the Secretary General in his search for a solution of the Afghanistan problem would continue to extend assistance, including the appointment of a special representative. At this point considerable pressure was brought to bear upon the Secretary General to appoint such a special representative. As this idea was opposed by the USSR, the then U.N. Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, announced in New Delhi on 11th of February, 1981, at the non-aligned Ministerial Conference, the appointment of Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, the Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, as his personal representative for this issue, as a compromise to the appointment of a *special representative*.

32. Mr. Perez de Cuellar visited Islamabad and Kabul in April, 1981 and again in August 1981. During both these visits the subject that was discussed was the modalities for starting a dialogue. There was no discussion of matters of substance. The 1981 UNGA session also permitted the Personal Representative to exchange views with both sides and this has been an informal feature of successive UNGA Sessions since then. Mr. Perez de Cuellar was himself elevated



to the post of U.N. Secretary General and in turn appointed Mr. Diego Cordovez as his Personal Representative on this issue.

33. In April 1982, Mr. Cordovez visited Islamabad, Kabul and for the first time Tehran. In the meantime it would be important to recall that the Kabul regime in May 1980 and in more detail in August 1981 had issued its famous policy statements on how the problem *around* Afghanistan could be tackled and solved. Predictably, the thrust of this declaration concerned itself with the difficulties *imposed* on Afghanistan by inimical *outside* forces.

34. During Mr. Cordovez's April 1982 round of visits it was agreed for the first time that the two parties would enter into direct talks with a defined agenda covering four issues:-

- (1) Withdrawal of troops (Pakistan's stipulation)
- (2) Non-interference (Afghan regime's stipulation)
- (3) International guaran- (Afghan regime's stipulation)  
tees
- (4) Return of refugees (Pakistan's stipulation)

Within this agreed framework the parties would negotiate indirectly with the aim of arriving at a comprehensive *one-piece* settlement, an interrelated package. It is on this basis that talks have continued for three years.

35. The first round of Geneva talks was held in June, 1982. It would appear that both parties arrived at a meeting of minds as to the potential substance and parameters of a comprehensive settlement which would cover all the four issues of the annotated agenda. Furthermore, the necessity of consulting the Afghan refugees was also conceded.

36. In January 1983, Mr. Cordovez again visited Kabul, Tehran and Islamabad. He presented the first outline draft of a comprehensive settlement. It was expected that after these consultations he would evolve a more specific draft for further negotiations.



37. The second round of indirect talks took place at Geneva in April 1983. After a short time the parties dispersed to continue the resumed Geneva Two talks in June of that year. When the parties dispersed it was clearly understood that on many major issues differences had been narrowed down. The outstanding issues appeared to be:-

- (1) Time frame for withdrawal of troops.
- (2) Consultations with prospective guarantors regarding the guarantees. (The USA and the USSR, and possibly China).
- (3) Modalities for consulting the refugees on the conditions for their return to Afghanistan.

38. At that point it was expected that Mr. Cordovez would next visit the region in September 1983. Apparently the Kabul side felt that there would be no progress in that round because they would not be able to give any time frame for the withdrawal of troops. Hence, Mr. Cordovez had to postpone his visit. It would appear that at this stage we may now pin-point a shift in the attitude of Kabul. Instead of going deeper into the substantive issues on which they had been, in a sense, cornered, the other side decided to raise a fresh question of whether withdrawals was a matter to be directly decided by the two parties concerned, Afghanistan and the USSR, and that this issue did not fall within the ambit of a mutually negotiated settlement between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

39. Meanwhile, joint Afghan-Soviet pressure on Pakistan for agreeing to direct talks continued. To get the talks back on the rails Pakistan evidently agreed to indirect proximity talks in the same building for the next round in August 1984 and stipulated that while Kabul was free to discuss troops withdrawal bilaterally with Moscow, it was essential that the agreement worked out was reflected in the comprehensive settlement. This led to the third round of talks at Geneva in August 1984 at which there was hardly any progress.



40. The fourth round of indirect talks was scheduled for February 1985 but because of the elections schedule in that month the Government of Pakistan asked for a postponement until April. Meanwhile, our President had the occasion in March 1985 to visit Moscow and to have a discussion with the new Soviet leader.

41. Eventually the fourth round of talks was held in Geneva from June 20-24, 1985. The negotiations coalesced into the shape of four separate agreements or "instruments" forming the integrated framework for an overall settlement.

- (a) An agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan on non-interference and non-intervention.
- (b) International guarantees by the guarantor powers.
- (c) An agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan which would deal with the return of the refugees.
- (d) The crucial fourth instrument which would put into context the connection between the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and the other agreements or building blocks comprising the overall settlement.

42. It became clear that the Kabul side would press for direct talks while down-playing the necessity of the crucial fourth instrument. This assessment was further strengthened by the inconclusive fifth round of talks that took place in Geneva on August 29 and 30 of 1985.

43. The sixth round took place from December 16-19, 1985 in Geneva and their continuation became dependent upon further negotiations between the personal representative and the respective governments.

44. In the first few weeks of March of this year, Mr. Cordovez visited Moscow and Islamabad and at the beginning, in the light of his usually optimistic self, he was rather pessimis-



tic. Despite his déclaration on the eve of the last round in Geneva that it would be a maker or breaker, there was no break-through.

45. The main stumbling block to the negotiation is a vital difference of perspective between the two sides. On the key issue of troops withdrawal the three main assumptions from Pakistan's point of view are :

- (1) A definite and fixed period.
- (2) All troops must withdraw.
- (3) The withdrawal must be unconditional. If a shot is fired from Iran subsequently it would not justify the reintroduction of Soviet troops.

46. It would appear that the implicit assumptions of the Kabul side are :—

- (a) The withdrawals would be subject to the flexible proviso that not all the troops would have to leave.
- (b) This will depend on Kabul's subjective judgement as to compliance and implementation by the other side of measures of non-interference.
- (c) Even if all the troops were withdrawn they could be brought back if the Kabul side so wanted.

47. It was basically a question of a lack of trust on both sides. Pakistan felt that the refusal of the other side to give a fixed time frame despite the willingness of Pakistan to meet all their previous conditions and to keep us in the dark on this issue was evidence of potential bad faith. On the other hand the Kabul side perhaps did not believe that Pakistan really intended to keep its side of the bargain in respect of non-interference. However, during his first concluded shuttle, Mr. Cordovez has provided Pakistan with a framework of troops withdrawal. He also claimed to have provided both



sides with his concrete proposal to settle the still outstanding question of format for further talks.

48. In tactical terms it would appear that at one time the Afghan-Russian side was not ready to tackle instrument IV unless we agree to direct talks. I am afraid, therefore, that the prognosis for a negotiated settlement, at least in terms of the present U.N. initiative, is rather uncertain. This is further borne out by Soviet actions on the ground in Afghanistan and on the regions bordering Pakistan.

49. Negotiations and events on the ground have shown that the Kabul/Soviet side would welcome a settlement based on their conditions and if that is not possible, they are prepared to carry on with a military solution to achieve eventual consolidation. Although one cannot but have all sympathy and admiration for the gallant Afghan resistance, one cannot ignore the fact that Soviet casualties are within parameters acceptable to the Soviet government and its people and that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan is only the tip of a readily available juggernaut. In the short term, the next four to five years, the central assumption of the friends of the Afghan resistance movement, that there can be only a military stalemate with neither side capable of fully prevailing over the other, will probably hold true. However, in the long run, as the President of Pakistan himself has admitted in public, time is on the side of the USSR.

50. To us in Pakistan, the question of how Afghanistan reached this sorry pass is of vital importance especially when we are urged to give moral and material support to the resistance cause. In assessing the causes of the failure of the policies followed by the rulers of Afghanistan which led to the loss of independence, the four major reasons appear to be that:

- (i) The Afghan policies had evolved from the need to keep a balance between two major neighbours. When the British withdrew from India the situation on ground changed dramatically. The Afghans



seem to have failed to adjust themselves to the new situation. In pursuit of their myopic policies they started ingratiating the very power which they should have feared the most, and paid the price.

- (ii) The Soviets were no longer deterred by the physical presence in India of the British. They reckoned that the "co-relation of forces" was in their favour to enable them to include Afghanistan into their own sphere to influence without stiff opposition from any foreign adversary.
- (iii) The Afghan rulers had done hardly anything for the amelioration of the lot of the masses, thus providing opportunities of ideological inroads to the so-called progressive forces — the number of converts was rather small but they were indeed motivated.
- (iv) Their over-emphasis on Pakhtunistan-generated forces — internal as well as external — which got out of hand. They had become victims of their own propaganda without being able to do much about it.

51. There are a number of explanations offered as to why the USSR invaded Afghanistan. Some postulate defensive motives, others expansionist aims, and their relevance lies in extrapolating the future course of events. Very often we tend to ignore the most obvious explanation because it appears too simple. I believe that the basic Soviet aim was to prop up and to save the new marxist-socialist regime from being toppled and being replaced for the first time in Afghanistan's history by an anti-Soviet regime. No doubt the opportunity offered other advantages, a potential flanking move into Iran had the U.S. used the hostage crisis to intervene physically, closer access to the Indian Ocean, and, more important, to the Gulf oil fields and oil lane choke points.



52. From 1978, with the fall of the Daud regime and the emergence of a Marxist government on our doorstep, the dilemma of how to tackle Afghanistan, given the constant need to safeguard against India, became the principal test of the vision of our foreign policy planners. Detailed discussions were held in Islamabad on this issue in January and July of 1979. On both occasions, coming fresh from Moscow, I stated verbally and in written presentations that:

- (a) We were now faced by very hard choices and that we had now to give our foremost attention to dealing with Moscow because that is where the locus of our relations with Afghanistan now lay.
- (b) We should have no doubt at all that the USSR would invade Afghanistan to safeguard the regime if it was threatened by destabilization.
- (c) For the first time we had an actual chance to achieve our objective of an Afghan recognition of our mutual border by offering in return our efforts to help curb cross-border insurgency. We could even offer joint patrols, as is the practice on the Thai-Malaysian border, provided that we had an agreed border.
- (d) Now was the time to offer India a no-war pact.
- (e) I concluded my presentation by saying that the best guarantee of our foreign policy objectives in neutralizing Indo-Soviet hostility lay in the realization of our Government's declared objective to return the country to democracy as soon as possible.

53. None of my distinguished colleagues felt that the USSR could or would invade Afghanistan. Similarly, the no-war pact concept found no acceptance at that time. Had our analysis of Soviet intentions been more realistic, our policy towards Afghanistan might have been different, and an



invasion might have been avoided. Certainly, we would have been better off with an indigenous Marxist regime in Afghanistan than with the Russians on our border. We also lost then an opportunity to achieve an Afghan recognition of our border, the Durand Line, which has constituted one of the two enduring objectives of our foreign policy since 1947 along with the principal task of coping with the ever present threat from India.

54. I would now like to turn to the second concrete step Pakistan took to improve its security position after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It negotiated into being a newly-revitalised understanding with the USA without detracting from its non-aligned status. President Carter's administration had offered an aid package which Pakistan had deemed inadequate despite the embargo on aid to Pakistan since the April 1979 embargo due to the Symington amendment connected with non-proliferation. Under the Reagan administration after intensive negotiations, in September 1981 a Pak-US agreement was worked out to provide 1625 million dollars of economic assistance and a military sales package on commercial, non-concessionary terms for 1555.2 million dollars over the next five years. The U.S. objective was to help Pakistan acquire a capability to stop further Soviet expansionism. For the next five years from 1987 we wanted a package for 6.5 billion dollars, but the U.S. will only be able to provide 4.02 billion.

55. Thirdly, Pakistan offered in 1982 a no-war pact to India which had originally itself made such an offer in 1949. Furthermore, Pakistan made a number of concessions to India not only in terms of the no-war pact in which earlier Pakistan had insisted on a provision for settlement of outstanding disputes but also on other issues such as a military balance between the two countries, the Indian desire for a South-Asian Regional Co-operation Institution, the Indian wish for a joint commission and by not provoking constant international exchanges on the Kashmir issue and the plight of the Indian Muslims. However, from 1982 up to the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Indian hostility towards



Pakistan and suspicion of its new relationship with the USA did not abate.

56. We have continued our peace offensive with the new government of Rajiv Gandhi. There has been some progress in the form of regional discussions for co-operations under the SARC umbrella, bilateral talks and understandings on trade, and an agreement in principle on not attacking each other's nuclear facilities. However, as long as we continue our present policy on Afghanistan, which is an issue of such great concern to India's main ally, the USSR, India is likely to regard our intentions as cosmetic. It is, therefore, my assessment that there will be no fundamental change in India's policy towards Pakistan. The Siachin glacier situation and frequent hostile Indian pronouncements on the festering Sikh issue would tend to bear this out.

57. At the time of partition the area that constitutes India and Pakistan was economically the most advanced between the Suez Canal and the Korean peninsula. Today we are the least developed countries in this same belt. The attainment of peace, an honourable peace, would go far to improve the socio-economic conditions of both states. Instead of no-war pacts or treaties of Friendship, which are defensive and hegemonistic respectively, a far better way to achieve a *modus vivendi* with India is to work out a common approach on Afghanistan. For once we have an issue which concerns both of us. The Indians are capitalists at heart and would not like to see an alien ideology gaining ground close to its border. Such a common approach is also likely to have the best chance of getting the USSR out of Afghanistan.

58. Having dealt with the global and regional background and with the evolution of our foreign policy, before turning to the options open to us, I would briefly like to touch upon the necessity for developing certain national characteristics. It is clear that no foreign policy and no amount of allies can make up for a lack of cohesion at home, as we found to our cost in 1971. In the greatest of the world's religions, Islam,



which provides the *raison d'être* of our creation and separate from India existence, we are assured of reaching our temporal and spiritual objective and of fulfilling our obligation if we follow the "al-sirat al-mustaqeem". The importance of cultivating the right attitude is shared by all philosophies of thought dealing with man's existence. In the Confucian ethic it is postulated that if, metaphorically, one faces in the right direction, all else will fall in place.

59. As Muslims we have to go back into the history of our civilisation to see why we flourished and why we sank into the depths of bondage. It is always tempting when we face intractable problems to call for a retreat to the simpler conditions of the past, which may or may not be completely applicable today. What we need is honest rigorous debate and analysis leading to the exercise of "ijtehad". Some of the "conditions", "characteristics", and "attitudes" that we must foster are :—

- (i) A commitment to democracy and democratic institutions giving effect to what is originally an Islamic concept, before it was taken up by the West, best expounded by the maxim of Imam Shaafi, "The voice of the people is the voice of Allah".
- (ii) The development of a spirit of true nationalism. This concept is often weak in many developing countries where feudal, tribal, and provincial links exert a stronger hold based on historical necessity. In our context it means that the predominant province, that of Punjab, must bend over backwards to placate the numerically smaller provinces. Perhaps it should be made a principle that military troops from one province should never be either stationed (apart from actual war time conditions) or more practically never used in another province.
- (iii) The spirit of tolerance in all matters. This was the



hallmark of Islamic civilisation at its height when it took the ideas of the Greeks, added to them and transmitted the results of these scientific and intellectual inquiries to the West to form the basis for the Renaissance.

- (iv) A commitment to give priority to education and especially scientific and technical skills. At the present time we spend less on education, not to talk of research, than even India or Sri Lanka. We must recognise that our survival in this modern technological age and our very relevance in an increasingly over populated resource and food-short world depends on the emphasis we give to this neglected field.
- (v) The advancement of the socio-economic conditions of our people. A people will only fight if they have a stake worth fighting for. I may remind the readers that when the British threw out the progressive Afghan King Amanullah, the USSR countered by setting up on the border of Afghanistan the new Tajik Republic to show the Afghans that the Tajiks in Central Asia could do better economically than those inside Afghanistan. This is what the USSR will now try to do in Afghanistan in relation to Pakistan.

60. I now come to the concluding section of this essay which is concerned with the options open to Pakistan at this point of time six years on after the Soviet invasion.

61. The first option is for Pakistan to continue its present policy of neither war nor peace. Such a policy has, it must be admitted, very skilfully and successfully reaped the benefits which could have been gained from the new situation, in terms of strengthening Pakistan's military potential in relation to the primary threat from India, while avoiding up to now significant covert or overt reaction from both the



Kabul/Soviet and Indian sides. Naturally this is the option that Pakistan's policy planners would like to continue in the best of all possible worlds.

62. Unfortunately, however, it is not probable that Pakistan will be left in this relatively happy position. On the one hand the USSR is consolidating in Afghanistan and it may well decide to take on and to punish Pakistan at some later date. On the other hand the U.S. administration may decide to escalate assistance to the resistance. In the short term it might be in the interests of the USA to "bleed" the USSR in Afghanistan rather than to accept or to facilitate a settlement which would lead an Afghanistan friendly to the USSR and neutral towards Pakistan and the USA. Rather the goal would appear to be to work towards an Afghanistan neutral to the USSR and friendly to wards Pakistan and the USA.

63. Afghanistan has now even more deeply entered the sphere of super-power confrontation and any eventual settlement or trade-off is likely to be concluded by these two super-powers over the heads of the regional states. We have seen reports in our press recently quoting an article that appeared in the American paper, "*The Christian Science Monitor*", to the effect that US-Soviet talks have taken place to explore the possibility of solving this crisis by "Finlandizing" Afghanistan and "Austrianising" Pakistan.

64. The second option available to Pakistan would be an even more close relationship with the USA. It is felt in many quarters in Pakistan that the present policy is a half-way house and leaves Pakistan dangerously open to ripostes from both the USSR and India. Pakistan could permit the pre-positioning of CENTCOM supply ships at Karachi. Both navies already have a mutual naval refuelling agreement. Such an arrangement would prevent the opening of any potential Soviet salient and is likely to deter any overt Indian move. Of all the neighbouring regional powers including China and apart, of course, from Kabul, the USSR and India, only Iran is likely to violently object. At the same time whether or not



such a closer relationship is consummated, the U.S. is likely to further pressurise Pakistan on the nuclear issue, to improve its relations with India and to support U.S. policy in the Middle East.

65. While such an option could be exercised and may possibly benefit Pakistan if it became another South Korea, formidable dangers would still have to be surmounted. One constant factor which would influence the success or otherwise of any policy option is the need for a genuine public consensus behind foreign and domestic policy.

66. Another important factor is the Afghan refugees. As long as there is no settlement, their presence will slow down our meagre economic development and will lead to the creation of another PLO-type situation within Pakistan. Furthermore, both the USSR and India will turn towards the option of destabilisation. India in our province of Sind and the USSR in Frontier and Baluchistan for which they have ample exiled Pakistani manpower which they have been holding back up to now hoping that we would not take this ultimate step. We have before us the example of South Vietnam where over half a million U.S. troops were not able to counter such subversion.

67. Before turning to our one remaining option, I would like briefly to digress on the necessity of developing a credible nuclear deterrent which I believe is a constant whatever option we may choose. Throughout my career I have argued for this to be done:

- (a) Only a nuclear deterrent can provide us with a stand-off capability from Indian military numerical superiority and demonstrated nuclear capability. India recognises this and that is why it is constantly harping on this issue.
- (b) We made a fundamental mistake in not going for an unsafeguarded nuclear reactor as India did. Even



now we should build our own small reactor and reprocess the fuel for weapons-grade plutonium in our small reprocessing plant. This will be a far cheaper route than uranium enrichment at Kahouta. To demonstrate our capability we do not have to explode a nuclear device, but we can donate an amount sufficient for one bomb to the I.A.E.A., under its statutes for research.

- (c) If Kahouta can provide us with weapons-grade enriched uranium again we can assure our credibility by donating material to the I.A.E.A.
- (d) As a last resort, we can terminate the Pak-Canadian agreement in six months on which I.A.E.A., safeguards on KANUP rest and use its burnt fuel for reprocessing for plutonium.
- (e) If we had the imagination we would inform the I.A.E.A., that we were going to reprocess KANUP fuel under safeguards, as India also does, with the resulting plutonium remaining under our physical control even though subject to I.A.E.A., safeguards. Even this capability would have a deterrent effect.

68. In my opinion the best possible option is for us now to follow a course of action adopted by other countries in response to their security needs, a move towards formal and permanent neutrality. The 1907 Hague convention on the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in war on Land, lays down the classical definition of neutrality under International Law as no more and no less than non-participation in a war between other states. A state which adopts neutrality assumes certain attendant rights, duties and obligations both in war and in peace which constitute the law of neutrality. Measures to apply this law constitute the policy of neutrality. The three fundamental pillars of permanent neutrality are for a state to bind itself to:—

- (1) Declare its permanent neutrality and to resolve



to maintain and defend it with all the means at its disposal.

- (2) Never to join any military alliances or to permit the establishment of military bases on its territory, and
- (3) Never to participate in a war between other states.

69. The evolution of neutrality in other countries owes much to their geographical position as areas of not primary but secondary importance across opposing two power blocs and tensions. Pakistan stands astride US-Soviet force potentials centered around the strategic gulf area and between Chinese Indian points of friction. Neither side would like us to belong to the other but would prefer our neutrality to that eventuality. As Machiavelli stated: "if you have a friend who has troubles with others, he wants you to be his ally; if somebody dislikes you or is indifferent, he wants you to remain neutral".

70. In the light of our situation we should have two aims, to avoid coming under the influence of one super-power while avoiding becoming the menacing outpost of the other super-power. The alternative may not be even Balkenization but Polandization which occurred when a country's continued inflexibility and over-reaching ambition led to its three partitions and occupations with the loss of national identity for centuries. A policy of neutrality is the only answer.

71. Only such a policy may conceivably help to preserve Pakistan's integrity and insulate this region from super power rivalry without which, realistically speaking, the Afghanistan crisis is not likely to be solved. Would it not be better for us, and indeed for the international community, to have a weak communist government in Afghanistan than eventually a strong and belligerent Soviet vassal with a permanent Soviet presence? I ask all Pakistanis to ponder on this question.



## REASSESSING OUR FOREIGN POLICY

The rise and fall of nation states has shown that neglect of either internal or external policy has invariably led first to their mutual interaction and has then determined the remaining life span of the ruling elite. There has seldom been such a clear example of a nation's foreign and domestic policy requiring simultaneous reassessment as is the case of Pakistan today.

Since the course of our internal policy has been so clear before us all, I shall mainly confine myself to our foreign policy. The two central determinants of our foreign policy since its inception have been to safeguard our territorial integrity and political independence from being weakened by the remorseless pull of the centrifugal forces generated by India, and, secondly, to get Afghanistan to drop its irredentist claim by recognizing the validity of the present Pak-Afghan border.

Every other factor in our foreign policy followed from these two basic needs coupled with the recognition that without socio-economic and industrial development there would be nothing to defend and nothing to defend it with. We turned first to America in the fifties, and then in a bold move, in the early sixties, towards China hoping to achieve a sufficient countervailing to India and to unblock the Kashmir issue.

The 1965 War and the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 forced us to recognize certain basic empirical realities:



- (i) China, which we had hoped to make the cornerstone of our security had the greatest interest in our continuing integrity and political independence because of our strategic position astride Sino-Indian territorial points of friction, but it lacked the means to build us up militarily and economically, and it did not possess the strategic strength to balance the Indo-Soviet alliance.
- (ii) America has the greatest ability to help us, but lacks, even when it has the will, for its own internal reasons influenced by the swing between Presidential and Congressional power especially in the post Vietnam era, the freedom of action to project credible guarantees of our security in relation to India.
- (iii) The USSR has the greatest ability to harm us as it had shown in 1971.

Throughout, whatever our mistakes, it was recognized that primacy had to be given to the first determinant of our foreign policy, safeguarding Pakistan from India. By the same token no one challenged the resulting central assumption that we could never face a two front war and must never place ourselves in such a position where we might be threatened by that possibility. While our relations with Afghanistan and India went through different cycles at least until 1977 we succeeded in this endeavour.

### AFTER '65 & 71'

From 1978, with the fall of the Daud regime and the emergence of a Marxist government on our doorstep, the dilemma of how to tackle Afghanistan, given the constant need to safeguard against India, became the principal test of the vision of our foreign policy planners. Detailed discussions were held in Islamabad on this issue in January and July of 1979. On both occasions, coming fresh from Moscow, I



stated verbally and in written presentations that:

- (a) We were now faced by very hard choices and that we had now to give our foremost attention to dealing with Moscow because that is where the locus of our relations with Afghanistan now lay.
- (b) We should have no doubt at all that the USSR would invade Afghanistan to safeguard the regime if it was threatened by destabilization.
- (c) For the first time we had an actual chance to achieve our objective of an Afghan recognition of our mutual border by offering in return our efforts to help curb cross border insurgency. We could even offer joint patrols, as is the practice on the Thai-Malaysian border, provided that we had an agreed border.
- (d) Now was the time to offer India a No War Pact.
- (e) I concluded my presentation by saying that the best guarantee of our foreign policy objectives in neutralizing Indo-Soviet hostility lay in the realization of our Government's declared objective to return the country to democracy as soon as possible.

None of my distinguished colleagues felt that the USSR could or would invade Afghanistan. Similarly, the No War Pact concept found no acceptance. Had our analysis of Soviet intentions been more realistic, our policy towards Afghanistan might have been different, and an invasion might have been avoided. Certainly, we would have been better off with an indigenous Marxist regime in Afghanistan than with the Russians on our border owing to our participation in the delusion that the clock of history could be turned back.

### POLICY SHIFT

With the resulting inevitable Soviet invasion of Afgha-



nistan, it is with a sense of dismay that I have observed a shift in our foreign policy which seems to be now based on the following implicit assumptions:

- (i) It is not possible to reach an accommodation with the USSR which will definitely take on Pakistan if it is allowed to consolidate in Afghanistan. Hence in the international and internal spheres, the Afghan pot must be kept on the boil.
- (ii) The security of Pakistan, lies with a reinvigorated relationship with America which can both build us up economically and militarily, and can also help get the USSR out of Afghanistan.
- (iii) Despite our policy on Afghanistan in concert with America we can negate Indian hostility and Indian solidarity with the USSR by offering it a No War Pact.
- (iv) We can forestall the potential effects of concrete Soviet hostility not only through our American connection, but also by strictly rationing our sympathy for the Afghan Mujahidin whilst at the same time entering into indirect talks under the aegis of United Nations.

The last few months have provided incontrovertible empirical evidence of the invalidity of both our internal and external policies. Each Pakistani can be but saddened at the present situation. The events in Sind have clearly demonstrated that our foremost internal need is to formulate as soon as possible a national consensus on the constitutional transfer of power. In the field of foreign affairs each of the current underlying four central assumptions of our foreign policy planners has broken down. The Geneva talks have been shot down by the Americans who were annoyed at the slight hopeful noises we made after the first round.

For a time, in India the Janata opposition used the issue of detente with Pakistan as a useful stick to beat Indira Gan-



dhi with. However, the difference between Janata and the Congress over Pakistan is a matter of forms not realities. How well I remember June, 1968, when Morarji Desai, at our very first meeting, told me that if Pakistan ever raised its head again, as it had done in 1965, he would ensure that it would be broken. It has only been self delusion on the part of our present India experts to rely on the Janata acting as a brake to Indian hostility and to believe the Janata propaganda that it wants a strong Pakistan as a buffer. India's reaction to the events in Sind is now the crux of our bilateral relations. East Punjab is but a reflection of this stance. Significantly, a few days ago the Janata leader, Chandraseker, gave Janata's concurrence to Indira Gandhi's declared public viewpoint on Sind. India may again close its ranks and reach its traditional consensus towards Pakistan.

Official statements and the media reaction from Moscow, Kabul and Delhi show that a concerted, strident international campaign has been started against Pakistan, unprecedented in its intensity and virulence. Weakened at home we are now at the moment of maximum external danger from the Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis. The Punjab is as much in danger as Sind. Apart from the urgent need to return to a democratic system in order to evolve a foreign policy consensus we must now re-examine our current assumptions and future options. Such an exercise should not be put off just because it might be seen as a sign of weakness or evidence of past mistakes. Policies which cannot adapt to changing circumstances inevitably fail.

The key to the present situation lies in Afghanistan. We were forced to turn to India with the offer of a No War Pact because our policy towards Afghanistan led to the potential activation of the Afghanistan crisis and because it felt that Pakistan was exploiting this issue for re-armament, India turned down our No War Pact offer. It was indeed unrealistic of us to expect India to acquiesce when we were in a position of weakness and when this would have left us a free hand



over Afghanistan against the interests of India's ally, the USSR.

### COMMON APPROACH

A far more practical method of reaching a *modus vivendi* with India would have been, and remains, to agree to evolve a common approach on Afghanistan. For such a common approach is probably the only hope of getting the USSR out of Afghanistan.

Unfortunately for us, India has been able since partition to balance off the two super powers far better than ourselves. Partly this is due to India's intrinsic size and importance. More important, despite the Western education and orientation of India's leaders, such as Jawharlal Nehru, these leaders were of an egalitarian persuasion, and thus were better able to comprehend and open up relations with the USSR.

No doubt the USSR believes that in fifty or one hundred years this whole region will go to the left. However, here and now the USSR does not want or need to take on the liability of an economically backward 82 million people. What the USSR wants is that Pakistan does not oppose its interests. We may recall that the years following the Tashkent agreement were evidence of our ability to have good relations with all three powers and to receive economic and military aid from all of them.

### DIRECT TALKS

We should ourselves realize that if we have not been able to free Kashmir in 36 years it would be futile to imagine that we can throw a super power out of Afghanistan. The North Vietnamese succeeded in a similar quest but they were reuniting their own country and it took them forty years of fighting, of sacrifice and of being almost bombed back into the stone age. We should offer to hold direct talks with Af-



Afghanistan and to help curb the cross border conditions provided that Afghanistan recognizes the present frontier. Without the advent of peaceful conditions in Afghanistan we will never get rid of this immense burden of three million Afghan refugees. Day by day, as the Russians consolidate in Afghanistan our bargaining position becomes weaker. Furthermore, it is quite possible that at some future date the USSR and America might reach some broad based Yalta type of global understanding in which Afghanistan might be left to the USSR as indeed has been the case for most of this century.

The drawback to any such reassessment is of course the American connection. American military credits and economic aid are solely predicated on our present Afghanistan policy. That is the price we will have to pay. The loss of military credits would not be that difficult to put up with. The last few Russian air attacks have shown the limited value of expensive F-16s. We need in any case to cut our military expenditure coat to the cloth of our own economic potential. Far too long economic and political development has been sacrificed on the altar of military security. A wiser and more pragmatic foreign policy can compensate for this military credits shortfall.

The economic aid loss will be harder to bear. However, we must evolve a more meaningful and constructive relationship with America, a great nation from whose democratic traditions, unsurpassed technological ingenuity and industrial strength we can learn more than from any other country and develop stronger economic and commercial links. Today Congressman Solarz can return from visiting Pakistan to write in the New York Times that the USA has an important interest in Pakistan's continued resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. How very reminiscent of what was said about South Vietnam and President Diem before that unhappy land became the scene of a terrible carnage! We should look forward to the day that America has an interest in the socio-economic development of our people as the best



## *Reassessing our Foreign Policy*

guarantee of our security — a Pakistan which displays no hostility to others and invites no hostility in turn.

Recently, the President of Finland aptly quoted Machiavelli's advice to small states which remains as relevant today as it was then: "Small states should ensure that their friends are nearby and that their enemies are as far away as possible"!

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*Ambassador Sajjad Hyder was given his first Embassy in 1961 in Baghdad, after which he served as Pakistan's Ambassador in Iraq, Kuwait and Egypt and North Yemen. He was Pakistan's High Commissioner in India from 1968 to 1971 during which crucial period the Government of Pakistan conferred on him the awards of S.Pk., and S.Q.A. for his services. Thereafter, he was Pakistan's Ambassador in West Germany, the Soviet Union, Mongolia, Finland and Netherlands. Ambassador Sajjad Hyder retired from the foreign service of Pakistan in 1980, and lives in Islamabad with his wife Ruhafza and daughter Rehana who themselves also write. One son is likewise a diplomat and the other a banker.*



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